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Over the past 40 years policing has gone from being an almost exclusively State 
government responsibility to one that is shared between the Commonwealth and 
State governments.  The extent of Commonwealth expansion into policing has been 
extensive and since 1979 has emerged from virtually nothing to a position of 
substance in the national structure. 
 The questions that are asked in this thesis are: to what extent, how, and why 
has policing shifted from being a strictly State and sub-national responsibility in 
Australia to being nationally-integrated and Commonwealth-driven? 
The proposition put forward is that policing changed because the 
Commonwealth government negotiated a role for itself in the problem-solving of a 
range of new and expanding crime-control challenges faced by all levels of 
government. The States and Commonwealth cooperated in solving new and 
emerging crime problems. Responsibilities have been negotiated so all levels of 
policing have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities for policing.  
By contrast with centralisation trends in a number of other policy areas, this can be 
seen as a case of ‘pragmatic’ and consensual adjustment to new conditions. From a 
federalism perspective the changes to policing were unusual because they were 
accompanied by States’ consent and support—a position at odds with usual fierce 
protection of their turf in other traditional State owned areas such as education and 
health.   
The evidence to support this proposition is based on a range of documented 
experiences and facts surrounding the activities of the Commonwealth in policing 
and the responses of the States.  The driving force used to justify Commonwealth 
activism concerned the fact of escalating crime problems since the 1970s, which if 
left unchecked would have posed serious political ramifications for governments at 
all levels.  The problems needed to be solved and the Commonwealth has taken on 
the role of problem-solver in many areas of crime, with the uncharacteristic support 
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of the States.  The new role of the Commonwealth has centralised aspects of 
policing and has resulted in policing being nationally integrated. 
The Commonwealth government has demonstrated a deliberate policy to 
expand its role in Australian policing since the 1970s.  It has achieved a position of 
prominence and equality in policing through negotiation with the States. It is now 
an equal with the other police agencies, with a clear allocation of responsibilities 
between them.  This has only occurred, however, because the task itself has 
expanded in such a way that the growing Commonwealth presence has not 






Researching and writing a thesis is generally something left to the young who aspire 
to be the best in their field or discipline, whereas I had already finished my first 
working life and was assumed to be in retirement.  However, some of us will never 
retire but just move on to another working life—one that we make on our own 
terms.  This thesis aims to lay the foundations for my new working life! 
What was my motivation to take on a doctorate?  I spent my working life in 
policing and it was clear to me by the time I retired that there was a need to expand 
the body knowledge and most importantly from a personal perspective, for me to 
contribute to this through my intellectual and academic pursuits.  Policing was 
always good to me and I believe I should provide something in return—to start 
with—my thesis.  This thesis evidences my current personal and professional 
ambitions and hopefully, will be the beginning of a body of works dedicated to the 
expansion of knowledge about Australian policing. 
The need to expand the body of policing knowledge in Australia is because it 
currently affords little academic interest and few meaningful works, if any, are 
produced each year.  Policing is its own worst enemy as the institution itself has 
never made any tangible attempt to make policing a separate and unique subject 
within the spectrum of disciplines studied in political science, public administration 
or public policy.  Policing is not just another government activity that can be 
coupled with other government activities and is a unique discipline within the scope 
of government domains.   
Since the Peel reforms in 1829 there has evolved a body of public policy and 
law associated with policing that has never been drawn together into one discipline 
in Australia.  Policing needs to be recognised as an individual discipline and have its 
own body of knowledge.  Currently, there is no single book available on Australian 
policing that describes in detail the structure and operation of policing nor provides 
any discussion on relative theories from a political or public administration 
perspective—hopefully there will be one soon. 
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Police themselves have to take ownership of the discipline and not leave it 
to a few academics who attempt to maintain interest in this under-recognised area 
of government and politics.  Police Commissioners and unions need to take the lead 
and use their power and influence to ensure policing becomes a mainstream 
discipline, and from within generate its own body of knowledge, intellectuals and 
academics.  What other areas in government have academics and experts on the 
discipline that have never been practitioners? 
Enough said about my motivation and aspirations, for these would come to 
nothing without the people behind me and those who supported and encourage 
my aspiration—I need to recognise those who have helped me along the doctoral 
journey.   
I could not have begun this thesis without the encouragement and 
assistance of Professor John Phillimore and the staff of the JCIPP.  And along the 
way my supervisor Professor Alan Fenna, like John Phillimore, provided critical 
feedback, suggestions and encouraged me to strive to produce my best work.  Not 
being a word-smith, but an old bush copper who took up tertiary education later in 
my working life, the considerate professors’, John and Alan, had to deal with my 
interesting grammar, syntax and writing style all along my journey—for that I give 
them special thanks.  
Finally, and most importantly, without the support and encouragement of 
my loving wife Rosanne, I could not have finished this thesis this or achieved all of 
the other achievements in my professional life.  Also, I cannot forget the 
contribution my family and friends have also made in supporting and encouraging 
me in my quest, particularly Lance McMahon and Leza Duplock at the JCIPP. 
I would also take this opportunity to dedicate the thesis to my parents—my 
late father Leslie and my mother Alice.  Being working class people they 
experienced the worst of the Great Depression then the Second Wold War in their 
early lives.  They emerged from those dark experiences with hope and always 
recognised the greatest gift they could offer their three children was education.  
They saw education as a way to ensure their children prospered and would have a 
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better life than they had endured.  They were right and education has ensured 
successful in all of our lives. 
Getting to the finishing line has been personally a marathon journey, so it 
will be a memorable achievement to add to my fortunate life so far.  Just as 
important, I hope it will add to the body of knowledge for policing and also 




Table of Contents 
 
CHAPTER ONE: THE NEW AGE OF AUSTRALIAN POLICING ........................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Background ........................................................................................................ 4 
1.3 The Research Question ...................................................................................... 7 
1.4 Outline and Structure ......................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER TWO: DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUSTRALIAN POLICING ..................... 15 
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 Defining Policing .............................................................................................. 15 
2.3 Australian Colonial Policing .............................................................................. 19 
2.4 The Structure of Australian Policing ................................................................. 20 
2.5 Policing and Government Bureaucracy ............................................................. 21 
2.6 The Size of Australian Policing .......................................................................... 24 
2.7 Describing Australian Policing .......................................................................... 26 
2.8 Organisation of Australian Policing ................................................................... 27 
2.8.1 Establishment ............................................................................................ 27 
2.8.2 Governance ............................................................................................... 29 
2.8.3 Jurisdiction ................................................................................................ 32 
2.9 Function ........................................................................................................... 33 
2.10 The Legislative Framework of Australian Policing ........................................... 35 
CHAPTER THREE: AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM .......................................................... 37 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 37 
3.2 Australian Federalism ....................................................................................... 38 
IX 
 
3.3 Australian Federalism: Design .......................................................................... 38 
3.3.1 Constitutional Construction ....................................................................... 39 
3.3.2 The Division of Powers .............................................................................. 40 
3.4 Australian Federalism: Evolution ...................................................................... 42 
3.4.1 Commonwealth Enumerated Powers ........................................................ 44 
3.4.2 Fiscal Power .............................................................................................. 46 
3.4.3 Concurrency (de facto) and Intergovernmental Relations .......................... 48 
3.5. Perspectives on Australian Federalism ............................................................ 49 
3.6 Drivers of Change to Federalism ....................................................................... 53 
3.7 Changing Federalism ........................................................................................ 55 
3.8 Federalism: Education and Health .................................................................... 56 
3.8.1 Education and Federalism ......................................................................... 57 
3.8.2 Health and Federalism ............................................................................... 60 
3.8.3 Education, Health and Federalism ............................................................. 63 
3.8.4 Federalism and Competing for Control ...................................................... 64 
3.9 Policing and Commonwealth Politics ................................................................ 65 
3.10 Conclusion: Federalism and Centralisation ..................................................... 66 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 68 
4.2 Australian Policing Background—1901 to 1979 ................................................ 70 
4.3 Policing Developments 1980 to 2000 ............................................................... 73 
4.4 Contemporary Policing Developments 2001 to 2010 ........................................ 76 
4.5 Social Change and Crime .................................................................................. 78 
4.5.1 Organised Crime ........................................................................................ 81 
4.5.2 Terrorism .................................................................................................. 84 
X 
 
4.6 National Political Decisions and the Start of Change ......................................... 85 
4.7 Contemporary Politics and Change ................................................................... 88 
4.7.1 Australian Police Ministers Council ............................................................ 89 
4.7.2 Common Police Services ............................................................................ 91 
4.8 Policing at 2000 ................................................................................................ 93 
4.9 Policing after 2000 ........................................................................................... 93 
4.9.1 Leaders Summit on Terrorism and Multi-Jurisdictional Crime .................... 94 
4.10 Policing at 2010 .............................................................................................. 99 
4.11 A Summary of Australian Policing—1970 to 2010 ......................................... 101 
4.12 Conclusion—Nationally Integrated Policing .................................................. 102 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE ............................................................ 104 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 104 
5.2 Drivers of Change in Policing .......................................................................... 104 
5.3 Spillovers........................................................................................................ 113 
5.3.1 Organised Crime ...................................................................................... 114 
5.3.2 Terrorism ................................................................................................ 119 
5.4 New Commonwealth Responsibilities ............................................................ 124 
5.4.1 Crimes Against Humanity ........................................................................ 124 
5.4.2 Cybercrime .............................................................................................. 125 
5.4.3 Firearms Control...................................................................................... 126 
5.4.4 International Policing .............................................................................. 128 
5.4.5 Northern Territory Intervention .............................................................. 129 
5.5 Economies of Scale......................................................................................... 130 
5.5.1 National Common Police Services............................................................ 132 
XI 
 
5.5.1.1 Criminal Intelligence ......................................................................... 134 
5.5.1.2 Forensic Science ............................................................................... 135 
5.5.1.3 Criminal Information ........................................................................ 137 
5.5.1.4 Research and Development .............................................................. 138 
5.6 Federalism and Driving Change ...................................................................... 138 
5.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 142 
CHAPTER SIX: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF POLICING ................................. 146 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 146 
6.2 Comparative Nations...................................................................................... 147 
6.3  Canada .......................................................................................................... 149 
6.3.1 Constitutional Arrangements and Policing ............................................... 151 
6.3.2 Policing in Practice .................................................................................. 153 
6.3.3 Centralisation and Canadian Policing ....................................................... 156 
6.4 Germany ........................................................................................................ 158 
6.4.1 Constitutional Arrangements and Policing ............................................... 160 
6.4.2 Policing in Practice .................................................................................. 162 
6.4.3 Centralisation and German Policing ......................................................... 165 
6.5 Switzerland .................................................................................................... 166 
6.5.1 Constitutional Arrangements and Policing ............................................... 167 
6.5.2 Policing in Practice .................................................................................. 168 
6.5.3 Centralisation and Swiss Policing ............................................................. 170 
6.6. United States of America ............................................................................... 171 
6.6.1 Constitutional Arrangements for Policing ................................................ 173 
6.6.2 Policing in Practice .................................................................................. 175 
XII 
 
6.6.3 Federal Policing ....................................................................................... 177 
6.6.4 Centralisation and US Policing ................................................................. 179 
6.7 The Australian Comparison ............................................................................ 180 
6.8 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 184 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE NEW MODEL OF AUSTRALIAN POLICING............................ 187 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 187 
7.2 The Extent of Change to Australia Policing 1970 to 2010 ................................ 188 
7.2.1 Resourcing of Commonwealth Policing .................................................... 189 
7.2.2 Expanded Policing Functions ................................................................... 191 
7.2.3 Commonwealth Leadership in Policing .................................................... 192 
7.2.4 Key Characteristics of the Extent of Change............................................. 193 
7.3 How Policing Changed .................................................................................... 193 
7.3.1 Federal Fiscal Power ................................................................................ 194 
7.3.2 Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) .......................................................... 195 
7.3.3 Legislative Mechanisms ........................................................................... 197 
7.3.4 Characterisation of How Policing Changed .............................................. 198 
7.4 Why Policing Changed .................................................................................... 199 
7.4.1 Characteristics of Change ........................................................................ 201 
7.5 Policing and Federalism .................................................................................. 203 
7.5.1 Changing Federalism—Descriptions and Explanations ............................. 204 
7.5.2 Cooperative Federalism ........................................................................... 204 
7.5.3 Australian Policing as Pragmatic Federalism ............................................ 206 
7.6 Summary ........................................................................................................ 208 
7.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 211 
XIII 
 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 215 
Appendices .......................................................................................................... 233 
Appendix A....................................................................................................... 234 
Appendix B ....................................................................................................... 275 
Appendix C ....................................................................................................... 284 
Appendix D ...................................................................................................... 287 
Appendix E ....................................................................................................... 289 






TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Australian Police Agencies Funding 1993/94–2009/10 ......................... 26 
Figure 2.2: Power of Police Minister to Direct Commissioner ................................. 30 
Figure 2.3: Summary of Police Legislative Framework in Australian 2010 ............... 36 
Figure 3.1: Total government education expenditure, by source of funds as a 
proportion of total expenditure, 2007–08 to 2009–11 (per cent) ........................... 58 
Figure 3.2: Total sources of funding for health, by source of funds as a proportion of 
total expenditure, 2007/08 to 2009/11 (per cent) .................................................. 60 
Figure 4.1: Police officers in proportion to population in Australia 1940–2010 ...... 72 
Figure 4.2: Australian Police Agencies Personnel Growth 1980/81–1999/2000 ...... 74 
Figure 4.3: Australian Police Agencies Funding Growth 1993/94–1999/2000 ......... 74 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of Growth for Population, Police Personnel and Funding, 
2000/01–2009/10 .................................................................................................. 76 
Figure 4.5: Comparison police staff increases with CPI and Population 1979/80 to 
2009/10 ................................................................................................................. 99 
Figure 4.6: Comparison of Growth of CPI, Population, Police Agency Funding 
1993/94 to 2009/10 ............................................................................................... 99 
Figure 5.1: Drivers of Change for Commonwealth Policing 1980–2010 ................. 107 
Figure 5.2: Common Police Services Agenda Items at First Four APMC Meeting (NAA 
2012f) .................................................................................................................. 133 
Figure 5.3: APMC Requests for Commonwealth Assistance at first eight Meetings 
1980–1983 (NAA 2012f) ....................................................................................... 140 
Figure 6.1: Comparison of Primary Statistics for Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland and USA ............................................................................................ 148 
XV 
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Policing Dimensions for Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland and USA ............................................................................................ 181 
Figure 7.1: Australian Police Agencies Funding ($m) 1993–94 .............................. 190 
Figure 7.2: Australian Police Agencies Expenditure ($m) 2009–10........................ 191 






CHAPTER ONE: THE NEW AGE OF AUSTRALIAN POLICING  
Those who framed the Constitution can hardly have foreseen the 
motor vehicle and the aeroplane. Arrangements for the governance 
of State which were adequate for trade, public order and the social 
requirements of the nineteenth century are not appropriate for 
dealing with serious wrongdoing which transcends State jurisdictions 
and affects the interest of the Commonwealth as a whole; terrorism, 
narcotics, and organised crime being perhaps the three most obvious 
examples (Mark 1978, 2). 
1.1 Introduction 
Like most other areas of government business in Australia, policing has changed 
greatly since Federation—and especially since the 1970s.  This has generally been 
attributed to a range of factors, including rapid economic, social and political 
change along with external influences such as globalisation.  These factors 
underpinned changes in government activities and the way governments went 
about their business, which eventually affected policing and the way policing 
responsibilities were shared in the federation.  
There were a number of critical events that had an important impact on the 
way policing is now organised in Australia.  These began in 1979 when the 
Commonwealth government legislated to establish a new police agency and 
endowed it with significant powers and resources.  This initiative created what soon 
became one of the larger police forces in the country, with sole responsibility for 
many critical areas of policing.  It changed both the scope and range of functions 
that constituted Commonwealth policing and also changed the balance of power 
between the Commonwealth and the State governments in this area.  
Commonwealth policing grew from virtually nothing in 1979 to a point where in 
2010, 15 per cent of all police funding was expended in the operation of the 
Commonwealth’s main agency, the Australian Federal Police (AFP).   
By 2010, the business and responsibilities for policing no longer resembled 
the original structure that had lasted for over 80 years.  A radical change had 
occurred with the Commonwealth assuming a major role and become a leader in 
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many aspects in an area that traditionally and constitutionally belonged with State 
governments.  In the normal theatre of Commonwealth-State relations such 
changes would be highly publicised and certainly resisted by the States.  What 
made these developments in policing so distinctive was the way they occurred in 
the shadows, with little public or media scrutiny or any publicised conflict between 
governments.  It appears this change was uncontroversial and uncontested by the 
States. 
This exploration of the development of policing provides an account of a 
process in Australian federalism that has been atypical when compared with the 
experience of other areas of service delivery.  Centralisation has been an ongoing 
trend in policing (like many other areas of service delivery) along with national 
integration, but how this has been achieved appears to differ from other areas of 
State government service delivery like education and health.   
It should be understood that centralisation or centralised in the context of 
Australian policing primarily relates to the fact each jurisdiction has only one police 
agency, unlike most other nations where policing is highly decentralised. The 
centralisation of policing, in the context of Australian federalism, indicates a trend 
whereby the Commonwealth government increasingly takes additional 
responsibility and as a consequence expands its policing agencies.  This has been 
caused by the Commonwealth passing new criminal laws and being therefore 
responsible for enforcement e.g. cybercrime or crimes against humanity.  
Additionally, some areas of criminal law that were the responsibility of State and 
Territory police agencies, e.g. terrorism and organised crime, have been handed 
over to the Commonwealth by constitutional means via a referral of powers1.   
The most notable element since 1980 concerning centralisation and the 
changed structure of policing in Australia is the position of the States in supporting 
the expansion of federal policing.  Prima facie, this explains why this significant 
change took place inconspicuously.  Why the States took this unusual approach to 
                                                        




Commonwealth activism is widely discussed in this thesis and a key component in 
answering the research question.  Prima facie, the States’ position appears to be a 
straightforward case of the States not having the resources or the political will to 
deal with the new and increasingly complex problems associated with crime in 
Australia.  Cooperating and agreeing to Commonwealth expansion in policing by the 
States was a pragmatic and calculated policy for their own benefit.   It should also 
be noted that in a number of areas where the scope of Commonwealth policing has 
expanded, this was facilitated by enumerated powers existing in these areas. 
In the context of Australian federalism, policing provides a new and 
interesting case study characterised by the States cooperating and supporting 
changes that increased the Commonwealth’s powers and the scope of its policing 
functions.  This approach is not normal in the Australian federal political 
environment, as in areas of traditional State responsibility, Commonwealth 
intrusions are commonly fought off vigorously.  Importantly, the case of policing in 
the federal political structure may also show the potential effectiveness of 
Australian federalism because with all the new problems and threats, the system 
reacted in the best possible way.  Does this give rise to a new view on federalism, 
outside current theories that explain change in the operation of the federation? 
What this thesis is about then, as gleaned from this introduction, centres on 
policing in Australia and how it has developed and changed since 1970.  The central 
theme is policing viewed through the prism of Australian federalism, which is the 
political architecture within which all government activity operates.  The 
fundamental research questions centre on the relationship between the national 
and sub-national levels of government and aim to demonstrate that policing 
changed because in this instance, a new approach to change the respective 
Commonwealth-State responsibilities and structure was undertaken by the federal 
partners.  The result was increased centralisation accompanied by the successful 





At Federation policing was an exclusive responsibility of the States and at the time 
there was no evidence to suggest the Commonwealth government contemplated 
future involvement, or that the States envisaged the Commonwealth would take on 
policing responsibilities in the future.  The responsibility for policing in a future 
nation was not discussed at the federation conferences, conventions or a topic in 
federation referendums, prior to Federation.  At Federation policing remained 
unequivocally a State government responsibility.  It should be noted that the 
related areas of criminal law and courts, were not included in the enumerated 
powers of the Commonwealth and by default remained the responsibility of the 
States.   
The Commonwealth Parliament’s powers, as enumerated in section 51 of 
the Constitution, included no reference to policing and the responsibility was left as 
an exclusive power of the States, pursuant to section 107.  The Commonwealth 
accepted this position in respect to policing, apart from some small and short lived 
ventures into policing in 1917, 1920 and 1925.  This was the fundamental position 
of the Commonwealth government until 1957 when it made the first serious 
attempt to enter into policing by legislating to establish the (second2) 
Commonwealth Police Force, as a Commonwealth police agency.3 
In 1917, 1920 and 1925 Commonwealth police agencies had been 
established but the government did not want the respective agencies to interfere 
with the general policing role undertaken by State government agencies.  
Specifically, in the 1925 debates concerning the formation of the Peace Officers 
Guard (Bruce 1925, 1875) and in 1957 regarding the Commonwealth Police Force 
(Spooner 1957, 592–593) the main Government speakers stated there was no 
intention to supplant existing policing responsibilities of State government police.   
                                                        
2 The first Commonwealth Police Force was administratively established in 1917 and disbanded in 
1919. 
3
 Commonwealth Police Act 1957 (Cth) 
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These agencies had been formed to cater for specific Commonwealth needs 
at the time, notably, the protection of Commonwealth politicians and public 
servants; physical security of Commonwealth property and protected persons, 
wartime security and intelligence; and in one case the enforcement of 
Commonwealth laws to break the 1925 waterfront strike.   
The Commonwealth Police Force was established in 1959 and proved to be 
unsuccessful in the role provided under its legislation for a number of reasons.  
Internal government reviews into its effectiveness in the early 1970s by Milte 
(1973), Bennett (NAA 2012c) and Mark (1978) established that the agency was 
under-resourced and had insufficient powers to service the policing needs of the 
national government effectively.   
However, this was not to be the case for much longer.  In the early 1970s 
there was a change in the approach towards policing by successive Labor (NAA 
2013a and b) then Liberal governments (NAA 2012a, b and c).4  Both sides of 
politics unreservedly committed to a policy of expanding the Commonwealth’s 
policing role with the aim of becoming self-sufficient in this regard.   This approach 
culminated in the establishment of a new Commonwealth government police force 
in 1979, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which was sufficiently resourced and 
empowered and encouraged to become a leading police agency.  It is noteworthy 
that since the formation of the AFP, Commonwealth policing has enjoyed bipartisan 
support.  From a public policy perspective, this bipartisan support has been critical, 
as it provided policing with continuity in direction even as governments have come 
and gone. 
The development of a fully functional Commonwealth agency changed 
policing in terms of the Commonwealth-State arrangements and resulted in policing 
shifting from a sub-national area of government responsibility to one operated 
concurrently by both tiers of government.  Policing became national in character 
due to this Commonwealth policy shift.  
                                                        
4
 A number of the National Archives documents are located at Appendix F, to assist the reader. 
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This shift was driven by the Commonwealth’s policy to provide policing 
services in its own right and on its own terms as expressed in the Second Reading 
speech concerning legislation to establish the AFP, in which one of the aims of the 
new police agency was to “more effectively and economically co-ordinate police 
resources in the Commonwealth area” (McLeay 1979, 292).  This change to policing 
began in earnest after 1979 as the scope and range of Commonwealth policing 
functions and tasks expanded and changed considerably.  It also resulted in the 
Commonwealth’s police agency operating as an equal with the other police 
agencies across the nation.  The evidence of this equality is discussed in detail in the 
later chapters and is simply illustrated at this point by the fact the first national 
police ministerial council (still operating today) was formed in 1980 with the AFP 
having equal standing with the other police jurisdictions (NAA 2012f). 
This expansion reached the point in the new millennium where the 
Commonwealth now takes responsibility for a number of policing areas that 
previously belonged to the States, along with responsibility for many new areas of 
policing.  The expanded scope of Commonwealth policing is evidenced by the 
parallel expansion of Commonwealth criminal laws and the obvious need to enforce 
those laws.  Prime examples of this have been additional offences created in the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and in 1995 the Commonwealth legislated its own criminal 
code, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).  There has been a significant amount of 
new criminal offences and powers created for which Commonwealth policing has 
the sole responsibility for enforcement, and which were hitherto non-existent or 
previously considered a State responsibility.  Examples of this include legislation 
covering cybercrime; crimes against humanity; drug trafficking; organised crime; 
and terrorism.  
Of particular significance is the fact that this expansion of policing 
responsibilities has not been driven unilaterally by Commonwealth governments 
and in some recent aspects has been at the invitation of the State governments.  In 
the case of two crucial areas of criminal activity—terrorism and organised crime—a 
seldom used constitutional mechanism was employed by the States in 2002 and 
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2003 respectively, to refer responsibility to the Commonwealth government under 
section 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution.  This referral of State criminal law has been 
described as “a Commonwealth phenomenon” (Williams 2011, 1152), which 
recognised the use of this mechanism to be unusual in the normal course of 
Commonwealth-State relations and how change was usually facilitated between the 
federal partners. 
1.3 The Research Question 
Responsibility for policing in Australia has changed substantially since 1901, with 
current arrangements clearly very different from those intended by the 
Constitution.  In this respect, policing is not unlike a number of other policy areas 
where equivalent or greater amounts of centralisation have taken place.  However, 
it would seem that an unusually large amount of this centralisation has taken place 
in policing with the active support or consent of the State governments—evidenced 
by the States voluntarily handing over specific criminal law powers to the 
Commonwealth.   Such an unusual approach by the States resulted in the scope of 
Commonwealth policing expanding at the expense of State policing.  The States’ 
behaviour was certainly different to what would be expected when such matters 
are negotiated between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Exploring the relationship between policing and federalism provides the 
central theme for the research and requires that a range of matters relating to 
Commonwealth-State relations are explored in order to better understand the 
journey of Australian policing from 1970 to the present.  This exploration leads to 
the main research question, which asks: 
To what extent, how, and why has policing shifted from being a strictly 
State or sub-national matter in Australia to being nationally-integrated 
and Commonwealth-driven? 
Underpinning the fundamental question is a set of propositions about what 
is known about developments in contemporary policing, within the political setting 
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of Australian federalism.  These propositions are the starting point to investigate 
and analyse the recent journey of Australian policing.  There are five propositions: 
 Since 1979 policing has changed from a State responsibility to one shared 
with the Commonwealth. 
 The powers, resources and responsibilities of Commonwealth policing have 
increased disproportionally in comparison with State police. 
 While increased centralisation is often characterised by conflict and 
resistance by the States, played out publicly and in the political arena, 
Commonwealth expansion into policing has been far more consensual. 
 Since 1979, Commonwealth expansion into policing has and continues to 
enjoy bipartisan political support by the main federal political parties. 
 Centralisation of policing is a trend that other western democratic 
federations have also experienced, regardless of decentralised policing 
structures and entrenched anti-centralisation political ideologies. 
Apart from the research question and the underlying propositions that 
centre on the change to policing, the thesis aims to investigate the role of 
federalism in the change to policing in Australia.  Prima facie, it appears there is no 
single federalism description or theory to exactly explain or account for the journey 
of policing, although some aspects of the foremost descriptions like 
cooperative/executive federalism or opportunistic/coercive federalism, may well 
provide a partial explanation of how policing changed.  The other aspect of 
federalism is to consider the contemporary drivers of change associated with 
policing and other like areas of government activity.  Why policing changed is 
explained as being driven by the need for governments to solve problems. In 
particular, the rapid increase in crime and several terrorism and organised crime 
focusing events, have been pivotal.   
The proposition adopted here is that federalism has influenced policing and 
that it has been characterised by the States cooperating with the Commonwealth to 
overcome pressing problems (in this case dominated by increases in crime on a 
national and international basis).  This approach has led to increased centralisation 
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in some circumstances and ensured the operation of police services in a nationally 
integrated manner, while retaining States’ responsibility for the majority of 
traditional policing functions.  The police case study will show a different view of 
federalism than would be expected in the normal course of Commonwealth-State 
relations. 
1.4 Outline and Structure 
The thesis has seven chapters and six appendices.  This first chapter introduces the 
topic of the thesis and outlines the theme and primary research question.  The next 
chapter provides the thesis foundation by defining the central theme of policing, 
which is essential for further analysis and discussion in the later chapters.  This is 
followed by identifying the key characteristics of Australian policing by defining the 
three key organisational characteristics—Establishment, Governance and 
Jurisdiction, and then describing the Functions the respective police agencies 
undertake.  Having a clear picture of policing is critical in order to understand the 
recent developments and changes it experienced within the context of the 
operation of government and the Australian federation.   
Chapter Three concerns federalism.  The chapter begins by exploring 
federalism in a general sense and then considers the mechanisms and drivers of 
change affecting Australian federalism in respect to the division and balance of 
power between the Commonwealth and the States.  This is followed by discussion 
concerning the nature and characteristics of Australian federalism by considering a 
range of descriptions and views on how federalism operates and explanations of 
what drives change.  This section incorporates contemporary literature concerning 
Australian federalism.  The chapter concludes by considering two comparative 
areas of government service responsibility: Education and Health.  Constitutionally, 
these were both areas of State government responsibility with a history similar to 
policing.  At Federation they were a sole State responsibility, but since have become 
a concurrent area of responsibility.  Consideration of the experience of these two 
prominent and largest areas of service delivery in Australia, in the context of 
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federalism, is enlightening because it demonstrates how centralisation has been 
achieved by the Commonwealth in these areas.  Importantly, it paves the way for 
the following chapters to analyse the development of policing in the context of 
federalism and to assess whether the journey of policing since 1970 has been 
undertaken differently.   
Chapter Four identifies the changes to the structure of policing between 
1970 and 2010 and considers the milestones and events critical to that 
transformation.  A historical narrative of policing from Federation to 1970 provides 
clear evidence that the policing model has substantially changed from the original 
State government-owned and operated model.  The chapter then considers the 
most significant change, identified as the expansion of Commonwealth policing in 
terms of its scope and range of functions after 1979.  The policy for expansion had 
its genesis in the Whitlam Labor government (1972–1975) and built up momentum 
under the Fraser coalition government and culminated with the 1979 passing of 
legislation to establish the AFP.   
The establishment of the AFP is identified to be the critical event for 
policing, for it signalled the Commonwealth was taking a major role in policing as an 
equal with the States and Territories.  From then on, significant growth of 
Commonwealth policing has occurred to the extent that by 2010 it was an essential 
and crucial component in the structure and operation of Australian policing—in 
effect, policing became nationally integrated.  This leads to the next chapter that 
examines the new policing paradigm in Australia and its drivers. 
Chapter Five draws on the two previous chapters and identifies the drivers 
of change to Commonwealth policing and their relationship to constitutional and 
sub-constitutional processes and institutions in the context of Commonwealth-
State relations.  The drivers of change are clearly identified as Commonwealth 
centric and surprisingly have enjoyed unexpected support from the States.  An 
important conclusion here is that the means of change differ from what would be 
expected in the normal course of undertaking functional changes by government 
agencies in the federal political environment. This array of changes also 
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demonstrates the effectiveness of Australian federalism in responding to the 
significant changes in crime and its consequences.    
The findings of the analysis concerning drivers also provides a major benefit 
for the body of police knowledge in Australia as currently significant gaps exist in 
this area.  Importantly, the chapter sets the scene for the conclusion in identifying 
how and why policing changed and the ramifications for Australian federalism. 
Before reaching the concluding chapter, the penultimate chapter (Chapter 
Six) undertakes an international comparison of Australian policing with four other 
like federal nations.  The point of this comparison is to ascertain if there is evidence 
to support the findings of the analysis of the Australian experience.   The chapter 
compares policing in the four nations in terms of their experiences over the past 40 
years, and pays particular attention to the extent of centralisation and the 
expansion of federal policing responsibilities and functions.  The chapter’s 
methodology involves an analysis of policing in respect to the national constitution 
and practical application of policing—the difference between theory and practice—
in order to identify the model of policing and the changes that have occurred in 
recent times.  The nations of Canada, Germany, Switzerland and USA are 
considered as they have federal political systems and policing operates within a 
similar western democratic political and legal framework.   
The police institutions of the four nations, like Australia, are formally linked 
by an international legal framework derived from international treaties that 
facilitates policing between the nations.  This linkage between national police 
agencies is a product of globalisation and is critical to facilitate effective policing 
operations across the five nations.  Importantly, this chapter also demonstrates the 
effectiveness of Australian federalism in coping with the changed environment for 
policing. 
The point of Chapter Six is to explore the experience of policing in these 
nations in order to ascertain if their experiences provide evidence supporting the 
findings concerning Australian policing and the role which the operation of the type 
of federalism in a nation has played in change.   In particular, was centralisation a 
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trend identified by the comparison and what role did the federal political system 
play in the development and change in policing? 
The final chapter draws together the discussion and key findings from the 
preceding chapters to address the primary research questions.  The chapter is 
structured around the theme of federalism and aims to answer the key question 
regarding the extent, how and why Australian policing changed over the 40-year 
period.  The key findings elicited from the previous chapters concerning the altered 
policing model are considered against the constitutional responsibilities and 
arrangements between the Commonwealth and the States.  Fundamentally, the 
changes in policing are considered through the prism of federalism and the implicit 
political relationships within the framework of government in Australia. 
In order to understand the change to the policing model and the resulting 
paradigm shift, contemporary federalism descriptions and explanations are 
considered and matched against the known policing experience and developments 
identified in the previous chapters.  Ostensibly, it would be expected that the 
changes to policing would be consistent with the changes in federalism and the 
centripetal trend being driven by the Commonwealth due to a range of 
conventional explanations.  The analysis undertaken using these descriptions 
favoured the cooperative federalism explanation to describe how the change was 
facilitated.  In the case of explaining the drivers of change to policing—why it 
occurred—pragmatic federalism offered a viable explanation.  
Additional factors also appear to have been at work in the case of policing 
that centre on two critical events.  Firstly, the 1979 decision by the Commonwealth 
Parliament to establish the AFP, which enjoyed the support of the main political 
parties, was the beginning of effective federal policing.  Secondly, the 2002 Leaders 
Summit resulted in the States taking the unusual step of handing over to the 
Commonwealth responsibility for important areas of criminal law.  This later 
occurrence again evidenced the atypical experience of policing in comparison to 
like areas of government service delivery and offers something uncommon for 
federalism scholars to ponder.   
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This discussion on policing and federalism also establishes that the 
Australian system of federalism has been effective in the case of policing.  It has 
allowed policing to respond to the challenges faced by all governments after the 
1970s.  Conventional views on how federalism operates to change policy areas, as 
discussed previously, have relevance but are not conclusive in the case of policing.  
Policing cannot be aligned with one specific view but can be matched to some but 
not all of the characteristics of the competing explanations of changing federalism. 
This leads to the conclusion, which answers the primary research question 
and puts forward the opinion that policing has demonstrated a different federalism 
experience, characterised by the paradigm shift in policing.  Importantly as a 
corollary for the thesis, the research provides policing with new data and 
information to fill many of the existing gaps in the body of knowledge.   






This provides a number of statistical analyses in respect to 
policing using specific data on personnel and funding in respect 
to the eight Australian police agencies.  In addition a number of 
comparative statistical analyses are provided, which use 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Population data as it relates to 
the two policing data sets.  A range of tables and charts in the 




This concerns Colonial Policing in Australia and explains the 
background to post-Federation policing.  This is important as the 
highly centralised nature of Australian policing is the direct 







This details the current statutory provisions relating to the 
functions of Australian police agencies. 
D 
Commonwealth 
This is a summarised history of Commonwealth criminal law 
reform from 1980 to 2010 and is derived from a Parliamentary 
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Criminal Law  Library electronic document concerning the “History of criminal 







This provides copies of three documents referred to in a number 
of chapters.  They are: 
1. Communique from Leaders Forum 4 April 2002 
2. Agreement 5 April 2002 





These NAA documents are key documents and referred to in 
most chapters and are provided for ease of reference as access 





CHAPTER TWO: DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUSTRALIAN POLICING 
2.1 Introduction 
There are two aspects to this chapter: defining the central theme of policing and 
identifying and describing the Australian policing structure and the model that 
currently exists.  
Policing is a generic term and its precise definition varies depending on the 
discipline being considered—sociology, political science or public administration.  
As well, it also varies in respect to the relationship with the political system, as in 
many nations policing is provided at a local government level and even to a large 
extent by private providers.  The organisational and functional characteristics of 
policing agencies are also critical to the definition.  Thus, the aim of the chapter is 
to consider all of these contextual matters and establish a working definition to be 
used and applied consistently throughout the chapters.  Following on from setting a 
definition is the identification of the contemporary structure and model of 
Australian policing.   
2.2 Defining Policing 
The definition of policing differs between nations and their polities for a variety of 
reasons, principally because of the terminology.  For example what is termed 
policing is also termed internal security; justice and public order; law enforcement; 
and public safety—both in Australia and other western nations.   
Relevant to the definition as it applies to Australia, is the assumption that 
the business of policing is a government responsibility.  This is derived from the fact 
that all Australian police agencies have been established by legislation and this 
licenses them as a virtual monopoly to undertake the business of policing in their 
jurisdiction.   
To begin, consider the definition in the English Dictionary of Policing 
(Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 232) that in broad terms asserts, that policing “will 
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always be what police officers do”.  Fleming and Wakefield consider policing to 
have changed substantially over the past 20 years because of a range of social 
drivers: “Globalization, neo-liberal politics, increasing prosperity, geographical and 
social mobility, the breakdown of the nuclear family, the decline of the welfare 
State, terrorism and technology” (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 233) have changed 
society and accordingly what police do—the business of policing.   
Policing has also changed in respect to providers of policing and is defined in 
terms of public and private policing and this pluralism influences the general 
definition in many nations.  However, public policing is the primary focus in this 
thesis although private policing is gaining impetus in Australia, as noted by Sarre: 
“We live in an era of public and private regulatory flux. The upshot of this is a 
society in which policing is now conducted not just by those people commonly 
referred to as ‘the police’ but by a host of private and non-government operatives 
who use a range of empowerment tools and resources at their disposal, not just the 
criminal law. This trend is set to continue.” (2002, 10)  Clearly, public policing has to 
work with private policing but in the context of this thesis public policing is the 
focus.  
From a sociological point of view public policing is defined somewhat 
differently, with a greater emphasis on the power relationship between citizens, 
communities and government.  A study investigating and comparing Anglo-
American policing (Manning 2005) defined a police agency to be: “a legitimate, 
bureaucratically articulated organization that holds out fatal force in control of 
political order” (Manning 2005, 41–42).  Crawford, a criminologist, considered 
policing to broadly involve a set of activities and processes” (Crawford 2004, 137) 
that can be undertaken by public and private agencies or individual citizens or 
groups of citizens.  The agencies established provide staff and resources to “police 
the broad mandate of crime control and order maintenance” (Crawford 2004, 137).  
This approach considers there are two aspects to the definition of policing: 
organisation and function, which set the parameters for what is policing. 
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Organisation concerning policing is “the relationship between particular 
policing organisations and the State or market” (Jones and Newburn 1998, 202–
203).  In the context of Australia this important relationship is between the eight 
Australian police agencies and the respective governments.   
Organisationally, from an Australian perspective the relationship between 
the respective police agencies is not always linear and clear-cut as there is a 
blurring of functions between jurisdictions because Australia is a federation and 
overlap of laws and jurisdiction is common place.  For instance this is exemplified by 
criminal law which, unlike many other nations, does not rest with the national 
government.  Thus, across Australia there are nine separate criminal law 
jurisdictions with the Commonwealth criminal law operating concurrently with 
State and Territory laws.  One noted lawyer and Chair of the NSW Law Reform 
Commission, James Wood QC, commented that the criminal law in Australia should 
be unified into one set of laws.  In an interview for the Sydney Morning Herald he 
rationalised “there’s a huge case for there to be unification of the criminal code” 
(Dick 2007, 3) as “each of the states, territories and the Commonwealth has 
different criminal law.  The difference can be significant, with penalties varying 
between states.” (Dick).  This creates potential for duplication and conflicts for 
policing where offences go beyond a single jurisdiction.   
One view in support of uniform laws that demonstrated its benefit was 
provided by the Commonwealth Attorney-General in 1995: “Our law enforcement 
agencies operate under a confusing array of State, Territory and Federal laws.  In a 
number of areas, uniform national laws would be of special benefit to Australia's 
police and courts. Uniform laws will provide the justice system with certainty and 
stability. They will also enable us to develop effective strategies to combat violence 
generally and especially against women and children.  For example, the 
Commonwealth has secured State and Territory agreements to make domestic 
violence orders portable in order to remove conflict between domestic violence 
and family law orders” (Attorney-General 1995, 1). 
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The scope of policing considered in this thesis from an organisational 
perspective focuses on public policing, which involves a statutory authority 
operating within a legal framework with the agency accountable to government.  
The functions undertaken by police are limited to those authorised by law: “The 
distinguishing feature of public police is that they exercise authority (in the name of 
the state) over the civil population” (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 232). 
Function is also identified from predominantly formal government sources: 
legislation, annual reports and budget papers.  Consideration of these sources 
indicate that the range of police functions includes the investigation and prevention 
of crime (including terrorist offences classified as crimes) and road traffic offences; 
maintenance of public order and safety; and the provision of support services for 
police operational activity.  This range of functions provides a broad definition of 
what policing currently involves and it must be understood this will probably 
change from time to time due to the dynamics of the environment in which policing 
(and most other government services) operates.   
The changing environment for police means that many of the tasks police 
undertook 40 years ago were different from those today, although many 
fundamental tasks remain.  What constitutes policing is best viewed in general 
terms of scope and range of activity and specifically, in the context of Australian 
federalism, provides a scope that falls within the government framework and a 
range of functions authorised by law and funded by the public purse.  Thus, policing 
for the purposes of the thesis is defined as:  
A government-operated service comprising functions undertaken 
by police officers and support staff involving the prevention and 
investigation of crime (including terrorist offences classified as 
crimes); maintenance of public order; road safety and traffic 
enforcement; and provision of related support services.  The 
provision of support services for police activity is a significant part 
of the whole.  Support services include: criminal intelligence; 
information management and exchange; investigation support 
using all disciplines of forensic science; research and development; 




As noted in Chapter One, a comparative analysis of the Australian policing 
model and the related experience over the past forty years is undertaken with the 
federal nations of Canada, Germany, Switzerland and USA in Chapter Six.  The 
comparison uses this definition of policing, although an exact comparison of what 
constitutes policing in these nations is not always possible. 
Now the definition of policing has been provided, what logically follows is to 
describe the organisation and function of Australian policing, but before getting to 
this point, it is worthwhile to briefly consider colonial policing.  The development of 
policing from settlement in 1788 to Federation provided the foundation for policing 
at nationhood and many characteristics of colonial policing continue to the present.  
For example, by 1898 all the colonies had centralised policing—each had only one 
government-operated agency responsible for policing across the colony (later 
State). 
2.3 Australian Colonial Policing  
At Federation each of the colonies operated a highly centralised police structure 
and had only one police agency.  This aspect of the respective model of policing was 
brought to each State and has continued on to the present.  A comprehensive 
history of the development of colonial policing is provided in Appendix B.5  
Constitutionally, all of the colonial police forces that seamlessly became State 
forces at Federation.  They all had a statutory basis and governance was on the face 
of it vested in the Crown and the jurisdiction of the police was restricted to the 
State border.  The functions of the forces mirrored each other and were focused on 
maintaining basic law and order.  The most important features inherited from 
colonial policing that continued on to the present were centralisation and 
ownership of policing by government.  This colonial legacy has shaped the major 
                                                        
5
 The discussion and description of colonial policing used in this section of the chapter and the 
Appendix is drawn from a range of works listed in the Bibliography and includes books and book 
chapters by: Bryett, Harrison and Shaw (1994); Finnane (1994); Milte and Weber (1977); and Sturma 
(1987).  Also used was the range of colonial legislation and parliamentary debates at the time 
relating to Figure 1 of Appendix B. 
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characteristics of Australian policing and in many aspects has been passed into the 
organisational DNA of the eight agencies.   
2.4 The Structure of Australian Policing6  
The Australian policing structure has changed since Federation with the most 
significant changes occurring after the late 1970s.  One of the most important 
changes occurred in 1979 with the Commonwealth establishing the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP).  This was a new police agency that was provided with 
functions and powers to match its State and Territory counterparts.  Drawing from 
the Mark report, related cabinet papers and Australian Federal Police Bill 1979 (Cth) 
explanatory memorandum and debates (Mark 1978, NAA 2012a; Explanatory 
Memorandum 1979), it is considered the primary goal of the AFP, was for the first 
time to provide the Commonwealth government with its own police agency that 
would satisfy the whole of its law enforcement requirements along with the every-
day policing services for the Australia Capital Territory and other territories 
(excluding the Northern Territory).  Once this goal was achieved it would result in 
the Commonwealth government no longer relying on State and Territory police 
agencies to service its policing needs.  The Second Reading speech supported this 
proposition when the Minister referred to the functions of the AFP:  “In the main 
they provide for the functions associated with the policing of the ACT, the 
investigation of offences against the Commonwealth and the protection and 
                                                        
6
 One of the challenges with describing the structure of Australian policing is the dearth of literature 
on the topic.  Policing has over the past 40 years generated scant academic interest and few works 
can be located concerning it in comparison with other areas of government.  The available works are 
generally not within the scope of political science, public policy or the specific topic of federalism 
and where they exist are concerned with aspects of public administration, criminology and 
management.  Regardless of this shortfall there are still some works, many aged, sourced for 
information to describe Australian policing.  These include articles, book chapters and books 
included in the Bibliography.  Important sources for the chapter have been: A History of the 
Australian Federal Police; a range of Internet documents from the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department; Baker’s The reinvention of Australian Federal Policing in the pursuit of 
national security; Finnane’s Police and government: histories of policing in Australia; Manison’s 
Managing Australia’s Police; two books by Kerry Milte; Pitman’s An independent model for police 
executive relationships; and Wettenhall’s Government and the Police.  Accompanying these sources 
have been additional sources found in the Bibliography that include a range of parliamentary 




safeguarding of the Commonwealth’s interest” (McLeay 1979, 2093).  This initiative 
was the culmination of a major policy shift by successive Commonwealth 
governments, first publicly advocated in Gough Whitlam’s electioneering speeches 
of 1972 (Whitlam 1985) and later developed further in 1976 by the Liberal 
government of Malcolm Fraser (NAA 2012b and c).  Subsequently, in 1979 
Commonwealth policing became part of the machinery of the federal government. 
Since that change there has been an exponential increase in funding for 
Commonwealth policing and also in the scope and range of its police functions and 
powers.  From a public policy perspective this has led to a significant change for the 
policy domain as for the first seventy-eight years of Federation, policing policy and 
the responsibility for service delivery belonged to the State governments.  After the 
AFP was established, the Commonwealth government undertook another initiative 
and invited the State and Territory governments to establish and participate in a 
national policy making forum, solely focused on policing (Coad 1994; Baker 2004; 
and NAA 2012e).  The Australian Police Ministers’ Council (APMC) resulted and 
continues to operate—although under a different title, the Standing Council on 
Police and Emergency Management (SCPEM).  Importantly, from a political and 
public policy perspective this initiative placed the Commonwealth police agency on 
an equal footing with the other jurisdictions and can be interpreted as the States’ 
recognition of the legitimate role to be played by the Commonwealth in policing.  
Whether the States actually understood the full ramifications of their actions is 
unclear but the consequences have been far reaching and are described in the later 
chapters. 
2.5 Policing and Government Bureaucracy 
Within the framework of Australian government, police agencies have generally 
been perceived and taken for granted as just another government department, 
meriting no special recognition or position within the operation of government 
services.  However, police agencies are not the same as other government 
departments and police officers are not public servants (Wettenhall 1977; Plehwe 
22 
 
and Wettenhall 1979; and Manison 1995).  These differences are identifiable by the 
way police agencies have been established and staff employed.  Each of the eight 
jurisdictions has a specific Act of Parliament for their police agency.  Included in the 
Act is the formal establishment along with provisions for the employment of police 
officers from commissioner to constables and the detailing of the powers 
concerning their roles and responsibilities.  Australian police agencies are classified 
as statutory authorities, which mean they have been created by statute as an 
individual agency with a specific function and they operate outside the general 
public service structure.  Critically, policing in theory is not subject to mainstream 
public sector arrangements and direct political governance (Wettenhall 1977; 
Plehwe 1979; Manison 1995; and Fleming 2004).  The practical situation is that 
politicisation and the challenge to police independence has been a developing 
matter and has attracted some academic interest.  Discussion on this issue and how 
it impacts on policing is considered later. 
The fact of having its own act for establishing the police agency, providing 
special arrangements for leadership, governance, management and appointment of 
staff, exemplifies the primary difference from the general public service.  Major 
differences include the departmental head—the Police Commissioner—being 
appointed by the Crown and not the responsible Police Minister.  While promotions 
and senior appointments within the agency are distanced from political 
involvement (Manison 1995, 497; Findlay 2004, 30–33), in reality executive 
promotions are being influenced “by political influence” (Pitman 2004, 117).   
The formal basis of independence from political influence stems from police 
officers swearing an Oath to the Crown to uphold the law and to use their powers 
fairly and without prejudice or bias.  The fundamental tenet for policing is that from 
commissioners to constables, police are employed by the Crown and individually 
swear an oath in respect to the exercise of their powers, for which they are 
accountable at law and not to the Government (Underwood 2005). The respective 
police Acts require that every officer must take the Oath in order to empower them 
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as a police officer.  This aspect of government employment sets police officers apart 
from other public servants.   
Since Federation, Australian courts—including the High Court of Australia—
have in judgments concerning policing and government, recognised the unique 
characteristics and arrangements for policing in contrast to mainstream 
departments and public servants. 7  Much of the difference centres on the notion 
that the government of a democracy like Australia should not politicise the police.  
Pitman has argued that there are two competing governance models relating to 
police commissioners—“dependency and independency models” (Pitman 2004, 
116).  The relationship between commissioner and minister is the central feature of 
the two models and the contentious issue in the relationship is the extent to which 
the commissioner is subject to directions of the minister (Pitman).  Thus, 
independence of the police agency from political direction is the key theoretical 
characteristic (Reiner 1996, 168–176) of the Australian arrangements with 
governments (Fleming 2004; Fleming and Rhodes 2004; Kerr 1994) and an 
important feature of the national policing structure. 
Police being independent is not the reality in Australia, as governments exert 
substantial influence on police commissioners and the operation of agencies by the 
minister’s provision of finance (Fleming 2004, 70) along with the government’s 
legislation and policies.  Interestingly, the issue of police independence is not 
restricted to Australia but is topical in many other western nations. Sossin (2007), in 
his discussion concerning Canada, best described the issue: “can the need for the 
police to remain above partisan politics and beyond manipulation by the 
government of the day be reconciled with these mechanisms of governance and 
accountability?” (Sossin 2004, 8). 
Finally, in respect to the whole operation of governments in Australia, the 
fact is police operate more independently than the mainstream public sector.  This 
difference has been recognised and traces back to the independent nature of 
                                                        
7 Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; (2005) 224 CLR 44; (2005) 221 ALR 95; 




policing.  Police agencies are not just another department nor are police officers 
public servants.  There is a significant difference because of greater freedom to 
operate outside the direct control of the government of the day (Wettenhall 1977; 
Manison 1995; Pitman 1999; Pitman 2004). 
Regardless of the demarcation from the mainstream public service, policing 
continues to move closer to the dependency model and this has been pointed out 
by Pitman (1999 and 2004) and Fleming (2004).  Any notion of policing in Australia 
operating independent of the government of the day is incorrect as ministers are 
becoming more influential. 
2.6 The Size of Australian Policing 
As mentioned previously, there has been scant research and therefore a paucity of 
literature available concerning Australian policing and it could be speculated this is 
due to it being an insignificant area of government activity and of no special 
significance.  One means of testing this perception is to consider the size of the 
policing sector as a component of government in terms of the most basic measures 
of government resourcing: funding and personnel numbers. The relevant data sets 
are found in government budget papers along with a range of reports concerning 
policing published annually by the agencies themselves.   Independent analysis of 
that data concerning policing has also been published on a regular basis by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in its Year Book series and the Productivity 
Commission’s Report of Government Services series.8  (Appendix A provides a 
detailed statistical analysis of the range of data provided from these and other 
sources.) 
A recent snapshot of funding shows that the Commonwealth government 
spent $1.4b on policing (Australian Government 2009b) in 2009–10.  It also 
provided State governments with special purpose funding of $293m for policing.  
                                                        




The total picture for Australian policing in 2009–10, based on the Report on 
Government Services shows that in total the Commonwealth and State 
governments spent $8.24 billion on policing (5.5 per cent of total government 
spending).  In total 64,830 staff (Productivity Commission 2011, 6.5) were employed 
in operational policing functions in the States and Territories (this total excludes 
AFP personnel working outside the ACT community policing role), while the 
national police total, including the AFP, is 69,728 (see Table 1, Appendix A).  The 
operational total translates to a per capita ratio of 262 operational police officers 
per 100,000 of population (Productivity Commission 2011, 6.5).   
To put policing expenditure into perspective ($8.24 billion) in respect to its 
comparative size with other areas of government service provision, the amount of 
expenditure by the governments (derived from the 2009/10 Report on Government 
Services) over the same period for other services included: 
1. $38.9 billion on schools—25.8 per cent total expenditure 
2. $31.36 billion on public hospitals—15.4 per cent total expenditure 
3. $7.5 billion on primary and community health—4.9 per cent total 
expenditure 
A review of State government budgets consistently shows policing was either 
the third or fourth highest expenditure item in 2005–06 and 2009–10 financial 
years.9  As a stand-alone expenditure, apart from education and health that absorb 
about 50 per cent of annual budgets, policing is clearly the next highest 
departmental expenditure. 
A noteworthy point with police funding has been the rapid growth in most 
jurisdictions since 1993, demonstrated by Figure 2.1, showing the funding increases 
for police agencies from 1993/94 to 2009/10.  To put some perspective into the 
chart, both the Australian population10 and Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth rates 
                                                        
9 Based on review of the six states’ annual budget statements for 2005–06 and 2009–10. 
10 It should be noted the actual growth rates of population differed for States and the States and 
Northern Territory with the largest population increases also had commensurate funding increases. 
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are included.  As this shows, police funding increases were far in excess of the 
respective growth rate for population of 20 per cent and CPI 46.25 per cent. 
Figure 2.1: Australian Police Agencies Funding 1993/94–2009/10 
 
2.7 Describing Australian Policing 
There are a number of important changes and developments shared by the eight 
Australian agencies since 1979, which together have resulted in the current 
structure and policing model.  The main characteristics of policing are: 
1. Public policing is owned and operated exclusively by the Commonwealth, 
State and Northern Territory governments; 
2. Since 1979 all police agencies have grown substantially in respect to the 
scope and range of policing activity and in turn continue to receive 
additional funding; 
3. The growth of Commonwealth policing has been disproportionally larger 
than the sub-national agencies’ rate of growth; and 
4. From a public administration perspective police agencies and police officers 
are structured and employed differently from the mainstream public sector.  





























CPI increase 46.25% 
Population increase 20% 
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These factors are relevant to the existing policing model, but they are 
superficial and in order to get a more detailed description of what constitutes 
policing a more detailed analysis has to be undertaken.  The means of doing this is 
to consider policing in the context of organisation and structure.  By analysing the 
development of policing in organisational and functional terms this has the added 
benefit of also exposing key legislative and political matters that have underpinned 
the evolution of Australian policing.   
The identification of three dimensions for organisation and a single 
dimension for function is applied in analysing Australian policing and was developed 
from the previous discussion on defining policing by Crawford in section 2.2.  The 
dimensions have been developed on the basis they are common dimensions used in 
legislation and in many cases they are found in existing literature on Australian and 
international policing.  The dimensions for organisation are: Establishment, 
Governance and Jurisdiction.  Function stands alone in it its own right.   
2.8 Organisation of Australian Policing 
The three dimensions are the product of legislation as this is the primary source, 
along with aspects of the common law and doctrine concerning government in 
Australia. 
2.8.1 Establishment 
Establishment concerns the statutory and legal framework provided under the 
respective jurisdiction’s constitutional processes and institutions.  This 
encompasses police agency legitimacy that emanates from the jurisdiction’s 
constitution authorising the respective parliaments to make laws for peace, order 
and good government (or expressed with similar words).  All the constitutions relied 
upon were post-Federation except for Western Australian Police that relied on pre-
federation colonial legislation—section 2 of the Constitution Act 1889 (UK).  The 
Northern Territory police agency originally established administratively by the 
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Commonwealth in 1926 was re-established legislatively in 1978 as a consequence 
of the Territory’s self-government legislation.11   
Effectively, this is the government procedure that licenses police agencies 
and in turn police officers to operate.  It also has the effect of setting the 
boundaries for what police agencies and their agents are permitted to do by law.  
As stated by Ratnapala and Crowe, the powers of an Australian police officer i.e. 
Commonwealth, State or Territory: “According to the cardinal common law rule 
recognised in Entick v Carrington,12 a police officer or official has no power to 
violate the rights and freedoms of a citizen without the authority of the law “ 
(Ratnapala and Crowe 2012, 114).  In the exercise of lawful authority by police 
officers, in essence they can only do what is permitted by law (common and statute 
law).   
The structure and contents of the eight separate pieces of legislation are 
very similar as illustrated in Figure 2.3 at the end of this section.  The legislation 
creates a legal entity that is provided with a title and is effectively empowered to 
undertake the business of policing within the jurisdiction.  The legislation 
centralises policing and also provides legitimacy to the structure including a military 
style rank structure that forms the foundation of the employment and operational 
structures for police agencies (Manison 1995, 496).  The only agency which has 
tried to change its employment structure has been the AFP that has gone towards a 
flatter and less hierarchical structure (Baker 2004, 150). 
Linked to the establishment legislation in all Acts are a range of matters 
which concern other dimensions.  Specifically, all the Acts authorise the 
appointment of the Commissioner by the Crown.  Flowing from that is direct or 
indirect reference to the functions the agency is authorised to undertake.  The 
governance dimension is coupled to the Commissioner and the relationship of that 
office with the political head of the police agencies—the Police Minister.  
Jurisdiction is linked by the explicit sections as to the powers of officers and 
                                                        
11 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) 
12
 (1965) 19 St R 1029 
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authorisation of special constables and the like, which is based upon geographic 
boundaries of States and Territories.   
For the purposes of describing policing and the subsequent model, 
establishment is a critical dimension that provides an exclusive licence to the 
agencies to go about the business of policing in a relatively uniform way.  The 
agency’s establishment by legislation ensures they are legitimised and what activity 
undertaken in respect to the other dimensions is constitutional.  Establishment also 
provides legitimacy to the structure and provides the powers that police officers 
rely on to carry out their duties.   
2.8.2 Governance 
Governance concerns the formal management of police agencies and differs in 
many respects to how agencies in the private sector and most other public sector 
agencies are governed (Fleming 2004; Fleming and Rhodes 2004; Pitman2004; and 
Wettenhall 1977).  The most exceptional characteristic of police agency governance 
is the relationship between agency head (Commissioner), the Crown (Governor-
General, Governor or Administrator) and executive government (Minister).  This 
triangular relationship provides a degree of ambiguity in the governance of police 
agencies. The legislative wording pertaining to the governance of the eight agencies 
differs between jurisdictions as provisions in the respective police Acts are not 
identical.  However, in effect the provisions are relatively common but in some 
cases the arrangements for governance are blurred due to the role provided by the 
legislation for the Crown vis-à-vis Police Minister.  Fundamentally governance 
centres on “the relationship between Australian Police Commissioners and their 
political masters” (Fleming 2004, 61).  Primarily the political control of the police in 
a jurisdiction is established by the governance provision in the Act, but the law is 
ambiguous in most cases (Fleming, 2004).  The table below sets out the respective 
jurisdictions’ legislative position concerning the Police Minister’s power to direct 




Figure 2.2: Power of Police Minister to Direct Commissioner 
Commonwealth NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
S. 37 S. 8 (1) Nil S. 4.6 S. 6 & 8 S. 7 Nil Nil 
It should be noted in the case of Western Australia under section 9 of the Act, the 
Commissioner requires the approval of the Minister in respect to rules and general 
orders etc. concerning members.  This implies the Minister has a tacit role in 
governance but the extent of this is not clear.    
Fleming (2004) saw the relationship between commissioner and minister as 
the central feature for governance and this was characterised by “uncertainty” 
(Fleming 2004, 61) as to the power of each party.  Pitman (2004) also noted the 
fundamental relationship between commissioner and minister was central to 
governance in all police agencies across Australia.  Importantly, the model of 
governance is impacted by the concept of office of constable and the British legal 
position13 on this has been widely debated in Australia.  Fundamentally, ministers 
cannot involve themselves in operational matters.  Both Pitman and Fleming 
discussed this matter and concluded it was problematic for both commissioner and 
ministers to have a clear understanding of what is operational.  This issue of 
governance and political interference has been tested publicly according to Pitman 
where “police commissioners have taken exception to ministerial directives and 
have generally came off second best” (2004, 115). 
Another aspect of governance concerning police officers, from 
commissioner to constable, is under all acts they must swear an Oath of Loyalty.  
The taking of the Oath is requisite to a police officer lawfully exercising police 
powers provided under both statute and common law.  The  impact on governance 
of taking the Oath was explained by the Chief Justice of Tasmania in 2005 
(Underwood 2005) and is summarised as follows: police officers in Tasmania were 
servants of the Crown and the exercise of their powers was independent as held by 
                                                        
13 R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex p. Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118: Lord Denning’s 
comments: “The office of constable exercises powers directly from the law and not indirectly 
delegated from the minister” (Pitman 2004, 123) 
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the High Court of Australia in the Enever case of 1906.14  Technically and legally all 
Australian jurisdictions consider their officers (constables at law) to be independent 
of government and this position has not been challenged to date some 108 years 
after the Enever case was decided by the High Court.   
In respect to governance of police, the Enever case inter alia established the 
nexus to English common law in this area and the principle of independence as it 
relates to governance.  Governance provisions for police agencies ostensibly put 
them at an arms-length from government—although as noted this is debatable and 
recent research on the topic by Fleming and Pitman clearly demonstrated the 
blurred and ambiguous nature of police independence.  This view is supported in 
this thesis as it will be shown that the ministers (government’s) power pertaining to 
funding, legislation and policy impinges directly on the notion of independence for 
the police.  The reality is police must enforce the law made by government; can 
only undertake functions for which they have sufficient funding; and must comply 
with government policy in respect to how an agency operates.  As a consequence of 
the two competing dynamics, operational independence versus the pragmatic 
reality of government forms of control (legislation, funding and policy), the general 
position of police agencies and officers in Australia means they operate with 
greater independence than other government agencies.  However, at the end of the 
day they are accountable to the government either explicitly or tacitly. 
It should also be noted Australian agencies differ significantly in this area 
from police agencies in most other western nations.  Chapter Six concerns the 
comparison of Australian policing with a number of other nations and discusses 
governance in this context.   It is suffice to say most of these nations have 
governance arrangements providing community input through independent boards, 
commissions, committees or councils with full or limited governance 
responsibilities.  Clearly the Australian approach to governance is different and 
excludes accountability to the community where an agency operates. 
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The final organisational dimension concerns jurisdiction.  It is an abstract concept 
derived from the respective constitutions and concomitant legislation.  The 
propositions put forward concerning jurisdiction in this section simply relies upon 
the interpretation and understanding of the current powers of the respective levels 
of government in the federation, for which police legislation is a product of the 
respective parliaments.  The theoretical basis for jurisdiction of the laws, as it 
pertains to the federal partners is discussed in general by Carney (2006) and 
Ratnapala and Crowe (2012) and the opinion that follows on police jurisdiction 
relies upon these fundamental tenets surrounding the question of jurisdiction.   
This issue of jurisdiction provides a well-used technical defence in judicial 
proceedings as police agencies and officers are only permitted to operate within 
geopolitical borders and undertake functions permitted by law.  It should be noted 
at this point the traditional concept of operating within geographic borders is 
problematic as the development of cybercrime and other crimes played out in 
cyberspace challenges conventional definitions and concepts of jurisdiction.   
Generally, policing activity is restricted to jurisdictional boundaries of the 
respective agencies in Australia.  For the six States this is straightforward and 
restricted to the State borders.  For the territories the jurisdictional issues differ.  To 
start with, the Northern Territory has its own police force and operates like a State 
agency within its borders.  The Australian Capital Territory is policed by the AFP 
along with the eight other Commonwealth territories.15  
The Commonwealth’s jurisdiction is covered by the AFP, which can operate 
anywhere in Australia and outside Australia where functions involve international 
                                                        
15 The Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) lists this as a function of the AFP and later in 1988, 
under section 23 (1) (c) of the Australian Capital Territory Self Government Act 1988 (Cth) excluded 
the ACT Parliament’s from having the power to make laws concerning: (c) the provision by the AFP of 
police services in relation to the Territory.   
The AFP also has jurisdiction in other territories of: Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Australian Antarctic 
Territory, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Coral Sea Islands, Jervis Bay Territory, Norfolk 
Island, Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands 
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liaison, international investigations, peacekeeping or training, that are authorised 
by law.  Additionally, since 2004 members of the AFP have been provided with the 
power to investigate State offences that have a Commonwealth aspect.16  Primarily 
section 4AA was inserted into their Act with the intention to assist AFP officers 
investigating offences against the Commonwealth (Ellison 2004; Explanatory 
Memorandum 2004).  This allows AFP officers to investigate both Commonwealth 
and State offences, a situation not reciprocated for State police who are restricted 
to State offences within their jurisdiction. 
Common to all jurisdictions is the power of Commissioners provided under 
the respective police Act to make special members or special constables.  These are 
generally police officers from other jurisdictions entering the adjoining State or 
Territory to undertake police duties.  Along the borders of the States and Territories 
police officers from both sides of the border as a matter of practice are made 
special constables in order to prevent borders becoming barriers to maintaining law 
and order or providing protection for fleeing criminals.   
The arrest and extradition of criminals between jurisdictions is facilitated by 
Commonwealth legislation, the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) and 
the legislation makes it a relatively easy and straightforward process for State and 
Territory courts.  Travelling to another jurisdiction and extraditing an offender does 
not require a police officer to be made a special constable in that jurisdiction to 
perform this type of police activity. 
2.9 Function 
Function complements the organisational dimensions for policing agencies and 
concerns the primary activity of police agencies—the scope and range of work 
undertaken by the personnel of an agency.  It can also be expressed in terms of the 
responsibilities an agency has under its commission that may be detailed in the 
respective Act.  This dimension is rudimentary as it establishes the boundaries for 
authorised activity that police agencies undertake in their respective jurisdictions.  
                                                        
16
 Australian Federal Police and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth). 
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The functions can differ between agencies and importantly in the context of the 
system of government, is directly related to the tier of government in which an 
agency is located. 
What the police actually do is not generally found in a specific written form.  
Some jurisdictions include general statements in their legislation as to the functions 
of police (the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland 
and South Australia) while other jurisdictions (Tasmanian, Victorian and Western 
Australia) have little or no reference to functions.  In the latter group of states the 
Acts provide indirectly for functions through the Commissioner’s power to define 
the work of police officers through subordinate legislation: 
 Tasmania—orders, directions, procedures and instructions 
 Victoria—standing orders 
 Western Australian—rules, orders and regulations  
The actual functions undertaken by the eight Australian agencies are best 
investigated by reviewing the contents of Annual Reports.  The functions 
undertaken all appear to be similar when these documents are considered.  The 
relevant functions where detailed in the respective Acts are set out on a jurisdiction 
basis in Appendix C. 
After considering the recent annual reports of the police agencies and the 
functions detailed in some of the Acts, along with the respective Commissioners’ 
powers, the functions all appear to be consistent with the definition used for 
policing in this chapter.   
In addition to the relatively common police functions delivered in each 
jurisdiction, the AFP provides these for the Australian Capital Territory and other 
territories, but also provides additional functions due to its national and 
international responsibilities (Baker 2004, 150–151).  These functions have two 
main sources.  Firstly, there are a number of specific functions derived from “the 
express incidental power in section 51 (xxxix) of the Constitution or in the implied 
incidental powers contained in the heads of power in sections 51 and 52 and in the 
executive power in section 61” (Parliament of Australia 2013).  Examples of these 
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matters concern crimes involving: illicit drug importation, financial and banking 
related money-laundering, crimes concerning communications and the Internet and 
crimes against humanity.  Many of these crimes are derived from the 
Commonwealth’s external affairs and communications powers that afford 
responsibility for related police functions.   
The second source concerns the unusual political development at the start of 
the new millennium, specifically in 2002 and 2003, when the States handed over 
responsibility respectively, to the Commonwealth government for criminal law 
involving terrorism and organised crime.  These responsibilities previously resided 
with the States and they collectively used a formal constitutional procedure 
(applying section 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution) to refer their criminal law powers 
in these areas to the Commonwealth Parliament.   
There are also other functional responsibilities for Commonwealth policing 
under section 7 of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), which provides for 
policing involving matters of an international nature, in addition to those matters 
concerning the investigation of criminal offences.  There is a range of functions 
including facilitating information between police agencies and agencies outside 
Australia, providing international liaison officers, peace-keeping forces, training 
including capacity-building of police agencies in other nations, especially in the 
Asia-Pacific area.  It performs many of these functions with the cooperation of staff 
from State and Territory police agencies.   
2.10 The Legislative Framework of Australian Policing 
As shown from the previous section, the organisational and functional dimensions 
of Australian policing are derived from a legislative base and it is worth tabulating 
salient sections of the respective acts.  The table is also a useful reference for the 
remaining chapters that refer to the legislative framework in a number of instances. 
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Figure 2.3: Summary of Police Legislative Framework in Australian 2010 
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CHAPTER THREE: AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores Australian federalism and its influence on the development of 
Australian policing.  The chapter begins by considering the design and evolution of 
Australian federalism and concentrates on the matter of increased centralisation 
and how this affected policing.  Regarding the design of federalism, the two key 
factors of the constitution and division of powers are explained in the context of 
Australia and the operation of government.  This is followed by examining the 
evolution of federalism and identifying the key instruments used by the 
Commonwealth to expand its role—enumerated powers, fiscal power and 
intergovernmental relations.   
The chapter then drills deeper in the analysis of the development of 
federalism and seeks to identify how and why change occurred in recent times.  
This analysis of federalism refers to a range of literature in respect to descriptions 
and explanations of Australian federalism.  Importantly, studying the range of 
opinions as to why Australian federalism changed and the mechanisms responsible 
provides important insight for the later chapters that investigate the role of 
federalism in policing. 
Two cases studies are then used in the chapter to illustrate the mechanisms 
that the Commonwealth used to increase centralisation.  Importantly for policing, 
these two areas, education and health, share the same antecedents and were solely 
State responsibilities at Federation yet now exhibit a high degree of concurrency.  
The point of the cases studies is for use in later chapters in order to determine 
whether the way in which centralisation has been pursued in policing is similar or 
not to these other areas of State service delivery. 
The chapter concludes by considering centralisation as a key characteristic 
of contemporary Australian federalism. 
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3.2 Australian Federalism 
Preston King (1982, 21) defines federalism in the following terms. 
Federalism, most distinctively, constitutes a variable response to 
opposed demands for the dispersal and concentration of power.  More 
precisely, federalism constitutes a variable response to opposed 
demands for the centralization and decentralization of power on a 
specifically territorial basis.  
Conceptualisation hinges on the relationship between the national and sub-
national tiers of government in terms of which tier has the most power.  Generally 
this power relationship relies on the founding constitution that sets out and 
articulates the fundamental elements of the relationship between the respective 
tiers of government i.e. the powers each level is responsible for, along with a range 
of technical and structural issues.  Succinctly put, the power relationship and the 
extent of centralisation is the key issue for governments with the starting point 
being the nation’s constitution.   
Much has changed in the world since many of the main federal constitutions 
were first ratified.  In most cases have not kept up with modern society.  These 
aging constitutions never envisaged the natural and man-made events affecting 
governments of the present and this is the case for the Australian Constitution that 
is over a century old.  So how has Australian federalism coped with these changes?  
To begin with the design of Australian federalism has to be considered in terms of 
its structure and the central issue of the division of power.  Once these two aspects 
are examined the evolution of federalism and the key mechanisms that have been 
applied to develop the current arrangements between governments are 
investigated. 
3.3 Australian Federalism: Design 
The design of Australian federalism can be ascertained from the constitutional 
structure and the division of powers between the two tiers of government—




3.3.1 Constitutional Construction 
The starting point for Australian federalism was the agreement between the six 
Australian colonies in the 1890s to establish the Commonwealth of Australia.  The 
nation came into being with the passing of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 by the Imperial Parliament. The Constitution established the 
two tiers of government—the Commonwealth and the six sub-national State 
governments.   The main features of the system of government at Federation 
included:  
1. Strong bicameralism.   The Commonwealth Parliament constituted by two 
houses of parliament—the House of Representatives (or lower house) 
elected from political sub-divisions of similar sizes; and a Senate (or upper 
house) constituted from an equal number of senators (six) elected from 
each of the six States.17  This was the house of review originally seen as 
protecting state’s interests.  State parliaments were also bicameral and all 
but Queensland18 have kept two houses. 
2. Based on the Westminster system, the Prime Minister and government were 
selected from the lower house—the House of Representatives.  This is the 
main house and it initiates money bills.  There was no provision for a 
separate executive government to be elected i.e. a President, and the 
national political leadership was drawn from the Parliament and like 
Westminster and by convention (e.g. no mention in the Constitution on how 
the Prime Minister is selected), this leadership was drawn from the lower 
house.  State systems mirrored this structure. 
3. The division of powers between the Commonwealth and States were 
influenced by the US system with the national government being “assigned 
powers” (Fenna 2008, 510) while the State’s powers “were left plenary and 
untouched” (Fenna 2008, 510).  The view was that a decentralised system of 
federalism existed at the time of Federation.  “Australian federalism was 
created on the presumption that the national government could be 
                                                        
17
 Currently there are twelve senators from each State and two from the ACT and NT. 
18 Queensland Legislative Council abolished by the Constitution Amendment Act 1921 (QLD), which 
took effect on 23 March 1922. 
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restricted to responsibilities of a specific national character.  Almost the full 
range of internal domestic responsibilities previously exercised by the 
constituent units would continue to be controlled at the sub-national level” 
(Fenna 2007b, 304). 
4. There was a prescribed process included in the Constitution for its 
amendment that required a national referendum.  Referendums have had a 
history of failure due to rejection by the electorate and since 1906 there 
have been a total of 44 referendum questions put to the electorate, with 
only eight being successful.  Some commentators are of the view that the 
low success rate of referendums to change the Constitution reflects the 
electorate’s reluctance to increase the powers of the Commonwealth 
(Twomey 2008, 61–62; Hollander and Patapan 2007, 290; Wiltshire 2008b, 
588). 
5. Provision was made for a court to adjudicate constitutional disputes 
between governments (the High Court of Australia).  The decisions of the 
High Court have been influential since Federation.  Between 1901 and 1920, 
the Australian federation was viewed as being decentralised until the High 
Court brought down its decision in the Engineers case (1920).19  With the 
Engineers case in 1920 there was a distinctive shift in the High Court’s 
interpretation of the enumerated powers (e.g. external affairs and 
corporations power of the Commonwealth)—from a narrow to a broad 
interpretation favouring the Commonwealth.  Following on from Engineers, 
the Commonwealth expanded its powers as the High Court continued to 
interpret the enumerated powers sections of the Constitution favourably to 
the Commonwealth (Fenna 2007b, 298–299; Wiltshire 2008, 587–589). 
3.3.2 The Division of Powers 
The form of the Constitution was similar to the US and Canada as it took a 
legislative approach (Fenna 2007b, 303).  The powers of government were divided 
                                                        
19 The Amalgamated Society of Engineers Claimant; and the Adelaide Steamship Company Limited 
and Others Respondents (1942) 28 CLR 129. 
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by assigning full responsibility for specific policy areas to one level of government or 
another (though sometimes with some overlap or concurrency).     
The key challenge for federal systems is the way the division of powers 
generates a relentless competition between the levels of government.  The decisive 
characteristic of any federation is the power relationship between the tiers of 
government and this is the case in Australia that sets the Commonwealth against 
the six States.  Australia has a history since Federation of disputes between the 
partners and the occurrence of disputes “over jurisdiction have been ever present” 
(Hollander and Patapan 2007, 280).  This is fundamentally concerned with the 
division of power that has become a fact of political life played out in the theatre of 
Commonwealth-State relations.   
The initial structure of Australian federalism was characterised by the 
Commonwealth exercising the powers and responsibilities seen as “imperatives for 
federation—defence, uniformity of economic policy, freedom of interstate trade, 
and uniformity in immigration policy” (Majeed 2006, 10).  Federation began with 
the establishment of a number of Commonwealth agencies or arrangements with 
States to administer and enforce legislation and policy.  One such arrangement was 
for the State police to provide the Commonwealth’s policing needs.  
Under section 107, the States were allocated sole responsibility for all 
matters not enumerated in the Constitution as the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth.  Thus, in areas like education, health and policing, the colonial 
arrangements for these services transferred seamlessly to the newly established 
State governments after Federation.  The Constitution enumerated the powers of 
the national government in section 51—thus powers not identified in section 51 are 
implicitly the exclusive responsibility of the State governments.  This appeared to 
provide clear boundaries for jurisdiction between the respective governments and 
was intended to limit the intrusion of the Commonwealth into the perceived 
responsibilities of the States. However, this has not been the case and the 
Commonwealth has entered areas of responsibility that at Federation appeared to 
be unequivocally reserved for the States.  These intrusions have been an ongoing 
source of tension between governments and have increased since the mid–1970s. 
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On the other hand the Constitution also makes provision for the States to 
transfer powers to the Commonwealth Parliament.  Under the reference power 
provided in the Constitution at section 51 (xxxvii), a State or group of States can 
formally refer an existing power for which they have responsibility to the 
Commonwealth Parliament.  This power “must fall within the legislative power of 
the State to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of their State” 
(Carney 2006a, 14).  An example occurred in 2002 when the State governments 
referred criminal law powers concerning terrorism20 (criminal law is predominantly 
a State responsibility) to the Commonwealth Parliament.  This was not a commonly 
used mechanism before the new millennium but has been increasingly used 
because of increasing pressure for the States to cooperate with the Commonwealth 
government (Carney 2006a; Lynch 2012).  The benefit of this approach is the 
process is relatively fast and cost-effective because it is a simple legislative process 
in the respective parliaments.   
Thus, there are several means to change the division of powers and the 
importance of this is fundamental as each time change is affected, it changes 
federalism and how it actually operates in practice, as opposed to the original 
model.  
3.4 Australian Federalism: Evolution 
Australian federalism is no longer (if it ever really was) a system characterised by 
each level of government taking individual responsibilities and providing specific 
services based on clearly articulated responsibilities.  Many responsibilities are in 
theory the sole responsibility of the respective government—border protection, 
defence and foreign affairs for the Commonwealth, education, health and policing 
for the States.  However, since the 1970s the Commonwealth has increasingly 
intruded into many traditional State responsibilities and has developed a record of 
involvement regardless of obvious constitutional limits.  Service delivery areas such 
                                                        
20
Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (NSW); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 
(Qld); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (SA); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 
2002 (Tas); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2003 (Vic); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) 
Act 2002 (WA). 
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as schools, national parks, hospitals, railways and national highways have all 
attracted Commonwealth interest and Commonwealth involvement.  This has been 
achieved by a range of mechanisms, with the most common being by the use of 
Commonwealth fiscal power (Fenna 2008, Painter 2001, Wiltshire 2008a).  This has 
resulted in the situation where the Commonwealth is involved in areas of public 
services regardless of the apparent absence of constitutional powers and formal 
responsibilities. 
Since the 1970s the structure of Australian government and the way it 
operates has changed as individual self-sufficient State and Territory departments 
and authorities can no longer operate efficiently or effectively without a degree of 
cooperation with national and in some instances international counterparts.  
Borders are now more porous both physically and virtually as is the case with 
communications and cyber-networks.  The population has become highly mobile 
with transport and communication networks providing real and virtual facilities to 
travel and do business.  This change in the political environment was reflected in 
the changed structure of government that developed arrangements and institutions 
for cooperating and sharing responsibilities.  Ratification of international treaties 
and agreements by the Commonwealth proliferated in the 1970s and thereafter 
(Carroll 2006) so government agencies in an array of areas have had to change to 
deal with international issues and problems related to the business of government. 
The 1990s saw changes to the operation of government characterised by 
significant increases in intergovernmental cooperation and agencies.  As Painter 
pointed out: “The result is an evolving system of multi-level governance, with 
system properties that threaten in the end to subsume the originating 
constitutional principles” (Painter 2001, 139).  The major characteristic of this 
development in Commonwealth-State relations has been greater concurrence and 
“Governments must surrender autonomy, parliaments must compromise their 
sovereignty” (Painter 2001, 139).  This evolution in government relations led in 
1992 to the traditional meeting of Commonwealth and sub-national leaders (the 
Premiers’ Conference) developing into the Council of Australian Government 
(COAG).  This resulted in the formation of a range of interdepartmental committees 
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and agreements that changed many important aspects of the business of 
government.  Cooperation between Commonwealth and State departments has 
been the mechanism used in many areas to achieve policy goals and deliver services 
to the mutual agreement of both levels of government (Menzies 2012, Twomey 
2009).   
Statutory authorities such as police and other emergency services are part 
of this structure, with policing being one of the oldest and most sophisticated 
groups to operate across borders in a cooperative manner.  Currently, this way of 
doing government business is described as harmonisation in Commonwealth circles 
and simply translates to the Commonwealth being highly influential and even 
setting policy goals in some State government areas.  Regardless, the 
Commonwealth intent supported by its fiscal influence and in some cases sheer 
determination and lack of State government fortitude to resist Commonwealth 
overtures, allows the national government to play an ever increasing role in areas 
traditionally the sole responsibility of the States (Selway 2001, 120; Jones 2008, 
171).  Change has taken place in the division of powers (the Commonwealth 
increasing) and the mechanisms used for this provide an insight to the 
transformation in Australian federalism.   
Fundamentally three mechanisms have been used to alter the division of 
powers and relationship between the federal partners and these are considered 
individually in order to also provide an understanding of how Australian federalism 
has evolved. 
3.4.1 Commonwealth Enumerated Powers 
The enumerated powers provided at section 51 of the Constitution have been 
critical instruments in centralising Commonwealth power.  The broad powers of 
communications 51 (v), corporations 51 (xx), external affairs 51 (xxix), immigration 
51 (xxvii) along with narrow references to sickness and hospital benefits and 
benefits to students 51 (xxiiiA) are examples of enumerated powers used as 
instruments to centralise power. 
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In the case of external affairs, the proliferation of international treaties and 
agreements in the second half of the twentieth century “facilitated the exercise of 
the external affairs power to regulate matters within traditional State areas” 
(Carney 2006a, 10).  The influence of international matters on public policy and the 
division of power in the federation has expanded the Commonwealth’s role 
exponentially in daily life.  This expansion saw the application of international 
agreements and treaties into government policy and law, resulting in the expansion 
of Commonwealth powers, which in a number of cases has lessened the powers of 
the States (Carroll 2006; Painter 2001; Wiltshire 2008a; Wiltshire 2008b; Hollander 
and Patapan 2007).   
Ratnapala and Crowe (2012) put forward a view based upon one succinctly 
put by Chief Justice Gibbs in the Tasmanian Dam Case21 concerning the influence of 
the enumerated powers on federalism: “there is almost no aspect of life which 
under modern conditions may not be the subject of an international agreement, 
and therefore the possible subject of Commonwealth legislative power” (Ratnapala 
and Crowe 2012, 374).  Perhaps the best means of exemplifying the impact of the 
external affairs power is to consider the State’s sole responsibility to provide 
criminal law in their jurisdiction and a matter concerning the State of Tasmania.  In 
this matter the Commonwealth used its external affairs powers to override 
Tasmanian laws that made homosexual acts a criminal offence.  The 
Commonwealth position was that the existing Tasmanian legislation was in 
contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which Australia ratified in 1980.  Subsequently, the Commonwealth Parliament 
enacted the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth), which contradicted the 
Tasmanian law.  Tasmania had no recourse and its homosexual laws became invalid 
on constitutional grounds because the Constitution at section 109 provides 
precedence for Commonwealth laws when they are inconsistent with State law.   
There are many other related matters where the external affairs powers 
have been used to achieve centralised outcomes in areas particularly relevant to 
                                                        
21
 (1983) 158 CLR 1 
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policing.  These include agreements and treaties concerning illicit drugs; licit drug 
trials; trafficking illicit drugs; selling chemical precursors; sex crimes; organised 
crime; money laundering; and terrorism.  Many of these areas of public policy and 
law that were once reserved for the States now belong to the Commonwealth or 
operate concurrently.  In some criminal law areas a number of States have declined 
to pass concurrent legislation and this has further legitimised the scope of 
Commonwealth law enforcement.  An example of some States opting not to 
provide concurrent laws is found in the case of the Commonwealth anti-terrorism 
legislation that followed shortly after the 9/11 attacks.  In this case New South 
Wales22 and Victoria23 were the only jurisdictions to pass concurrent legislation.  
Similarly in other areas of criminal law such as cybercrime and organised crime, 
some States have opted not to match Commonwealth legislation.  Other 
enumerated powers such as postal and communications, banking and finance and 
immigration have provided major inroads for the Commonwealth because they 
used these powers to expand the Commonwealth’s criminal law.   
Another well-known example of the use of enumerated powers was the 
Commonwealth use of section 51(xxxiiiA), which was the product of the 1946 Social 
Services Referendum.  Interestingly most of the powers lay dormant until 1972, 
when the Whitlam Government used several of the provisions as instruments to 
centralise powers in the areas of health and education.  The sickness and hospital 
benefits provision was used to establish the national health system Medicare and 
benefits to students facilitated free university tuition.  Both reforms went to the 
heart of State responsibilities and powers. 
3.4.2 Fiscal Power 
One of the chief architects of the Constitution and first Chief Justice of the High 
Court, Sir Samuel Griffith, envisaged the States exercising wide-ranging powers and 
enjoying financial independence, free of interference or control by the 
Commonwealth.  He considered the States should have the fiscal powers to enable 
them to be self-sufficient and not rely on the Commonwealth (Zines 1986, 77).  To a 
                                                        
22 Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) 
23
 Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) 
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degree, this position of the States collecting and spending revenue to satisfy their 
needs was the way governments operated in the federation until the Second World 
War.  However, in 1942 the Commonwealth established a uniform national income 
tax scheme and removed income tax powers from the States.  The result has been 
that the Commonwealth collects far more revenue than it needs—82 per cent of 
the nation’s total tax revenue is raised by the Commonwealth (Twomey 2008, 65)—
and thus the States are beholden to it for sufficient revenue to operate services.   
According to the 2009–10 Commonwealth Budget, 49.2 per cent of State 
revenue will be provided by the Commonwealth “in the form of general revenue 
assistance and payments for specific purposes” (Australian Government 2009, 2).  
Fundamentally, “the States have a limited capacity to raise their own revenue. They 
are constitutionally barred from imposing excises, they were effectively deprived of 
their income taxes in 1942, and their tax-base was further narrowed in 1999 by 
Commonwealth requirements imposed as part of the implementation of the goods 
and services tax ('GST')” (Twomey 2008, 65).  Commonwealth funding from a power 
sharing and policy making perspective has a substantial influence on State 
governments.   
The Commonwealth currently provides financial support for the States’ 
service delivery efforts through National Specific Purpose Payments (National SPPs) 
to be spent in key service delivery sectors.  They also provide three types of 
National Partnership Payments—project payments, facilitation payments and 
reward payments.  Also they provide General Revenue Assistance, consisting of GST 
payments to be used by the State for any purpose, and other general revenue 
assistance.  The ability to provide conditional funding to the States through tied 
grants has been instrumental in increasing the power and influence of the 
Commonwealth.  This power to make grants on such terms and conditions as it sees 
fit has been challenged by the States unsuccessfully in several notable cases with 
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the Commonwealth’s right to making funding conditional under section 96 upheld 
by the High Court (Ratnapala and Crowe 2012, 356).24   
From a policy making perspective, the fact of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
(VFI)—where Commonwealth revenue exceeds requirements while States’ 
revenues are incapable of matching expenditure—provides the Commonwealth 
with broad persuasive power to influence and direct public policy, as by necessity 
States rely on Commonwealth funding.  One result of the use of conditional grants 
has been “the legislative limits on the Commonwealth have not prevented it from 
playing a significant role in the formation of policy outcomes in areas historically 
seen within the province of the States.  Section 96 is the basis of this power” 
(Majeed 2006, 18).   
3.4.3 Concurrency (de facto) and Intergovernmental Relations 
The Commonwealth, however, has not moved to its present position by applying 
only its enumerated and fiscal powers.  Another important mechanism providing it 
with increased power has been the negotiation power of the Commonwealth, 
outside of the formal constitutional mechanisms.  This has resulted in the 
development of a system of intergovernmental committees, councils and meetings 
as the means of facilitating business between the tiers of government.  The 
significance of intergovernmental relations cannot be underscored as it plays an 
increasingly important role in how federalism operates. 
Where the Commonwealth fails to achieve its objectives by constitutional 
means it has the option to use sub-constitutional processes and mechanisms to 
achieve its objectives.  Sub-constitutional mechanisms have been used by 
successive Commonwealth governments over the years to change the balance of 
power by the application of mechanisms facilitated by negotiation and cooperation.  
Negotiated settlements come about when the respective governments “reach an 
agreement as to which government would be responsible for which fields of public 
policy and expenditure, with a commitment not to legislate or act within a field that 
                                                        
24
 The notable cases referred to by Ratnapala and Crowe included — Second Uniform Tax Case: 
(1957) 99 CLR 575; Federal Aid Roads Act 1926 (Cth): Victoria v Commonwealth (1926) CLR 399; and 
State Aid Case: Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559. 
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fell to the responsibility of another government, then a reallocation of 
responsibilities could be achieved without any formal constitutional amendments 
with respect to powers” (Twomey, 2008 63). 
In this vein, the Commonwealth has developed a range of formal bodies to 
negotiate matters between the members of the federation.  Multi-level governance 
(Painter 2001) or executive federalism (Wiltshire 2008a; Wiltshire 2008b; Twomey 
2008; Hollander and Patapan 2007) or intergovernmental relations (Wanna et al 
2009) is a development involving ministerial councils and devolved bodies and 
institutions.  It is characterised by decision and policy making operating outside the 
constitutional processes and institutions, most particularly parliament and 
executive government.  This form of arrangement, labelled as undemocratic by 
some commentators (Wiltshire 2008a), has been used to change the balance of 
power and has been a means applied most effectively, to the benefit of the 
Commonwealth in order to achieve its goals.   
Mechanisms involving intergovernmental relationships have become 
increasingly complex and sophisticated and now are enshrined in the form of a 
bureaucracy operating under the badge of the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) since 1992.  Under the auspices of these meetings of Commonwealth, State 
and Territory first ministers, a hierarchy of ministerial councils, administrative 
forums, committees and agencies provide an administration operating alongside 
the traditional machinery of government.   
3.5. Perspectives on Australian Federalism 
The shift to a system with a much expanded Commonwealth role and, as a result, 
extensive de facto concurrency, has generated a variety of analyses and critiques 
revolving around concepts ranging from ‘cooperative federalism’ to ‘opportunistic 
federalism’. 
Cooperative practices have been most thoroughly investigated in Martin 
Painter’s 1998 book—Collaborative Federalism: economic reform in Australia in the 
1990s.  Painter’s main argument was that the quest for economic reform and not 
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federalism reform drove the development of the much closer working relationship 
between the Commonwealth and the States known as cooperative federalism.  
While this much more ‘integrated’ model is described as ‘cooperative’ and features 
a number of collaborative institutions and arrangements, Painter (1998, 32) 
emphasises that it remained nonetheless ‘adversarial’.  The imperative to work 
together cannot change the fact that the Commonwealth and States have 
“competing images of cooperative federalism: the Commonwealth had in mind a 
centrally managed, collaborative model, and the states mostly had in mind moving 
towards an arms-length, balanced relationship of mutual respect, and were 
attracted to a model of competitive federalism” (Painter 1998, 12). This form of 
federalism has advanced centralisation as the Commonwealth is a single unified 
body while the States have difficulty acting as a unified bloc.  The fiscal power of 
the Commonwealth will always be a dampener to State sovereignty and 
individuality. 
In a later work, Painter (2001, 149) argued that “the Australian federation 
will evolve as a system of multi-level governance in a way that undermines the 
constitutional forms on which its constituent units, and the union itself, were 
based”.  The Commonwealth uses sub-constitutional mechanisms and institutions 
to increase centralisation.  Painter’s view can be summarised as cooperative 
federalism has been mainly responsible for change to the balance of powers. 
Following on from this view of cooperative federalism has been the detailed 
case study by Stephen Jones (2008) that argues the Commonwealth has used the 
Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs 
(MCEETYA) to achieve its policy goals in those areas.  The fact of its fiscal power and 
the single Commonwealth entity vis-à-vis the diverse State and Territory entities, 
has facilitated its preeminent role in this policy making domain.  The 
Commonwealth has been able to use “its fiscal and constitutional superiority to 
implement its own agenda” (Jones 2008, 7). 
Another view on cooperative federalism by Cliff Walsh (2008) considered 
the relationship between governments and their agencies in economic and political 
terms.  The cooperative approach facilitated by sub-constitutional mechanisms is 
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“sometimes highly desirable and productive [but], is not invariably ‘a good thing’ 
from the perspective of applying democratic principles” (Walsh 2008, 566).  He also 
observed that generally only changes that benefited the Commonwealth got 
traction and were successfully implemented.  Many of these changes were due to 
the fact of spillovers (Walsh 2008, 579–580) or achieving economies of scale (Walsh 
2008, 570-571) for which the Commonwealth was the natural responder and 
willingly took on additional responsibilities.  
The emergence of a highly integrated and centrally-led federalism in 
Australia has also led some authors to focus on the need to adapt to those realities. 
Selway (2001), for instance, has argued that the States need to reform their 
institutions so they can effectively work with the Commonwealth in order to ensure 
prosperity across the whole of the federation.  The key to reform is for the States to 
understand their primary role is service delivery, not policy making, and under the 
new cooperative model this is their assigned role. This is because “the 
Commonwealth has become the pre-eminent source of policy on any issue that it 
chooses; the states have primarily become the providers of services which are 
funded by the Commonwealth and where the Commonwealth determines broad 
standards of quality” (Selway 2001, 120). 
 Similarly, Menzies (2012) recognised that regardless of this type of 
federalism having many critics—who see it as an undemocratic means for 
government to function in Australia—cooperation is the way forward.  This 
approach allows “intergovernmental decision-making within the context of the 
global economy” (Menzies 2012, 2).  Executive federalism provides political leaders 
with the pragmatic means for fixing issues—problem-solving for current political 
issues.  The expansion of COAG—the peak intergovernmental instrument, is 
beneficial to political leaders by providing more expedient and effective problem 
solving instruments, generally not available in such a timely manner through 
parliaments and the constitutional decision-making structure.  Executive federalism 
diminishes the role of constitutional and political institutions but improves the 
effectiveness of government. 
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The concept of pragmatic federalism can be seen as representing the 
culmination of this line of interpretation. According to Robyn Hollander and Haig 
Patapan (2007, 281), changes to Australian federalism (in the period from Hawke to 
the Howard Governments) are best characterised as ‘pragmatic’: “a direct 
engagement or confrontation with pressing problems, an engagement unmediated 
by larger theoretical concerns”.  Supported by the High Court, this approach has 
favoured the Commonwealth at the expense of the States and centralisation has 
increased. Compelling problems provided a window of opportunity for the 
Commonwealth to deal with them and this simply expanded the scope and range of 
federal powers.  Consistently, the Commonwealth has been prepared to intrude 
into sub-national governments matters concerned with new and emerging 
problems. Cases studies cited by Hollander and Patapan to support their hypothesis 
include the establishment and development of COAG; National Competition Policy 
(NCP); national gun control following the Port Arthur massacre; and the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST).   
The alternative view to these analyses emphasising cooperation and 
pragmatism is to see a much more coercive aspect to the centralising trends in 
Australian federalism and a much more opportunistic use of Commonwealth 
power. From this perspective, intergovernmental relations are more adversarial 
and the Commonwealth more coercive in its use of fiscal and constitutional power 
over the States.  
Creeping centalisation is an alternative description of the opportunistic/ 
coercive approach characterised by the Commonwealth increasing its powers and 
government becoming more centralised in Australia.  This evaluation concludes that 
the current system fosters “creeping centralism (that) is dysfunctional” (Twomey 
2008, 57) and the Commonwealth obviously is benefiting from this, while States’ 
powers are diminishing.  Overall, heading in this direction is considered detrimental 
to the nation.  Fundamentally, the observation made about the evolving system of 
federalism is that the Commonwealth is both opportunistic and coercive and this 
increases its powers. 
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Similarly, Hollander and Patapan’s idea that centralisation is best 
understand as representing a relatively benign process of pragmatic adjustment 
whose direction has been determined by judicial decision-making has been 
contested by Alan Fenna (2012b).  Fenna argues that while in some areas the 
process has indeed been a relatively uncontentious one, pragmatic adjustment has 
not been the case across the board.  In many areas the Commonwealth has 
engaged in a policy expansionism that has been resisted or resented by the States 
and while the High Court has indeed facilitated centralisation, it has not been the 
driving force.  Underlying much of the centralisation, Fenna (2007a) argues, are a 
range of economic and social changes that have given a national dimension to 
problems that were previously only local.  In some instances this has given rise to 
pragmatic adjustment, but in others a more programmatic and sometimes 
‘opportunistic’ (Fenna 2007b, 305) centralisation has been evident. 
If Hollander and Patapan are correct, we ought to see evidence in policing of 
the same dynamics at work as in other policy areas as well as an important role for 
the High Court in directing change in a centralising way.  If, alternatively, Fenna is 
correct, we ought to see evidence of consensual, pragmatic, adjustment in some 
areas but not in others and the High Court playing a secondary role.  If the pattern 
does vary across policy areas as Fenna suggests, we need then to understand why. 
3.6 Drivers of Change to Federalism 
Given that there are competing views on how federalism has manifested itself and 
changed government operations and structures, at this stage before considering 
specific areas of government, it is worth taking a step back to consider the drivers 
of change to federalism. 
Primarily, it appears new and emerging problems or focussing events have 
required governments to develop solutions to the problems or respond to the 
events.  As they emerge or come to the surface, governments are being increasingly 
expected to take the role of problem-solver and provide solutions.  The past thirty 
years has seen for example the advent of globalisation and all of the associated 
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issues emanating from this phenomenon.  Generally, this has required national 
governments to take up the primary response role for addressing direct 
international problems and interrelated State challenges.  This is because they are 
seen to have the infrastructure, jurisdiction and resources to respond in an 
effective and timely manner.   
In Australia this approach to problem-solving has occurred in many areas of 
government activity, policing being a good example.  Many of the problems 
emanating from outside Australia have affected the community at both a national 
and state level and have in the case of some crime matters driven the involvement 
of the Commonwealth government in policing.   
The evidence to support the proposition that the problem solving role of 
government is a key driver of the centripetal trend and changed federalism can be 
found in some of the literature discussed previously.  Hollander and Patapan and 
their pragmatic federalism argument explains the centralist trend as being the 
result of problem identification, requiring immediate solutions and action through 
sub-constitutional processes and institutions to solve the problem under the 
auspices of cooperative federalism.  Their argument appears to fit well in areas of 
service provision where traditionally State governments are responsible, but now 
have difficulty providing the resources to do the job properly.  They provide the 
case study of Gun Control after the Port Arthur Massacre and three other cases,25 
to explain what was driving Commonwealth intervention in State matters.  These 
cases revolve around new problems and focusing events26 (Birkland 1998) that have 
national implications for which the Commonwealth wanted to become involved—
and critically had the capability to provide solutions.  The States, in all of the 
matters, agreed to Commonwealth involvement and solutions, in some cases with 
some reluctance, as in the case of uniform national gun laws (Hollander and 
Patapan 2007, 285–288). 
                                                        
25 In the section “Politics, Problems and Patterns” (pp. 285–288) there are four cases considered by 
Hollander and Patapan—Keating’s COAG; National Competition Policy; Gun Control; and GST. 
26
  A focusing event is defined as “an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably 
defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that 
are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to 
policy makers and public simultaneously” (Birkland 1998, 54). 
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Menzies supports this approach of fixing issues (Menzies 2012, 2; Hollander 
and Patapan 2007, 290) in a timely manner through sub-constitutional means like 
the use of COAG as being “in the national interest” (Menzies 2012, 2).  The 
conclusion that is drawn from consideration of these arguments is the 
Commonwealth is best positioned and is willing to help the States out, for it has the 
resources and desire to expand its powers in the national interest.   
Finally, when considering drivers of change and federalism, the fact of the 
Commonwealth’s opportunistic/coercive approach in many traditional areas of 
State government should be considered.  Over the past thirty years there have 
been a number of blunt intrusions into State affairs where the Commonwealth has 
come out on top.  In the areas of the environment with the Tasmanian Dam case,27 
Tasmania’s homosexual criminal laws28 and vocational training and tertiary 
education,29 the power of the Commonwealth has been exhibited.  Jones’ study of a 
ministerial council (Jones 2008) provides evidence of the Commonwealth’s agents 
in action; they are subtle but coercive, and the Commonwealth generally gets its 
way in the respective policy. 
3.7 Changing Federalism 
There are clearly a range of views concerning the change to Australian federalism 
and they are generally descriptive and focus on how change occurred in recent 
times. There are also explanatory opinions that focus on why change occurred and 
the relevant drivers.  The conclusion drawn from the discussion is that federalism is 
changing and there are competing views on how and why it occurred.   
In the following chapters the question of how and why change occurred in 
policing are tested against the experiences and events since 1970.  However, it 
                                                        
27
 The High Court successfully upheld the Commonwealth’s challenge to the state of Tasmania 
building a dam on the Franklin River on the grounds that its External Affairs powers i.e.it has entered 
international treaties concerning the protection of the environment, allowed it to override State 
legislation to build the dam—Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
28
 The Commonwealth passed the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth) to override 
Tasmania’s criminal laws in this area. 
29
 Since the Whitlam era successive governments of both political persuasions have undertaken a 
concerted campaign to control these traditional areas of State responsibility.  Basically, 
Commonwealth control has been achieved. 
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appears obvious at this stage that in respect to the changes in many areas of 
government, the operation of federalism has played a major role.  It has been 
identified that much of this changed approach to federalism is driven by 
governments continually having to deal with and resolve new and emerging 
problems affecting their communities and stakeholders.  This appears to have led in 
many instances to the need for national action for which the Commonwealth 
government is the preferred respondent vis-à-vis State government.   
This new federalism does on the face of it lead to increased centralisation 
for services like policing as opposed to the traditional standalone delivery of 
services by the States.  At this point it is appropriate to consider this practically and 
test the view on centralisation by examining the experience of two distinct areas of 
government service delivery, Education and Health.  Nationally, these areas are the 
largest and most costly areas for government service delivery. 
3.8 Federalism: Education and Health 
In these two main policy domains—education and health—a pattern can be 
identified that is in many ways typical of the centralisation that has occurred in 
Australian federalism. 
The starting point with these areas of government begins at Federation 
where they, like policing, were exclusively State government services and since the 
1970s have developed into concurrent areas of responsibility.  This expansion in 
Commonwealth activity in these areas has been undertaken by using both 
constitutional and sub-constitutional mechanisms.  An example of constitutional 
means has been the use of the equivocal references to health and education 
matters in section 51(xxiiA).30  Regardless, the Commonwealth government 
possesses only slivers of explicit enumerated powers to base much of its activism in 
these two areas of State government responsibility.   
                                                        
30
 A section inserted in the Constitution as a result of the 1946 ‘social services’ referendum and 
reads in part—51. (xxiiiA) the provision of …pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical 




3.8.1 Education and Federalism 
The Commonwealth’s involvement in education prior to the Whitlam government 
(1972–75) had been ad hoc, but from then on it has been concerted and significant.   
Post-Whitlam State education systems have been described as being subject to 
Commonwealth systematisation (Lingard 2000) with successive national 
governments applying policy inputs via the government’s capability to provide 
conditional funding.  Whitlam’s foray into education “was to be the engine for 
achieving a more socially just Australia” (Lingard 2000, 26) and this approach began 
with the commissioning of the Karmel Report and the implementation of many of 
the recommendations.  Successive governments, in particular Hawke then Keating 
took an active interest in education but were more pragmatic than the Whitlam 
government in the approach to issues and how they dealt with the States.  The 
motivation for Commonwealth involvement under these governments was more 
strategic and concerned national economic policy rather than issues of social 
equality.  Australia had to increase national productivity and international 
competitiveness (Hinz 2010) and the view of the Commonwealth was this could be 
achieved by improving the education systems of the States.  Since the 1970s, 
Commonwealth involvement in education has been justified on the grounds of 
national interest, for education was considered to be strategically important for 
both social equality and later for economic prosperity.  The economic imperative 
that began with the Hawke government also foreshadowed the division of 
education into three distinct subdivisions by policy makers: schools, universities and 
vocational education.  Tactically, this made it easier for the Commonwealth to 
target individually the three sectors rather than one large area.  Strategically, the 
incursions on an individual scale combined to make Commonwealth involvement 
for the whole area, significant. 
The mechanisms for exerting Commonwealth influence have generally 
followed the conventional approach and applied constitutional instruments and 
also to a lesser degree sub-constitutional processes.  The authority for many 
aspects of the constitutional approach can be traced to the 1946 referendum and 
the resulting section 51(xxxiiiA) ‘benefits to students’ being added to the 
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enumerated powers.   This added a specific power for the government that it has 
applied concurrently with the States.  But it has been the fiscal power of the 
Commonwealth has been the main instrument to make inroads into education.  The 
extent of Commonwealth funding for example is demonstrated by considering the 
2009/10 Commonwealth budget that provided the States with $21.1 billion in 
specific purpose funding (Australian Government 2009a).  According to the ABS in 
the recent years 2007 to 2010, funding for education by the Commonwealth 
government increased substantially and represents a significant amount of funding 
(ABS 2010).  The contributions to education are demonstrated by Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Total government education expenditure, by source of funds as a 
proportion of total expenditure, 2007–08 to 2009–11 (per cent) 
Government Level 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 
Commonwealth 34% 35% 50% 
State and local 
government 
66% 65% 50% 
Other processes used by the Commonwealth included establishing a 
national ministerial council for education, the Ministerial Council on Education, 
Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA).  The Council according to a 
study undertaken by Jones (2008) provided the Commonwealth with a forum that it 
has used to achieve its policy agenda.  Among the findings of the study were that 
the council’s agenda between 1994 and 2005 was dominated by the 
Commonwealth.31  This clearly evidenced the Commonwealth’s use of such a forum 
to achieve greater influence than the lesser governments. 
More recently the Commonwealth has established reform programs for 
education, including a national curriculum and national standards (MySchool 
program) that have been forced upon State governments.  These programs have 
been tied to Commonwealth funding and unequivocally demonstrates the federal 
government modus operandi.  
                                                        
31 Raising 42 per cent of issues followed by 19 per cent by NSW and 11 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively by Queensland and Victoria.   
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It can be concluded the Commonwealth increased its influence in education 
and it has become more centralised.  Primarily, the Commonwealth used fiscal 
means to achieve its current position.  An important fact to note concerning the 
Commonwealth’s involvement in education is it continues to be policy based 
without any operational capacity.  It does not own or operate any institutions and 
employs no academics, administrators and teachers to staff the education systems 
of States and Territories but is responsible for significant change and reform.  
There has been significant opposition to this centralisation and there has 
been widely reported conflict between the States and the Commonwealth on 
education issues.  Commonwealth involvement in education continues to grow 
“despite protestations by many a State minister for education that schooling is a 
Constitutional responsibility of the States” (Lingard 2000, 31).  Jones also offered an 
insight into opposition by the States to Commonwealth involvement into education 
policy, “a function that clearly belongs to the States” (Jones 2008, 171).  Jones 
concluded that the Commonwealth deliberately made policies “designed to 
overcome State resistance” (Jones 2008, 170).  Moodie’s 2007 article (Moodie 
2007) concerning Vocational Education also supported the proposition that conflict 
between the Commonwealth and States in the education sphere had been ongoing 
since the Whitlam era and continued on to the present.  The case of the 1992 
establishment of the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA) as a 
compromise after the failed Commonwealth attempt to take over the sector 
demonstrated the occasionally effective nature of State resistance.  Further 
attempts by the Commonwealth are outlined by Moodie up to 2005, all that were 
resisted.  The resistance to some of the recent Gonski education reforms by some 
States reinforces this and again shows that conflict between the federal partners in 
this area is a fact of life as the recent head line in an article on the topic shows: 
“The Federal Government has backed down on schools funding after a row with a 
majority of the states and territories” (Perth Now News 2013).  
With education, centralisation was achieved predominantly by coercive 
fiscal means and the States have and continue to resist the Commonwealth’s 
intrusions.  It has not been a consensual or pragmatic process. 
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3.8.2 Health and Federalism 
The Australian health sector is the largest area of government expenditure in 
Australia and is dominated by State government operated health services, while 
there is also a significant private element to the sector.  Primarily, the 
Commonwealth funds State health systems and in the 2009/10 budget allocated 
$12.138b for specific purpose grants for health (Australian Government 2009).  The 
funds go to governments to be spent on specific health programs subject to agreed 
outcome targets.  According to research by the NSW Parliamentary Library 
Research Service in 2004/05 (Griffith 2006), 66.8 per cent of recurrent costs of 
those sub-national health services were derived from the Commonwealth.  While 
according to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), when the total 
health bill for the nation is tallied, and taking into account non-government 
sources, the Commonwealth contributed about 44 per cent annually between 2007 
and 2010.  The table below was derived from the AIHW 2010/11, Health 
Expenditure Australia report (AIHW 2012). 
Figure 3.2: Total sources of funding for health, by source of funds as a proportion 







Individuals Other Total 
 
2007/08 43.2 25.5 68.7 7.6 16.8 6.9 31.3 
2008/09 44.1 25.1 69.1 7.8 17.1 6 30.9 
2009/10 43.7 26.3 69.9 7.5 17.5 5.0 30.1 
This snapshot of health funding illustrates the critical role played by the 
Commonwealth government in keeping State and Territory health systems 
functioning.  The role of the national government originally was insignificant as it 
was the responsibility of the States alone, the Commonwealth having only one 
health responsibility, quarantine.  It should be noted many of the principal health 
service providers at Federation and well into the century were non-government and 
included churches, charities, entrepreneurs (mainly doctors) and friendly societies.  
In the second half of the twentieth century State governments increased their 
participation in the provision of public health services and hospitals.  In the case of 
hospitals some States now totally control this area of health services and hospitals 
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both public and private, operate under government regulation and license, and rely 
heavily on the State receiving Commonwealth funding. 
In the first half of the century after Federation a number of initiatives were 
undertaken by the Commonwealth to expand its role and influence in health areas.  
The first venture was in 1921 with the establishment of the Commonwealth 
Department of Health which apart from its enumerated quarantine power, became 
involved in State health matters by funding programs concerned with national 
disease outbreaks and ongoing problems like Hookworm, TB and venereal disease.  
The Commonwealth also used sub-constitutional processes to influence health 
policy and in 1926 established the Federal Health Council, constituted by the 
Commonwealth Director of Health and State department heads.  This body 
developed into the peak national research body for health policy and after 1937 
became known as the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).  The 
Council later changed its role and is now an independent research agency funded 
by the Commonwealth.   
The most recent developments occurred under the COAG reforms in the late 
1990s when the health sector (along with other key areas) was included in the raft 
of ministerial councils that sit below the peak leaders’ forum.  The peak ministerial 
body is the Standing Council on Health (SCOH) that has the Australian Health 
Workforce Ministerial Council (AHWMC) and the Australian Health Ministers' 
Advisory Council (AHMAC) amongst the bodies reporting to it.  Below these two 
councils is a network of committees and groups tasked in respect to individual 
aspects and issues of the health portfolio.   
The treatment of the health sector like the other areas of State government 
activity contained in the COAG structure resulted in health being considered as a 
concurrent area of government responsibility, shared between the Commonwealth 
and State governments.  In respect to constitutional processes, the 1946 
amendments to the Constitution provided formal powers at section 51(xxiiiA) 
concerning health related matters of “The provision of …pharmaceutical, sickness 
and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorise any 
form of civil conscription)”.  These powers have been used as an instrument to 
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expand the Commonwealth’s role in health reforms of the 1970s, the most 
important being the establishment of the national health insurance system.  It was 
the Whitlam reform government (1972–75) that made the most significant foray 
into the health sector, using the section 51 powers and fiscal power to fuel reform 
and increased centralisation.  That culminated in the Hawke government’s 1983 
establishment of Medicare.  Since then, regardless of the ideology of successive 
Commonwealth governments, they continue to provide the majority of funds for 
State health services. 
The tension between the Commonwealth and sub-national governments 
over health issues is played out in the media on a regular basis and continues to be 
a topical political issue.  State opposition to centralisation has been identified in the 
recent works of a number of researchers on health services and federalism.  
Philippon and Braithwaite described opposition by the States as political 
turbulence: “It is a logically plausible, but politically turbulent, possibility for the 
Commonwealth to assume much more responsibility for the whole health system” 
(Philippon and Braithwaite 2008, 182).  France (2008, 687) described the 
Commonwealth’s intrusions into health care as “a source of significant 
intergovernmental tension”.  A recent and typical example of disagreement 
between the respective governments was the Rudd hospital reforms.  Proposed in 
2010 and heralded by a speech at the National Press Club in which the Prime 
Minister clearly acknowledged the fact of State resistance to Commonwealth 
reforms in health: “If the states and territories do not sign up to fundamental 
reform, then my message is equally simple: we will take this reform plan to the 
people at the next election” (The Australian 2010). 
The position of the States was reported immediately after and they in most cases 
went on the defensive and as reported on the News Weekly website on March 20: 
Some states are showing strong early signs of resisting the PM's 
plan. The WA Liberal Government flatly rejected it. Said Premier 
Colin Barnett: "We will not tolerate a situation where, from 
Canberra, all the decisions relating to our hospitals and most of 
the healthcare decisions are made".   
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The NSW Government says it will not consider the plan until the 
recommendations of the Henry Tax Review—which was 
completed in December, but which Mr Rudd has been too afraid 
to release—are aired and debated.  Premier Kristina Kenneally 
says a new carve-up of the GST should not be discussed until all 
parties understand where the national tax system is heading.   
And Victoria, which most strongly resisted John Howard's Murray-
Darling takeover, is opposed to a plan which is unlikely to provide 
any real benefits.  Premier John Brumby, who prides himself on his 
economic management, is least likely to agree to a reduction in his 
slice of the GST pie. 
Only the South Australian and Tasmanian premiers, both in the 
middle of tight election campaigns, were warm to the idea, but 
that co-operation may change the day after polling day (News 
Weekly 2010). 
Health services are a critical political issue at all levels of government and 
polling continues to show it has high priority for the electorate.32  Again as with 
education, the Commonwealth is not a service provider in its own right and owns 
no infrastructure or employs staff, apart from in the original quarantine area and 
the Medicare bureaucracy.  Thus, in order for the Commonwealth to achieve its 
goals it relies on the States to implement its policies, rather than provide services in 
its own right. 
The Commonwealth is the major source of funding for all public and State 
operated health systems (Bennett 2009; Deeble 1996; France 2008; Griffith 2006; 
Philippon 2008).  The quid pro quo since the Whitlam era has been control or at 
least significant influence of the policy agenda in specific areas of the sector.  
Primarily the States allow this to happen because of the fact of VFI—they own the 
service responsibility but not the means to fund its operation.   
3.8.3 Education, Health and Federalism 
When considering the federalism aspects of State operated areas of government 
service provision, there are a range of similarities in the means used by the 
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areas for the 2013 election—available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-09/vote-compass-
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Recent Australian Financial Review survey showed Health and Hospitals to be the most important 




Commonwealth to engage and control many aspects of them, most importantly the 
policy agenda.  Consequently, the areas are characterised by increased 
centralisation, especially after the Whitlam years.   
The use of mechanisms such as fiscal power, enumerated powers and 
intergovernmental relations—have provided the Commonwealth with an effective 
means of influencing and in some instances controlling both these areas of service 
delivery.  The Commonwealth has not become an operator in its own right of these 
services but critically has been able to use its power to gain and maintain effective 
control.  The Commonwealth approach and modus operandi has been 
fundamentally the same in these two areas and its unrelenting pressure through 
funding and influencing policy making has been successful.   
One feature, pointed out in the respective discussions on education and 
health, was the fact of ongoing resistance by the States to Commonwealth 
intrusions at a policy level.  This situation between the Commonwealth and the 
States was observed by Ramamurthy (2012) in her research on tied grants and 
policy reform in public hospitals and schools.  Importantly, she observed the nature 
of relations between the respective governments in terms of policy-making 
initiated by the Commonwealth was generally resisted: “the Commonwealth is 
susceptible to open or passive resistance from states and local stakeholders, 
causing the delay, remodelling or even the quashing of tied grants” (Ramamurthy 
2012, 118). 
3.8.4 Federalism and Competing for Control 
The struggle for control between the Commonwealth and State governments 
concerning significant aspects of the education and health policy sectors 
demonstrates some key aspects and characteristics of the operation of Australian 
federalism.  The strategy and tactics used by the Commonwealth to shift the two 
areas to concurrent status has been successful.  This has resulted in it becoming 
dominant by successfully controlling much of the policy agenda, regardless of the 
fact it provides no services itself.  It appears the real work is left to the States while 
the Commonwealth influences the extent and how they deliver services.  
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Centralisation of areas of service delivery is increasing and there is no end in sight 
for the States.  Centralisation in the main is characterised by ongoing but 
unsuccessful State resistance and the relentless application of Commonwealth fiscal 
power. 
3.9 Policing and Commonwealth Politics 
Before concluding the chapter, it is worth noting that the topic of policing and 
federalism has not been an issue of interest or attention from the media or 
academia in recent times.  This is primarily due to the fact that there is little or no 
literature on the specific topic.  The reality is it has been the subject of fierce 
political debate in the Commonwealth Parliament on a number of occasions since 
Federation.  Three major debates took place in 1918 (Catts 1918; Ferricks 1918), 33 
1925 (Pearce 1957; Bruce 1925) 34and 1957 (Ward 1957; Evatt 1957; Fraser 1957; 
Kennelly 1957; Aylett 1957; Spooner 1957). 35 All of these debates and legislation 
that followed centred on the primary federalism issue of the Commonwealth’s role 
in respect to policing.  Labor consistently opposed Coalition government initiatives 
to provide federal police agencies and did not even countenance a role for the 
Commonwealth in the enforcement of its own laws.   
The grounds for Labor opposition to Commonwealth policing according to 
the parliamentary debates were consistent and took the view a national police 
agency would be used by conservative governments to suppress unions and stiffle 
political opposition.  This Labor view concerning Commonwealth policing changed 
with the election of the Whitlam Government and likewise continued in Opposition.   
Importantly for the policy position of all succesive Commonwealth 
governments after 1979, there has been continuous bipartisan support for all 
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 Parliamentary debate concerning a no confidence motion in Prime Minister Hughes centred on his 
government’s continuance of funding of the Commonwealth Police. 
34 Parliamentary debate concerned the establishment of the Peace Officers Guard to be used to 
break the strike on the wharves in NSW and WA where these governments stopped their police 
forces from assisting Commonwealth officers in breaking the strike. 
35
 This was the most vitriolic opposition to establishing a Commonwealth police agency and harked 
back to the bitter 1951 Banning the Communist Party referendum and surrounding debate and the 




policing legislation in the Commonwealth Parliament.  The point of mentioning the 
debate about Commonwealth policing, from a federalism perspective, is that having 
bipartisan support in the parliament has ensured that the advancement of 
Commonwealth policing has been a less arduous task for federal governments.  As 
will be seen later, bipartisan support is an important factor when considering how a 
changed federalism impacted on policing and other areas of government services. 
3.10 Conclusion: Federalism and Centralisation 
The conclusion reached from the discussion on Australian federalism is that it has 
displayed an increasingly centralised trend.  This has been as a result of the 
Commonwealth’s activism being driven by the need, both real and perceived, to 
deal with an increasingly complex range of problems that affect the electorate.  The 
recent experience of traditional State responsibilities like education and health 
provided a clear example concerning this view of the evolution of federalism in 
Australia.   
The discussion on federalism used a range of literature that was discussed in 
the chapter.  That material showed there was widespread agreement that the 
balance of power between the Commonwealth and States has changed and the 
federation has become more centralised, especially since the Whitlam government 
of the early 1970s.  This trend continued under successive Commonwealth 
governments, regardless of their political ideology.  Traditionally, Labor was 
centralist and Liberal decentralist.  “The Labor party has had a strongly centralising 
‘overarching conception of federalism’ that has deeply influenced its practice over 
the decades since Federation” (Fenna 2012b, 583).   
Interestingly in parliamentary debates concerning Commonwealth policing, 
Labor consistently opposed Coalition government centralisation initiatives and did 
not even countenance a role for the Commonwealth, even in the enforcement of its 
own laws.   This Labor view concerning Commonwealth policing changed with the 
election of the Whitlam Government and likewise continued in Opposition.  After 
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1979, bipartisan support has been the hallmark of policing legislation in the 
Commonwealth Parliament. 
The extent of centralisation in the federation has increased over the past 
forty years in the traditionally State owned areas of education and health, and it 
appears that this may also be the case for policing.  Much of the capability to 
centralise power by Commonwealth governments was because it simply had the 
desire “to take the lead position in any area of policy it chooses” (Jones 2008, 171) 
and set its own agenda in those fields.  The Commonwealth seems to have had 
considerable scope to pick and choose what areas of public policy and service 
provision it becomes involved in, vis-a-vis States primarily mandated to specific 
areas of service delivery.  To go further in respect to the implied ambitions of the 
Commonwealth, former Labor Premier and Federal parliamentarian Carmen 
Lawrence recently speculated—“It may be, as some have suggested, that we are 
witnessing the death throes of the States as anything other than service providers 
for Commonwealth-devised programs” (Lawrence 2013). 
There are a number of competing views—such as cooperative, coercive and 
pragmatic federalism—which describe and explain federalism and its role in 
changing government services like policing. At this point no conclusion concerning 
policing can be made.  Instead, the logical sequence from here is to consider in 
detail the experience of policing in Australia since 1970 in the context of the 





CHAPTER FOUR: THE NATIONAL INTEGRATION OF POLICING 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the evolution of Australian policing with emphasis on the 
social change, political and focusing events along with the decisions that set in 
motion the process of national integration that occurred after 1970.  The chapter 
aims to characterise and explain the journey policing took to get where it was by 
2010.   
The chapter analyses the changes to Australian policing that occurred 
between Federation and the 1970s and then focuses in greater detail on the 
periods 1980 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010.  Over this thirty-year period, the 
aggregated sum of resources provided to policing by governments grew at a rate 
greater than increases in both the population (nationally and in each State and the 
two main Territories) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI).36  In particular, over the 
two most recent periods the Commonwealth’s involvement in policing grew from a 
relatively low base in 1979 to providing one of the larger police agencies (out of the 
eight) in the nation.  For such a major change to occur within the structure of 
government, and in such a short time-frame, this was unprecedented.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth’s recently acquired role in policing is the logical focus of the 
chapter, for this it will be argued in this and later chapters, is the reason why 
Australian policing has changed forever.  Fundamentally, this change has been 
facilitated through the operation of Australian federalism and its institutions. 
Underpinning the evolution of policing was the significant increase in crime 
rates across Australia that became a major problem for governments at all levels in 
the federation.  Importantly, the increased criminal activity was for the first time 
recognised as being linked in many aspects to the activities of national and 
international organised crime groups.  This was one aspect of the findings of a 
number of royal commission inquiries undertaken by both the Commonwealth and 
State governments (Woodward 1979; Williams 1980; Costigan 1980).  The other 
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 Appendix A, Chart 14 and 15 demonstrates this proposition. 
69 
 
aspect of the findings was the independent State police agencies were not 
structured, resourced or empowered to respond to crime operating beyond their 
borders.  There were also a number of focusing events (Birkland 1998) interrelated 
to the other events and problems that clearly accelerated change in policing and led 
to national integration being achieved.   
In setting the scene for considering how policing grew generally and how 
Commonwealth policing grew specifically, it must be acknowledged that 
governments at all levels also grew over this period at a greater rate than ever 
before.  This view is supported by Novak: "Public expenditure by all levels of 
Australian government, as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), is now about 
39 per cent (2014). Prior to the global financial crisis (GFC), in 2007 08, the spending 
to GDP ratio was 35.8 per cent. Prior to the election of the Whitlam government in 
December 1972 it was 27 per cent of GDP. This represents a massive increase in the 
size of government in Australia” (Novak 2014, 1).  It was further concluded about 
the size of government that “the clear suggestion that can be drawn from the 
available measures is that governments in Australia have grown in size over the 
long run and especially since the second half of the twentieth century” (Novak 
2013, 44).  This view has been supported by Stephen Kircher’s research into the 
growth of government: “The growth in the size of government in Australia is subject 
to relatively little scrutiny or debate.  According to former Australian Treasury 
Secretary Ken Henry, ‘the close to 6 percentage points of GDP [gross domestic 
product] expansion in government expenditure during the Whitlam Government 
has never been reversed.  And I think I can safely say that it never will be’” (Kircher 
2011, 1). 
The chapter begins with a historical narrative.  It then brings together the 
analyses and information concerning sub-national and Commonwealth policing and 
details the evolution and development of policing in a social and political context, 
which led to the current Australian policing structure and arrangements—the 
national integration of policing.   
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This chapter sets the scene for the next, which in the context of the 
Australian federation and system of government, analyses the shift in policing and 
explores the drivers that were responsible for change. 
4.2 Australian Policing Background—1901 to 1979 
In the federation discussions and conventions of the 1890s, policing was never 
discussed in the context of the enumerated powers to be provided to the 
Commonwealth.  The only mention of Commonwealth policing involved the matter 
of which government would be responsible for providing a police force for the new, 
yet to be identified, location of the national capital.  In the discussion of 28 January 
1898, at the Melbourne Federation Convention it was agreed: “If the 
Commonwealth undertakes the government of a piece of country only 10 miles 
square, it must completely govern that country, including the establishment of its 
own force of police” (Barton 1898).  The interpretation of the position taken by 
Barton and evidently also supported by the other delegates was the States would 
be left to police their own jurisdictions, while the Commonwealth would take 
responsibility to police any territories.  It never precluded the Commonwealth from 
policing and administering its own laws but obviously from the start of Federation it 
chose not to have its own police force. 
Up to 1979 the Australian police structure was basically operating as it had 
since Federation and in the colonial years,37 with the States carrying full 
responsibility for local policing and the Commonwealth relying on the State police 
for most of its policing needs.  As well, all prosecutions of Commonwealth offences 
were undertaken in State and Territory courts (still the case for most criminal 
offences) using their criminal law procedures and laws of evidence.  There were 
eventually two Commonwealth Territory police forces providing state-like policing 
services to the Northern Territory (1926) and the Australian Capital Territory 
(1927).  For all intents and purposes these operated independently from the 
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 Appendix B provides a summary of colonial policing.  At Federation each colony had a single police 
force.  Previously most colonies had decentralised policing but it was finally centralised in each 
colony by 1898 (Tasmania was the last colony to centralise). 
71 
 
Commonwealth bureaucracy and were under the control of the Administrator of 
the NT and the Governor-General, respectively.   
The Commonwealth did establish four police agencies over that period, but 
they were police agencies in name only and their functions were mostly outside 
what was defined at the time to be policing.  It should be noted it was only in 1917 
when the first agency was established.  The four agencies were:   
1. A Commonwealth Police Force was established in 1917, under the 
regulations of the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth).  The Force existed primarily 
to monitor the activities of war-time unlawful associations in Queensland and 
was disbanded in 1919.38  
2. The Commonwealth Investigation Branch was established by 
administrative means in 1919 and focussed on national security.  In 1945, it was 
re-named the Commonwealth Investigation Service (CIS) with responsibility for 
investigation and security concerning Commonwealth government 
responsibilities.  In 1949 the national security function was handed over to the 
newly established Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).  
1. In 1925 the Peace Officers Guard was established as a result of the 
Commonwealth government’s inability to enforce its laws on the waterfront in 
respect to the British seaman’s strike and union blockades of the wharves.  It 
continued until 1960. 
2. The Commonwealth Police Force was established in 1960 by 
amalgamating the Peace Officers Guard and CIS.   
It is noteworthy that the first meaningful foray into policing by the 
Commonwealth came in 1960 when the second Commonwealth Police Force was 
established.39  Its main function was physical security and some investigations of 
property crime (i.e. fraud and stealing from Commonwealth agencies and 
                                                        
38 The impetus for the action was an incident in November 1917 in which eggs were thrown at Prime 
Minister Billy Hughes at a conscription rally in Queensland.  When Hughes ordered a Queensland 
policeman to arrest the assailant the officer responded that he did not accept Hughes’ authority and 
only recognised Queensland laws.   
39 This was the second Commonwealth Police Force in name but this one was established by 
legislation while the original was established administratively.  
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departments).  Later the Commonwealth Police established a national intelligence 
unit, the Australian Crime Intelligence Centre (ACIC) to work with the State and 
Territory police agencies.  However, the Centre was unsuccessful in that role, 
serving as only a collector of statistics and not an effective intelligence provider 
(Williams 1980, B174–175). 
The function of the State and Territory police agencies over this period had 
not changed significantly and it was only in the late 1960s that the actual functions 
of policing began to expand because of a number of significant economic, social and 
cultural changes (Manne 1999; Mukherjee 1987; Crowley 1986).  Interestingly, the 
ratio of people to police officers decreased substantially from the Second World 
War—i.e. there are now more police per head of population.  Figure 4.1 illustrates 
this fact.  It should be noted these statistics have been derived from the Australian 
Year Book series, which from its inception used this form of measurement to assess 
how many people in the population there were for every police officer employed by 
governments.  (Currently police numbers to population are measured on officers 
per 100,000 population basis).40 
Figure 4.1: Police officers in proportion to population in Australia 1940–2010 
 
After the Second World War, Australia enjoyed great economic prosperity 
and linked to economic prosperity and social and cultural change was the 
recreational use of illicit drugs that resulted in a cohort of drug addicts, funding 
their habit with petty property crime.  The consequences of the new phenomenon 
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192 & 263; 1950 YBA 1954 Pp. 330 &505; 1960 YBA 1963 Pp. 306 & 684; 1970 YBA 1973 Pp. 130 & 
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of illicit drug use were extraordinary and considered to be a major factor 
responsible for increases in crime levels never before experienced in Australia 
(Mukherjee 1986; Crowley 1986; Mukherjee, Neuhaus and Walker 1990). By the 
end of the period the scope and range of police functions was beginning to change 
for State and Territory police agencies and this was the beginning also of the annual 
independent record-keeping process of police by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS).  The personnel statistics were crudely accounted for in the Australian Year 
Book series that was first begun in the 1940 Year Book and was expanded to 
provide more in-depth statistics after 1990.  It was only in the 1981 Year Book that 
Commonwealth Policing was recognised in the police aggregate statistics. 
4.3 Policing Developments 1980 to 2000 
The twenty year period from 1980 to 2000 was one of marked change to policing in 
Australia in many respects, but primarily by the Commonwealth expansion into this 
area of traditional State responsibility and service delivery.  1980 represented the 
effective starting point for the shift that changed the policing landscape forever.  At 
the start of the period policing was still dominated by the State police agencies and 
the newly formed AFP was the nation’s second smallest police agency.  According 
to ABS statistics, over the next twenty years Australia’s population increased by 32 
per cent with some States and Territories having significant growth like Queensland 
(60 per cent), NT (62 per cent) and WA (50 per cent).  South Australia (16 per cent) 
and Tasmania (11 per cent) had below average population increases.  The larger 
States of NSW and Victoria maintained consistent growth rates of 26 per cent and 
23 per cent respectively.  Over the same period inflation was calculated at 104 per 
cent.   
On the basis of the rudimentary statistics for population and inflation, 
personnel numbers and funding for the period increased disproportionally over the 
20 year period.  What occurred across all police agencies was an accelerated 
growth trend and of note is the AFP grew at the smallest rate in terms of Personnel.   
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Figure 4.2: Australian Police Agencies Personnel Growth 1980/81–1999/2000 
 
Source: Appendix A Chart 3 
As to funding over this period, reliable uniform data relating to funding of 
police agencies was only available after 1993 and the period between then and 
2000 is interesting.  As evidenced from Figure 4.3, over this period AFP funding was 
just above national average. 
Figure 4.3: Australian Police Agencies Funding Growth 1993/94–1999/2000 
 
Source: Appendix A Chart 6 
A new issue that had an impact on policing and was something outside the 
scope of the normal problem-driven variables was managerialism (Vickers and 
Kouzmin 2001).  Police agencies like all other government agencies increased their 
administrative resources and internal structures to cope with the demands for 










































did and how it went about its business became a part of the agency’s function after 
the 1990s.  Labelled as managerialism in this analysis, additional resources for 
police agencies were provided by government to cope with the new requirements 
mandated by all governments.  The extent and complexity of information required 
by government varied in jurisdictions but regardless of that the size and complexity 
of agency annual reports for all agencies evidenced the substantial increase of 
resources needed to service the mandated information and collection of data.  By 
2000 managerialism was adding functions and contributing to additional personnel 
and funding.  This growth caused by it would continue into the next decade. 
The early 1980s also saw for the first time a new strategic approach to the 
crime problems affecting the nation and several key initiatives were undertaken by 
the Commonwealth government with the support of the States.  These included the 
formation of the Australian Police Ministers Council (APMC) in 1980; the 
establishment of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI); and the 
creation of the National Crime Authority.  All three provide clear evidence of 
policing being changed and in particular it was a business that had to address 
problems of a national and international nature.  These three entities are 
considered in more detail later in the chapter when the political developments 
related to the expansion of policing in general, and Commonwealth policing in 
particular, are considered. 
Interestingly, when taking into account indicators of growth for agencies as 
provided in the Statistics Appendix A—AFP personnel grew by 30 per cent in the 
first ten years of the period and then decreased by 14 per cent over the next ten 
years.  Over the whole period as stated previously, it grew by 10 per cent, well 
below the average rate.  By the end of the decade the AFP was simply treading 
water and not going anywhere.  There was a shortage of personnel and resources 
to cope with the demand on existing tasking and the agency was looking to raise its 
profile (Baker 2004, 151). 
By the end of the millennium the AFP had been around for 20 years and 
when it and the NCA were factored into the structure of Australian policing, policing 
had become more national in character with Commonwealth policing by 2000 
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established as a legitimate component.  However, the relative size of 
Commonwealth policing was in decline in the later part of the period and from 1993 
on did not enjoy the same expansion and profile of State agencies (Baker 2004, 
150).  This was all about to change with events and political decisions to come after 
2001. 
4.4 Contemporary Policing Developments 2001 to 2010 
Policing in Australia changed significantly again after 2001 as a result of decisions 
made on a political level by both Commonwealth and State governments.  The 
growth of subnational policing grew in terms of personnel and funding at a rate 
proportionate to the population increases of each State and Territory, while the 
AFP grew at a far greater rate in terms of both personnel and funding.  Figure 4.3 
demonstrates the respective increases of population, agency personnel and funding 
for the ten year period. 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of Growth for Population, Police Personnel and Funding, 
2000/01–2009/10 
 
Source: Appendix A Chart 15 
The chart reveals two distinct experiences across policing for the decade.  
The first experience involved the sub-national agencies that grew in terms of 
personnel and funding.  Funding grew at a much greater rate than personnel 
numbers.   
NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT AFP Australia
Population % 12 16 26 22 10 8 17 17 17
Personnel % 12 22 33 24 22 11 46 105 26










Additionally, over the decade managerialism drove many changes and was 
motivated by increased executive government accountability for agencies in terms 
of efficiency and effectiveness.  This created new police agency internal 
organisations dedicated to both quantitative and qualitative data collection and 
research, and was a uniform trend for all agencies (Vickers and Kouzmin 2001; 
Fleming and Scott 2008).   
The second experience involved Commonwealth policing, and as the chart 
demonstrated, the national population grew by 17 per cent over the period yet the 
AFP had a significant rate of expansion in both personnel and funding, much greater 
than the sub-national agencies.  Clearly, something occurred in the decade to 
increase AFP personnel by five times the rate of State and Territory police and four 
times the rate in respect to funding.   
The ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 and later the 2002 Bali 
bombing were focusing events that presented the Commonwealth and State 
governments with threats of terrorism to Australia and challenged governments to 
provide a policing structure capable of dealing with the threat (Baker 2004; 
McFarlane 2007; Keelty 2008; Williams 2011; Deflem 2005; Lemieux 2010).  
Additionally, there was clearly a link between terrorist groups and international and 
national organised crime groups.  The problem of organised crime had been 
bubbling away since the 1970s and the reality was the intelligence-based strategy 
centred on the NCA and ABCI was ineffective.  Terrorist and organised crime groups 
had many links and in the Middle East and Western Asia there were prime 
examples of the synergy between groups producing opium and funding terrorism, 
narcoterrorism (Clark 2008). 
The perceived dual threat of terrorism and organised crime to Australia was 
a theme taken up with enthusiasm by the Commonwealth government and this led 
to the 2002 Leaders Summit on Terrorism and Multi-Jurisdictional Crime,41 attended 
by State, Territory and Commonwealth government leaders.  Appendix E contains 
documents that relate to the Summit and the main intergovernmental agreements 
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 The Summit was held on 4 April 2002 at Canberra and was initiated by the Prime Minster. 
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that followed, many that directly affected policing.  The developments and changes 
to policing are considered later in the chapter.   
It was clear by the end of 2010 that the previous thirty year period had 
provided significant changes to policing as policing in 2010 bore no resemblance to 
the past structure found in 1980, and was even substantially different to that of 
2000.   
Recounting the change to policing in terms of its main causes and how it 
was facilitated is the next aspect to be considered in the chapter and this is 
undertaken under two intertwined headings over the whole period 1970–2010.  
Firstly, social change and the related increase in crime are considered in the context 
of it being an important precursor that led to changes in policing.  Secondly, the 
political decision making by governments to change policing is considered. 
4.5 Social Change and Crime 
After the Second World War, Australia enjoyed great economic prosperity and by 
the 1980s a serious crime problem developed—“Reported crimes for Australia have 
risen by almost two-thirds, from 845,923 in 1980-81 to 1.41 million in 1988-89” 
(Walker and Henderson 2003,1) and “this rising level of reported crime has 
provoked reactions at many levels of society” (Walker and Henderson 2003,1-2). 
From a policing perspective the most serious area impacting on State 
agencies was illicit drugs use that developed from the 1970s and resulted in an 
inordinate increase in property crime: in 1973–74, 110,000 cases of breaking and 
entering were reported; this more than doubled by 1982–83 to 260,000 reports 
(ABS 1985, 236).  The 1985 Year Book of Australia provides some meaningful 
statistics and discussion on the increase in drug crime, beginning with a table on 
drug seizures by federal agencies from 1977 to 1984.  In 1974, 11.7 kilograms of 
heroin and 741 kilograms of cannabis were seized.  The respective figures for 1984 
were 101.5 kilograms of heroin and 6,912 kilograms of cannabis (ABS 1985, 235).  
The consequences of the new phenomenon of illicit drug use and related crimes put 
pressure on governments to increase police resources.  This fact was noted in the 
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same Year Book (1985) while Mukherjee and Dagger also commented that because 
of these crime increases “community groups react by persuading governments to 
take stronger measures against crime.  The 15 years between 1973-74 and 1987-88 
have seen a 59 per cent increase in the number of uniformed police officers in 
Australian police departments” (1990).   
The serious illicit drug and crime problems in Australia were dramatically 
increasing (like other Western nations) and policing these problems became a 
critical issue for governments.  The functions of the State and Territory police 
agencies had not changed significantly and it was only in the late 1970s when the 
actual functions of policing began to expand because of these related problems 
(Manne 1999; Mukherjee 1987; Crowley 1986).  Significantly, at this time the 
Commonwealth government was solely responsible for the prevention and 
detection of the importation of illicit drugs such as cannabis, cocaine and heroin. 42   
The type of crimes attributed to drugs ranged from low level property crime 
such as house breaking and stealing, to the successful operation of both national 
and international organised crime groups trafficking in drugs and other illicit 
commodities.  Also accompanying organised crime activities in the 1960 and 1970s 
was related violent crime and murder.  The drug related murders of Donald McKay 
in 1977 (Woodward 1979; Stewart 1983) along with that of Isabella and Douglas 
Wilson in1979 (Stewart 1983) provided a great deal of media attention and 
community concern and became significant focusing events (Birkland 1998).  These 
murders made politicians focus on these infamous activities that were occurring in 
Australia.  43 
                                                        
42 Under section 51.(i) trade and commerce with other countries—the Commonwealth has been 
responsible for policing the borders of Australia for all illicit drugs since Federation and the Customs 
Department has always held primacy of  that responsibility.  With the increase in illicit drugs being 
imported into Australia in the 1960s, the Federal Narcotics Bureau (FNB) was established in 1969 
within the Customs Service with the role to prevent and detect the importation of illicit drugs and its 
policing role was justified on the basis of the Australian Government ratifying the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs 1961.   
43
 These murders were subject to investigation in the two royal commissions referenced above.  The 
finding of both identifies organised crime concerned with drug trafficking in Australia were 
responsible for the respective murders. 
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By the early 1970s policing still remained a State responsibility, but the size 
of the crime problem in Australia had expanded and so did the size of the police 
agencies. Across the nation there was a substantial increase in crime that resulted 
in a reactive response of increases in police staff and resources along with new 
powers to deal with crime.  This trend continued according to Walker and 
Henderson: “Taken at face value, crime statistics in Australia during the 1980s and 
90s showed increases of around 450% in rates of reported crime” (Walker and 
Henderson 2003, 1).  Thankfully, a more strategic approach began in the late 1980s 
after the crime rate got even worse.     
The Commonwealth role in policing remained relatively low key due to 
inadequate resourcing to deal with the obvious problems occurring across the 
nation, much of which emanated from outside the national border.  Crime was 
becoming a matter of concern in national politics and for the first time, in the 1972 
federal election, policing related policy proposals and initiatives were put to the 
electorate by the Labor Party.  Labor leader Gough Whitlam advocated police 
reform with the Commonwealth role in policing to be “expanded and its role 
extended to that of the American FBI” (Whitlam 1985, 599–600). This elevated the 
crime problem in Australia to the national political stage and evidenced that it had 
become a political issue.   
Labor won the election and was arguably the first Commonwealth 
government to place policing on its political agenda as it had a clear obligation to 
expand Commonwealth policing and took immediate action.  This entailed 
administrative action to establish the Australia Police in 1975 (NAA 2013a and b).  A 
Commissioner was appointed and several Australia Police Gazettes were published 
(Archives ACT 2010).  The relevant legislation never reached Parliament before the 
government was dismissed.  However, successive conservative governments also 
harboured similar sentiments to Labor and this culminated in 1979 with the 
formation of the AFP and a number of other police related initiatives by the 
Commonwealth government.  
Following on from the Whitlam period, two new areas of crime became 
pivotal in the evolution of policing across Australia after the 1970s and continued to 
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impact significantly on changing the structure and making it more centralised.  
These two areas of crime—organised crime and terrorism, were first seen as major 
threats in the 1970s. 
4.5.1 Organised Crime 
As mentioned previously, crime increased alarmingly from the 1970s onward 
(Mukherjee and Dagger 1990; Walker and Henderson 2003) to the 1980s 
(Mukherjee and Dagger 1990)—but why was this occurring?  This was a question 
governments were keen to know the answer to and it was speculated in many 
quarters that organised crime was operating unchecked and was the major 
contributor to this phenomenon.  This perception was derived from public concern 
fuelled by the media and political campaigners complaining of rising crime rates 
and corruption.  One significant event that focused attention on this was the 
disappearance and murder in 1977 of leading anti-drugs campaigner Donald McKay.  
He had publicly identified the operation of the Italian Mafia in drug trafficking in 
New South Wales and gained a great deal of media and political attention.  As a 
result of the pressure of the McKay case and other well publicised instances of 
murder and corruption attributed to organised crime, a range of government 
inquiries were commissioned.  These inquiries were extraordinary as they were 
empowered to operate outside of the normal investigative processes and given 
coercive powers in respect to the collection of evidence and questioning of 
witnesses.  The most significant inquiries were:44  
1. 1980 Commonwealth, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and 
Tasmania Government.  Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs. 
Commissioner: Mr. Justice E. S. Williams 
2. 1980 Commonwealth and Victoria Government.  Royal Commission on the 
Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union. Commissioner: 
Mr. Frank Costigan Q.C. 
3. New South Wales Government: 
                                                        
44 It should be understood the date of each Royal Commissions is when the final report was handed 
down.  All commenced at least one year before the date noted.  
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a. 1979 Royal Commission into Drug Trafficking. Commissioner: Mr. 
Justice Woodward 
b. 1983 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking. 
Commissioner: Mr. Justice D. G. Stewart (investigated matters mainly 
concerned with crime in the 1970s) 
4. 1979 South Australia Government. Royal Commission into the Non-Medical 
Use of Drugs. Commissioner: Professor Ronald Sackville  
The broad findings of these inquiries was that the significant growth in the 
recreational use of illicit drugs like cannabis and heroin had created an illicit market 
for these commodities and that huge profits were being made by criminal 
organisations.  Directly related to the operation of these crime groups was 
accelerating levels of violence and corruption not previously experienced in 
Australia.   
These inquiries provided evidence of the effectiveness of organised crime 
groups operating across the nation and the connection of those groups to 
international criminal organisations.  Evidence also revealed significant gaps in 
policing structures and systems to counter these problems.  The Woodward Royal 
Commission for example articulated the extent of the drug problem and the 
activities of these groups:  
In the eastern States, the existence of a drug menace in the form 
of cultivation, production and distribution of cannabis (marijuana), 
the importation of heroin and to a lesser degree, of opium and 
cocaine, the illegal supply, and obtaining for non-medical use of 
medical drugs, and the illicit manufacture and distribution of 
medical and non-medical drugs (Woodward 1979, 1).   
The findings of these inquiries also established that organised crime groups had 
been responsible for numerous murders, serious assaults and incidents involving 
intimidation and corruption.   
The once doubted and in many cases rejected outright hypothesis, that 
organised crime did exist and was operating effectively in Australia was proven, and 
it became evident that the problem required urgent attention by governments and 
their police agencies.  The recommendations emanating from the inquiries primarily 
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identified the need for increased enforcement strategies involving increased 
policing in this area.  The Woodward inquiry recommendations went further and 
identified the inability of the existing policing structure in Australia to cope with the 
criminal activity and related corruption in the expanding area of drugs and 
organised crime:  
From a consideration of all the evidence before me, I believe that 
drug law administration in New South Wales, in both State and 
Federal hands is significantly less effective than it could be.  The 
deficiencies that do exist lie in the characteristics of the respective 
administration structures, of lack of inter-agency co-operation, of 
proper planning and of logistical priorities (Woodward 1979, 
1620).   
The problem identified in this case was the inability of police agencies to 
cooperate and share intelligence and information.  The Williams’ findings were 
consistent with Woodward in respect to the problem and the inability of traditional 
police arrangements and structures in the country to deal with the problems.  The 
inquiries in general also identified the need to revamp and upgrade the 
Commonwealth’s police agencies in order to be more efficient and effective in 
respect to drug crime.  Williams was of the opinion that the two Commonwealth 
police agencies, the Commonwealth Police and Federal Narcotic Bureau, had failed 
in their roles related to drug crime (Williams 1980, B164 and D89).  Commonwealth 
policing in this area had to be reformed and given more resources to police the 
national border—effectively—constitutionally the Commonwealth’s responsibility 
(Williams 1980, B178–181). 
Subsequently, the NSW Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking 
was undertaken by Justice Donald Stewart (1983), that focussed on the burgeoning 
organised drug trafficking involving national and international crime groups 
interacting with NSW and Australian crime groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Significant identification of at least five murders in the late 1970s by one crime 
group became an indictment on the ineffectiveness of policing across the nation at 
the time.   
By 1980 the threat from organised crime had been clearly demonstrated by 
the host of other formal inquiries (Mark 1978; Williams 1980; Woodward 1979) and 
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recognised by all governments in Australia to be a threat, sufficient to justify a 
range of initiatives and changes to policing.  This recognition of the need to change 
was the starting point for the movement and shift away from the traditional 
structure and arrangements for Australian policing and heralded the beginning of 
change, characterised by much greater involvement of the Commonwealth and the 
national integration of policing. 
4.5.2 Terrorism 
The seventies also experienced another phenomenon that was international in 
character and managed to permeate Australian society—terrorism.  The 1970s 
experienced many displays of organised terrorism throughout the Western world 
that began in the 1960s and peaked with the 1972 Munich Olympic Games attack 
and the killing of 11 Israeli athletes.  This focusing event led Australia, like most 
other Western nations to develop response systems and a counter-terrorism 
capability.  While responsibility was placed in the hands of State and Territory 
police, the Commonwealth Police force was expanded to provide physical security 
of airports, protection of diplomats and embassies in Australia.  However, response 
at all levels remained a sub-national police responsibility. 
Australia’s response to terrorism was tested on home soil in 1978 with the 
Hilton Hotel Bombing.  The Hilton Bombing was clearly a critical focusing event that 
motivated the government to take action and address the threat on a national basis 
(Crowley 1986,367–369; Mark 1978; McFarlane 2007).  This approach emanated 
from the recommendations concerning terrorism in the 1978 Mark review.  Mark 
subtly referred to the Commonwealth’s enumerated powers as the constitutional 
basis for such a change to policing: 
The Federal Government, responsible for Defence and Foreign 
Affairs, will sooner or later have to consider its inability to play a 
sufficiently influential role in the maintenance of law and order, 
since the latter activity will assume an increasing significance 
nationally and is likely more than ever to affect the interests of the 
nation in addition to those of the States comprising it (Mark 1978, 
25).   
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Again it was found, as with the experience of organised crime, that the 
existing sub-national policing structure was inadequate for the times.  What was to 
follow was a paradigm shift in Australian policing, orchestrated politically and 
resulting in the development of a nationally integrated structure. 
4.6 National Political Decisions and the Start of Change 
The proposition that is put forward at this point in the chapter is that as a result of 
the increase in crime in the 1970s, there was a major policy shift on the issue of 
policing by all governments, most importantly by the Commonwealth.  Policing has 
been changed for ever and in the context of federalism, from a decentralised base it 
has become increasingly centralised and nationally integrated.  The start of this 
change, as stated previously, began with the drug and crime problems first 
evidenced in the 1970s.  However, the political debate concerning policing and role 
of the Commonwealth government cannot be conveniently attributed to only the 
events of the 1970s, as policing had been the subject of spirited political debate 
prior to this time in the Commonwealth Parliament. 
It should be noted that there is a paucity of literature on policing and in 
particular the background and politics of the Commonwealth’s involvement in 
policing, however, a good deal of information has been derived from parliamentary 
documents and Hansard on the topic.45   
Little known or researched is the fact there were significant ideological 
debates in the Commonwealth Parliament on the specific topic of policing and the 
role of the Commonwealth in 1919, 1925 and 1957.  What is clear from reading the 
records of the debates is Commonwealth policing had been vigorously opposed on 
ideological grounds by the Labor Party, while Coalition and Liberal governments 
supported the idea of the Commonwealth government taking an active role in 
policing.  Interestingly, this appears to have gone against the traditional ideologies 
of both parties at the time, as it is generally accepted Labor supported centralism 
                                                        
45
 The Bills Digest No. 90 1999–2000 for the Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Bill 
1999 (Cth) (Law and Bills Digest Group 1999) provides important information about the formation 
and development of the AFP.  Parliamentary debates involving Commonwealth policing that took 
place in 1919, 1925 and 1957 are also very informative. 
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and the Coalition side of politics was oriented to States’ rights and a decentralised 
approach to federalism.   
The fundamental position taken in 1918 (Catts 1918; Ferricks 1918), 1925 
(Pearce 1957; Bruce 1925) and 1957 (Ward 1957; Evatt 1957; Fraser 1957; Kennelly 
1957; Aylett 1957; Spooner 1957) in parliamentary debates concerning 
Commonwealth policing by the Labor opposition, consistently resisted Coalition 
government centralisation initiatives and did not even countenance a role for the 
Commonwealth, even in the enforcement of its own laws.  The Labor opposition to 
Commonwealth policing according to the parliamentary debates was consistent and 
took the view a national police agency would be used by conservative governments 
to suppress unions and stifle political opposition.  However, by 1972, Labor had 
abandoned its long standing opposition to Commonwealth policing and this was 
made clear from the electioneering speeches of the Opposition Leader and soon to 
be Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (Whitlam 1985).   
The first policy initiatives concerning Commonwealth policing and its 
expansion were articulated by Whitlam in his electioneering promises and were 
later reiterated after he was elected as Prime Minister.  Whitlam considered 
Commonwealth policing needed to be expanded and it should play a significant role 
in policing across the nation.  To do this he advocated the reform of the 
Commonwealth Police: 
The Commonwealth Police Force will be upgraded to better 
pay and conditions to meet the growing threat of political 
terrorism and organized crime.  Its facilities will be expanded 
and its role extended to that of the American FBI.  The 
Commonwealth Police Force will become the key link 
between Australian law enforcement agencies and Interpol 
for the fight against international crime and drug traffic must 
be primarily a national task (Whitlam 1985, 599–600).   
The decisive themes in his statement were two-fold: it placed policing for 
the first time on the political agenda in a federal election; and secondly, it publicly 
introduced the notion that some crime issues should be a Commonwealth 
responsibility and not left to the States—“the fight against international crime and 
drug traffic must be primarily a national task” (Whitlam 1985, 600).   
87 
 
After winning government Whitlam commissioned two inquiries into the 
Commonwealth’s policing arrangements: A report on the Commonwealth Police 
following an inspection by Kerry L. Milte (Milte 1973); and the Report to establish a 
national police force by Secretary of the Department of Customs and Excise, Alan 
Carmody (1974).  Both reports, inter alia, recommended the expansion of 
Commonwealth policing.  As a result the government took the policy decision to 
form the Australia Police (NAA 2013a and b), an amalgamation of the 
Commonwealth; ACT Police Force; NT Police Force; and Federal Narcotics Bureau, 
into the one agency.  The policy was implemented administratively but because of 
the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975, never reached the point of 
legislation (Parliament of Australia 2013).   
The Fraser coalition government that replaced Labor was also not satisfied 
with the operation of the Commonwealth Police Force and wanted to construct a 
police agency that could service all of the needs of the Commonwealth 
government.  Accordingly, it went back to the drawing board and in 1979, based on 
the recommendations of the Report to the Minister for Administrative Services in 
the Organisation of Police Resources in the Commonwealth area and other related 
matters (Mark 1978, 9), legislated to replace the Commonwealth Police with a 
purpose-built agency, the Australian Federal Police (AFP). 
The 1979 initiative was a critical event from a political perspective—for the 
first time legislation to establish a Commonwealth policing agency was passed with 
bipartisan support.  Labor had opposed this type of legislation when it had been 
presented in the 1925 and 1957 Commonwealth Parliament.  This change in Labor 
policy was to significantly alter the status quo in Australian policing, and has been 
one of the reasons why Commonwealth policing expanded.  The importance of 
bipartisan support for this policy cannot be underscored.  This was a reform 
characterised by a fundamental policy shift by the Commonwealth to take sole 
responsibility for its own policing needs and no longer be reliant on the States.   
The establishment of the AFP represented the implementation of the main 
recommendation of the 1979 Mark review into the Commonwealth’s law 
enforcement requirements, but in reality such a coalition Government policy had 
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been in existence since 1976.  Generally not well known is the fact that in 1976 the 
Commonwealth cabinet secretly decided upon the policy.  This was done without 
consulting the States (NAA 2012b and c).   
What had been lacking prior to 1979 was a trigger to justify the 
implementation of the 1976 policy decision by the Cabinet.  The 1978 Sydney Hilton 
Bombing provided it with a focusing event to pull the trigger.  Because of the 
bombing, the government instigated the Mark review, which inter alia, 
corroborated the opinions held by government of the ineffectiveness of the 
Commonwealth Police Force i.e. the shortcomings in Commonwealth policing, and 
recommended the immediate establishment of a new police agency.   
Thus, beginning in late 1979 this once State-dominated area of service 
provision became national in character with the Commonwealth government 
becoming actively involved by establishing the AFP and providing it with the 
resources and powers to be on an equal footing with the State police agencies.   
4.7 Contemporary Politics and Change 
The formation of the AFP heralded the beginning of the Commonwealth’s serious 
participation in policing.  The period was characterised by steady growth in the 
1980s and a marked downturn in the late 1990s.  From a functional perspective, the 
period also saw several other important decisions made by the Commonwealth that 
expanded its scope and range of criminal investigation responsibilities.  These 
related to the investigation of drug trafficking and importation; organised crime; 
and emerging and related white-collar crime.   
The expansion of the AFP’s scope began shortly after its formation when the 
Federal Narcotics Bureau was disbanded in 1982 and the responsibilities and 
functions, previously controlled by the Department of Customs and Excise were 
transferred to the AFP.  Also, the protective service function of the former 
Commonwealth Police was taken away in 1984 and transferred to the newly 
formed Australian Protective Service (APS).46This expanded role for Commonwealth 
                                                        
46
  The APS was reintegrated into the AFP in 2002. 
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policing was not only undertaken by the AFP but also by another new agency 
established in 1984, the National Crime Authority (NCA).  On the face of it the NCA 
was a national police agency owned by all the Commonwealth and State 
governments, but in reality it was a Commonwealth police agency that existed until 
2003 when it was replaced by another agency, the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC).   
Over the period to 2000 in addition to the formation of the AFP and NCA, 
two significant policy decisions were made by the Commonwealth with the support 
of the State and Territory governments.  These policy decisions had a lasting 
influence on policing across the nation, especially for the expansion of 
Commonwealth policing. These were the formation of the APMC and secondly, the 
establishment of the conceptual framework for national common police services.   
4.7.1 Australian Police Ministers Council 
The establishment of a formal council for the nation’s police ministers as 
recommended by Mark was without doubt one of the most critical changes in 
Australian policing to benefit the Commonwealth government.  The change was 
strategic as it established for the first time a formal and separate policy forum for 
policing at a political level.  Prior to this the nearest equivalent was the Police 
Commissioners Conference, but that was clearly more tactical and lacked political 
authority.  Importantly for the government, the policy forum allowed the 
Commonwealth to take a leadership role regardless of having the youngest police 
agency in the nation. 
The starting point for the forum was a Mark review recommendation 
suggesting the establishment of a national body—“for co-ordination of all State and 
Commonwealth police activities which can be pursued more efficiently, more 
comprehensively and more economically on a collective basis” (Mark 1978, 8).  The 
body was to be named the Police Advisory Committee (PAC) and was to be 
permanently chaired by the Commonwealth minister responsible for the AFP (Mark 
1978, 8–9).  As a result of the Commonwealth’s negotiations on this matter with 
the States, the Australian Police Ministers Council (APMC) was established and 
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became the peak body for policy making along with having the primary governance 
responsibility for national common police services, which emerged after 1980.   
According to the resolutions of the first meeting held in 1980, the States 
insisted upon a rotating chair (NAA 2012f); a clear demonstration of the States’ 
perception of equality with the Commonwealth.  The APMC continued meeting 
biannually until it was absorbed into the COAG ministerial council structure and 
although renamed—Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management 
(SCPEM), remains the peak national policy making body for policing.   
Although not apparent, the formation of the APMC marked the first tangible 
indicator of Australian policing becoming national in character—nationally 
integrated, and undertaking a shift from a purely State government controlled 
public policy domain.  From a political perspective the inclusion of the 
Commonwealth government in the policing policy forum recognised the national 
character of policing and that some responsibilities in this area now belonged to the 
Commonwealth or at the very least, were concurrent.    
The motivation for this change was predominantly the developments and 
events previously discussed in section 4.5.  These happenings in the 1970s and 
1980s involved federal responsibilities and illicit drugs, terrorism and climbing crime 
rates across the nation.  The responses to these events were also sped up by a 
number of focusing events such as the Wilson and McKay murders and the Hilton 
bombing.  All contributed to the change in policing and the Commonwealth’s new 
roles and responsibilities.   
The formation of the APMC was an astute strategy and has been beneficial 
for Commonwealth policing.  When the States signed up to the Council, they 
effectively recognised the role of the Commonwealth in policing and signed off on a 
new national policing structure.  The obvious question coming from this subtle 
political outcome was whether the States actually understood the full significance 
of what they had done by joining the Council? 
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4.7.2 Common Police Services 
The second Mark recommendation to be implemented related to the formation of 
the APMC and concerned the establishment and operation of what was to be 
labelled National Common Police Services or common police services.  Mark 
recommended their establishment and the oversight by a “Police Advisory 
Committee chaired by the Minister for Administrative Services consisting of 
Ministers (or their representatives) responsible for the administration of police in 
every State and Territory” (Mark 1978, 8).   
The concept of common services was based upon the problem identified by 
Mark that in many areas of policing—for example communication systems, criminal 
intelligence databases and forensic science technologies—there was expensive 
duplication because each police agency was attempting to provide individual 
systems and services.  The duplicating of these systems and services could only be 
overcome by having national common services that each of the eight agencies 
shared.  It was presumed benefits would flow due to economies of scale.  Primarily 
the new AFP would be ideally positioned to provide such services given its 
perceived central role that Mark likened to the provision of such services by the 
Metropolitan Police in the UK.   
At the time of the recommendation, there was already one common service 
operating in a rudimentary manner for State police agencies.  Since 1942 the New 
South Wales Police had established and operated what was titled the Central 
Bureau, which provided a national service in respect of fingerprint identification 
and criminal record database for State agencies.  The expansion of the Central 
Bureau database and the use of new identification processes facilitated by the 
advances in electronic and communication technology were suggested by Mark.  In 
addition Mark identified new areas (many based on the finding of concurrent royal 
commission inquiries at the time) where benefits from common services would 
increase efficiency (decreasing costs) and effectiveness (more accurate and timely 
information and analysis of evidence).  The areas identified involved criminal 
intelligence; forensic science; research and planning; education and training.  Also 
recommended was a national police computer system to facilitate the timely and 
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accurate exchange of information and intelligence.  These recommendations 
provided the starting point for a new approach to developing common systems 
with the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of all police agencies. 
As noted from the minutes of the first meetings of the APMC (NAA 2012f) 
the council members embraced the concept and established an array of common 
policing systems that were to benefit policing across Australia.  Pivotal to the 
development of the common police services was the control of them at a political 
level by the APMC and critical to their success was the funding and support services 
provided by the Commonwealth government.  Without this central funding, the 
common services would not have been developed to the extent where they are 
now essential for all police agencies in Australia.  However, the obvious quid pro 
quo was the Commonwealth and its agency became more influential than the other 
jurisdictions, for it controlled the purse strings. 
While Mark recommended that the AFP be responsible for providing the 
common services (Mark 1978, 8), the AFP did not take up this role.  Each common 
service developed independently and became organisations in their own right.  
Nonetheless, the AFP gained some influence by taking administrative control of the 
ABCI and also providing the National Bomb Data Centre and Australia’s Interpol 
agency.  Additionally, Commonwealth funding became integral to developments of 
all common services and this is evidenced from the resolutions from the first APMC 
meeting minutes and resolutions (NAA 2012f).  The full extent of Commonwealth 
involvement in these services is detailed in Chapter Five; however, it is suffice to 
say at this point that in the first eight meetings of the APMC, at seven of them the 
Commonwealth was asked and duly agreed to providing significant funding to 
establish the range of common services.  Though not done in the usual manner of 
providing tied grants, the Commonwealth’s fiscal power was on display in the 




4.8 Policing at 2000 
Australian policing at all levels expanded in the twenty-year period from 1980 to 
2000 at a relatively steady rate of growth and greater than population and CPI 
growth.  Commonwealth policing was a little different and went through two 
phases over its first 20 years.  The first decade was one of development and 
growth, the second of decline.   After 1990 “the AFP was experiencing reduced 
budget levels, restructuring and declining employee numbers” (Baker 2004, 150) 
and many members were deployed to other agencies and its role in Commonwealth 
policing was confused and fragmented (Baker 2004). Federal policing had been 
challenged over this latter part of the decade but survived, yet it was not 
prospering as expected.   
One indicator of the AFP’s decline was that the agency had 11 per cent 
fewer staff in 2000 than it had in 1991.  As Baker’s research revealed, the status and 
role of the AFP by 2000 was clearly on the decline.  He evidenced this by 
considering the role of the AFP in the preparations for the 2000 Sydney Olympics.  
Even though it was the national police agency, it was scripted a small role that 
reflected its marginal status at the time.  The agency was described as “an 
unheralded agency of the Attorney-General’s Department, a police organisation 
small and inconspicuous by comparison with the larger State police departments” 
(Baker 2004, 151).  
A new millennium found the AFP and the NCA, the arms of Commonwealth 
policing, at low points.  But all this was about to change for the two agencies, the 
former to be invigorated and expand exponentially while the latter was to be 
disbanded. 
4.9 Policing after 2000 
The ‘9/11’ attacks in the USA in 2001 and later the 2002 Bali bombing were focusing 
events that presented the Commonwealth and State governments with threats of 
terrorism to Australia and challenged governments to provide a policing response 
capable of dealing with terrorism (Baker 2004; McFarlane 2007; Keelty 2008; 
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Williams 2011; Deflem 2005; Lemieux 2010).  Additionally, there was clearly a link 
between terrorist groups and international and national organised crime groups.  
The problem of organised crime had been bubbling away since the 1970s and the 
reality was the intelligence-based strategy centred on the NCA and ABCI was 
ineffective.  Terrorist and organised crime groups had many links and in the Middle 
East and Western Asia there were prime examples of the synergy between groups 
producing opium and funding terrorism, narcoterrorism (Clark 2008). 
The perceived dual threat of terrorism and organised crime to Australia was 
a theme, once again, taken up with enthusiasm by the Commonwealth government 
and this led to the 2002 Leaders Summit on the topic, attended by the Prime 
Minister and State and Territory leaders.  (Appendix E contains documents that 
relate to the Summit and intergovernmental agreements that followed). 
4.9.1 Leaders Summit on Terrorism and Multi-Jurisdictional Crime 
The decisions that came out of this meeting of the nation’s political leaders have 
been significant and highly influential for the structure of Australian policing.  In 
April 2002 the Prime Minister and Premiers met at the Leaders Summit on 
Terrorism and Multi-Jurisdictional Crime to develop a policing strategy to address 
the dual threat of terrorism and organised crime (Dodson 2002; Chulov 2002a and 
b).   
The summit was unconventional in many respects and atypical of the usual 
negotiations and outcomes involving Commonwealth-State forums at this political 
level.  The States agreed to use constitutional means to hand over their criminal law 
powers concerning terrorism and to allow the government to establish a new high-
level crime commission (Taylor 2002; Doherty and Banham 2002; Crabb 2002; 
Australia 2002 ).  The NCA and ABCI were to be disbanded and absorbed into the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC).  Subsequently, all the States passed uniform 
legislation pursuant to section 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution to refer these powers 
to the Commonwealth government.  The summit was another crucial event for 
Commonwealth policing, as it expanded the scope of its functions and range of 
tasks, while the State governments yielded these functions (Gallop 2002; COAG 
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2004).  The newspaper coverage at the time is telling of the unity of mind in the all 
Labor Party sub-national leaders, as illustrated by the photo in the Melbourne Age 
newspaper of 5 April 2002.  
 
The respective articles concerning the Summit and aftermath in four of the 
major newspapers of the time: The Australian, The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The West Australian, reflected the extent of the political realities and a 
distinctive acceptance of the centripetal shift in policing that this meeting’s 
outcomes (subsequent agreements and legislation) resulted. 
The build-up to the summit was punctuated by both the Prime Minister and 
some State Premiers speaking about a range of policing matters, in particular Prime 
Minister Howard warning that the State “law enforcement agencies were ill-
prepared and ill-suited to tackle the scourge of terrorism” (Mallabone 2002).  
Organised crime was also on the agenda for the Summit and it received similar 
treatment and billing to terrorism.  The Coalition federal government clearly had an 
agenda in what it wanted and how it would deal with the eight Labor governments.  
Obviously, the two levels of governments had opposing political ideologies and the 
outcomes of the meeting in this context were phenomenal.   There has been little 
analysis of the summit’s important outcome for policing but it is speculated that 
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individual States could not afford to take the risk of policing terrorism and multi-
jurisdictional crime alone. 
The newspaper articles concerning the summit and later developments 
resulting from it are listed in the following compilation of their headlines and by-
lines, set out in chronological order, starting prior to the summit and concluding 
after the participants returned to their jurisdictions. 
The Australian, 2 April: Premiers backing for Commonwealth terror role—“plans 
for an increased role in criminal investigation for the Commonwealth and its law 
enforcement arm, the Australian Federal Police, will be the main focus of Friday’s 
summit, in a meeting which will be crucial to how future governments deal with 
crime” (Chulov 2002b). 
The Age, 4 April: PM seeks control in fight on terror— “State leaders to give to 
Canberra State legal and police powers to fight national and interstate terrorism” 
(Dodson 2002). 
The West Australian, 4 April: Summit row over agenda—Both the WA Premier and 
Police Minister voice concern over “the signs coming out of Canberra are they do 
want to grab power in this area” (Clery 2002).  This area involved policing in the two 
areas of terrorism and organised crime. 
The Age, 5 April: Premiers back new crime agency—State and Territory leaders 
agreement to support Commonwealth policing initiatives concerning terrorism and 
multi-jurisdictional crime and also allow Commonwealth police to investigate State 
offences (Crabb 2002).   
The Australian, 6 April: Police anger at AFP role—The Police Federation (federation 
of all AFP, State and NT Police unions) and unnamed senior police express concern 
with expansion of AFP into State police roles and powers.  Commonwealth and 
premiers agreed to this expansion which is “absolutely crucial to the future of law 
enforcement in the country” (Chulov 2002a). 
The Australian, 6 April: Terror on Commonwealth police beat—Premiers agree to 
“cede responsibility for terror related crime fighting to the Commonwealth.  The 
decision reached at yesterday’s transnational crime summit in Canberra, also gives 
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the AFP a potential veto over State-based inquiries if they are suspected to be 
linked to organised crime” (Chulov 2002c). 
The West Australian, 6 April:  Leaders to scrap crime watchdog—WA Premier's 
concerns expressed on 4 April are alleviated and the agreement from the summit is 
seen as a “major step forward” (Mallabone 2002).  Federal policing expanded and 
to take responsibility for crime previously a State responsibility and States formally 
hand over powers. 
The articles evidence a mostly positive approach to the issues by the States, 
although not all matters were cut and dried.  Some tinkering with the terrorism 
legislation followed several years later (2005) as a result of the protestations of the 
leaders of the ACT and Victoria.  The reported concerns of the national police union 
never gained traction and were never followed up. 
The reforms from the Summit took some time to implement, but they were 
clearly demonstrated in the passage of uniform legislation47 in every State and 
Territory concerning terrorism and the later Agreement on Counter-terrorism Laws 
and in particular recital 3 which reads:  “The parties consider it appropriate to 
facilitate comprehensive national application of those offences by means of State 
references in accordance with paragraph 51 (xxxvii) of the Commonwealth 
Constitution” (COAG 2004). 
In the context of Australian federalism, was the summit and its outcomes an 
example of federalism at work?  Did this event exemplify what Mark considered 
was needed from federalism to make policing effective and keep up with the times?  
To reiterate Mark’s view:  
Those who framed the Constitution can hardly have foreseen the motor 
vehicle and the aeroplane. Arrangements for the governance of State 
which were adequate for trade, public order and the social requirements 
of the nineteenth century are not appropriate for dealing with serious 
wrongdoing which transcends State jurisdictions and affects the interest 
                                                        
47
 Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (NSW); Terrorism (Emergency Powers Act) Act (NT); 
Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) 2002 (Qld); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (SA); 
Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (TAS); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 
(WA); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2003 (Vic); Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary 
Powers) Act 2006 (ACT).  
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of the Commonwealth as a whole; terrorism, narcotics, and organised 
crime being perhaps the three most obvious examples (Mark 1978, 2) 
 
On consideration of the inputs and outcomes from the summit, it is argued 
that this event was an example of modern federalism at work.  Previously, a similar 
event was the firearms summit held in 1996 after the Port Arthur masacre, where 
the Commonwealth took a similar approach and achieved its goal of a national 
firearms policy, regardless of having no enumerated powers in this area. 
There has been some criticism of the outcomes of the 2002 summit in 
respect to terrorism by noted commentator and academic George Williams.  In his 
review of ten years of terrorism laws, he had reservations that Australia’s anti-
terrorism laws were passed “with inordinate haste and insufficient parliamentary 
scrutiny” (Williams 2011, 1163).  The article also demonstrated that the 
Commonwealth had achieved its goals and dominated this area as a result of the 
summit.  The states opted to let the Commonwealth take control of this high risk 
area: “The states possess considerable legislative responsibility in the field of 
criminal law. Nevertheless, they decided against enacting their own comprehensive 
anti-terror law regimes, and instead referred their legislative power to the 
Commonwealth so as to enable the making of national laws” (Williams 2011, 1152).  
It should be noted that the outcome from the Summit may have also been shaped 
by the fact that the focusing events, i.e. 9/11 and Bali Bombing, were “creating 
pressure on the dominant policy community or policy monopoly to open up policy 
making and accept change” (Birkland 1998, 55). 
From a policing and federalism perspective, this process of calling State and 
Territory leaders together at short notice with the Commonwealth having set the 
agenda has been effective.  The outcomes bear testimony to that proposition and 
clearly this is an example of the contemporary approach to federalism that impacts 
on policing.  More importantly, it evidences the effectiveness of Australian 
federalism in such circumstances, allowing the efficient undertaking of change to 
the benefit of the nation. 
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4.10 Policing at 2010 
By the end of the decade policing at a sub-national level had grown to the highest 
levels ever experienced in terms of personnel and funding and on a per capita basis 
according to the most recent Report on Government Services.   




Figure 4.6: Comparison of Growth of CPI, Population, Police Agency Funding 
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It is important to note that Commonwealth policing grew at a greater rate and 
volume in all respects to the sub-national agencies.  Apart from the obvious 
increases in the scope of functions and range of tasks derived from the Leaders 
Summit, additional criminal laws had been passed by the Commonwealth 
Parliament that also helped to expand the scope of enforcement responsibilities for 
Commonwealth policing.  New criminal laws included: 
1. Crimes against humanity—crimes introduced into the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): 
1. 1994—the exploitation of children by child sex tourism made a crime under 
Part 111 (child sexual tourism);  
2. 1999—sexual slavery became a crime in division 270: Slavery and sexual 
servitude; and 
3. 2002—people smuggling became a crime under section 73. 
2. Cybercrime and related Internet offences involving crimes against persons and 
their property e.g. lottery, property investment and EBay scams 
 1995—Part 10.7 of the new Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) includes a range of 
cybercrimes; and 
 2001—The Cyber Crime Act 2001 (Cth) was introduced in 2001 to cover the 
broad range of cybercrimes. 
3. Northern Territory Intervention. 
1. 2007—with the passing of the Northern Territory National Emergency 
Response Act 2007 (Cth) and the Appropriation (NT National Emergency 
Response) Act (No.1 and 2) 2007 (Cth), a specific role in enforcement of 
provisions of the Act was placed upon the AFP. 
These new crimes and policing responsibilities were matters which directly or 
indirectly emanated from the enumerated powers of the Commonwealth. 
Federal policing expanded exponentially as clearly evidenced by the 
statistics in Figure 4.3 for this period and demonstrated the two-speed growth in 
policing between the Commonwealth and sub-national components.  This change in 
policing has been exceptional and when it is considered in light of the fact 
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Commonwealth policing only effectively came into operation in 1980.  How this 
occurred in a federal political environment has been shown previously in the 
chapter but it is worth summarising prior to the conclusion to the chapter. 
4.11 A Summary of Australian Policing—1970 to 2010 
The evolution of policing began in the 1970s as a result of escalating crime rates 
having an impact on all levels of government.  What followed has been a range of 
political decisions and subsequent policy that changed policing.  Obviously, many of 
the issues associated with the increase in crime had relevance to Commonwealth’s 
enumerated powers and it was considered that prima facie the government should 
play a role (Whitlam 1985; NAA 2012b and c; and NAA 2013 a and b).  After the AFP 
was established and following the range of Commonwealth reforms and changes, 
especially the increase in the volume of Commonwealth criminal law, policing 
became truly national in character.   
Without doubt the sub-national agencies increased their personnel and 
funding over the period and this was in the main at a greater rate to population 
increase for the respective jurisdictions.  Commonwealth policing on the other hand 
has by the end of its first 30 years expanded exponentially in terms of the common 
metrics of personnel and funding.  Additionally, the scope of Commonwealth 
policing functions expanded, especially after 2001.   
It is noteworthy in the context of the overarching theme of federalism—the 
States did not make this a matter to quarrel over with the Commonwealth.  The 
changes could be characterised as bipartisan, consensual and cooperative.  As 
shown in the previous chapter, in areas like education and health, conflict between 
the federal partners over turf is the norm.  In the case of policing, all the evidence 
so far points to the States supporting the expansion Commonwealth policing. 
The experience of policing demonstrated that Australian federalism 
operated in a very effective way in response to the problems and threats faced by 
governments requiring a police response.  The recognition by the States that the 
Commonwealth was best positioned to respond, due to its obvious fiscal and 
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jurisdictional power, to national and international crime problems, resulted in 
critical changes to policing.  The significant outcome from this example of 
federalism in action was the centralisation of some aspects of policing along with 
the national integration of policing, away from a decentralised approach dominated 
by the States. 
4.12 Conclusion—Nationally Integrated Policing  
Since 1972, successive Commonwealth governments have aspired to service their 
own police requirements and to place Commonwealth policing agencies on an 
equal footing with the established sub-national agencies.  This aspiration 
manifested itself in the form of Commonwealth policies, developed and ratified in 
1972 and 1976.  The substantive implementation of the policy began in 1979 with 
the establishment of the AFP.  Incremental growth of Commonwealth policing 
followed at a positive rate until 2001, thereafter it has grown exponentially 
compared with sub-national policing.  The AFP is the main Commonwealth police 
agency and it plays a powerful role in Australian policing, hitherto non-existent 
before the 1980s.  It has achieved this transition by both constitutional and sub-
constitutional means and this has been underwritten by Commonwealth funding.  It 
has also achieved this position in the policing structure with bipartisan political 
support and the unusual spectacle of State cooperation and consent. 
From a political perspective the obvious result from what occurred federally 
in terms of legislation and funding resulted in the establishment of policing as a 
national policy domain (vis-à-vis sub-national) shared concurrently between the 
federal partners.  This national integration of policing can alternatively be described 
as a paradigm shift where many aspects of policing were increasingly centralised 
with the support of the sub-national governments.  The structure of Australian 
policing is now very different from the way it was at Federation and even in the 
1980s.  Australian policing is now nationally integrated and not an exclusively sub-
national responsibility.  This demonstrates a new approach to federalism, different 
to other areas of government that have been previously considered. 
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The chapter has identified the extent of the paradigm shift in policing and 
described the changes in detail that begs the question of what were the drivers that 
brought about the change to policing within Australia’s federal political 




CHAPTER FIVE: THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter described the place of Australian policing in the federal 
system from Federation to 2010 and concluded it had changed substantially—and 
indeed been transformed into a nationally integrated model where the 
Commonwealth plays a significant role.  The task for this chapter is to dig deeper 
and identify the drivers of these changes.  What were the drivers of change within 
the political and government framework of the Australian federation?   
From the information provided in the previous chapters it is apparent that 
the most critical event for Australian policing was the Commonwealth 
government’s actions in 1979, establishing the AFP.  However, this only established 
an agency—what led to that event and what drove the expansion of the agency and 
Commonwealth policing from then is the real story.  The analysis of the events and 
policy decisions that drove change is then the focus of the chapter.  The analysis 
identifies three interrelated drivers of change: Spillovers; New Commonwealth 
Responsibilities; and Economies of Scale. 
The chapter starts by employing a matrix to set out the key drivers and drills 
down into the associated issue or the problem for each driver, then identifies the 
relationship to the legal framework and finally considers the mechanisms applied to 
drive change in the area.  The contents of the matrix are then analysed and 
explained in detail.  This leads to the conclusion that discusses the new policing 
structures and the inextricable link between the development of policing on a 
national basis and the role of federalism. 
5.2 Drivers of Change in Policing  
The distinguishing features of the change to policing between 1980 and 2010 have 
been twofold—the bipartisan approach to change; and the support from the sub-
national governments.  This consensual way of going about change, and developing 
the Commonwealth’s expanded role, is atypical given conflict and resistance are the 
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hallmarks of centralising initiatives in the normal course of party, political and 
Commonwealth-State relations.  
The research concerning the developments and change to policing in the 
past thirty years identified three main drivers to be responsible for change.   
1. Spillover of policing responsibilities beyond the capability of the States.  
Spillover involves matters where the cost or benefits of an activity go beyond the 
borders of the jurisdiction in question.  In such cases it is beneficial for the delivery 
“of the public good at a higher level of government” (Geys and Konrad 2010, 4).  
Spillover has been recognised in a range of federalism literature as an important 
issue affecting federalism.  It has been used to explain and even justify change in 
responsibilities between governments in Australia (Fenna 2007, 187; Twomey and 
Withers 2007, 46; Twomey 2007, 59; Walsh 2008, 557; Wanna et al 2009, 10–11). 
2. New Commonwealth Responsibilities directly related to its enumerated 
powers and to matters beyond the jurisdiction of the States.   There are two aspects 
to this—firstly matters that can be directly linked to the enumerated powers of the 
Commonwealth.  Secondly, new areas of government interest that arose after the 
Constitution was written e.g. air navigation, electronic communications technology 
and environment.  The latter class of matters needed new powers to be negotiated 
between the Commonwealth and States: “The allocation of legislative power in the 
Constitution, which was undertaken in the 1890s, needs to be reconsidered today.  
It needs to take into account changes in the world, such as new developments in 
information technology and communication, as well as globalisation and the 
operation of modern economies” (Twomey and Withers 2007, 46; Twomey 2007, 
61). 
3. Economies of Scale aimed at increased efficiency and effectiveness for 
policing across all jurisdictions.  Like spillovers, a great deal of change to federalism 
in Australia has been explained and justified on the grounds of the need for 
economies of scale—“economies of scale are highly relevant to the undertaking of 
alignment of responsibilities” (Wanna et al 2009, 10).  A number of commentators 
have identified this concept as being an important factor in changing federalism in 
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Australia.  Walsh provides the example of “centralising tax collection” (Walsh 2008, 
570) as being a beneficial example of economies of scale at work while Twomey and 
Withers (Twomey and Withers 2007, 46) and Twomey (Twomey 2007, 58) also 
recognised the importance of this for future reforms and developments in 
federalism.  
These drivers are explored under their respective heading and considered in 
light of the events of the time and policy decisions that triggered the respective 
changes and reforms.  The following matrix summarise five key elements to be 
discussed under the individual headings: Issue/Problem; Source of Problem/Issue; 
Constitutional/Legal Empowerment; Government Action; and Legislative Action. 
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Figure 5.1: Drivers of Change for Commonwealth Policing 1980–2010 
Driver Issue/Problem Source of Issue/Problem Constitutional/Legal 
Empowerment 
Government Action Legislative Action 
Spillover Organised 
Crime 
Significant increase in national 
crime rate from 1970 attributed 
to illicit drugs trafficking by 
organised crime groups 
1970–1990 Media coverage 
exposing judicial and police 
corruption along with violent 
crime aimed at anti-drug 
campaigners and police 
1978–1983 Royal Commissions48 
and Mark Review identify 
organised crime threat to the 
nation. Serious and organised 
crime undermines border 
integrity and security. It erodes 
confidence in institutions and law 
enforcement agencies, and 
damages economic prosperity 
and regional stability. 
Trade & Commerce 51(ii) 
External Affairs 51(xxix) 
Referred Powers 51(xxvii)  
1978–1983: Four Royal 
Commissions into 
organised crime 
1984 National Crime 
Authority (NCA) 
established 
1994 Coad Review of AFP 
to investigate organised 
crime 
2003 Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC) replaces 
NCA and subsumes ABCI 
 
National Crime 
Authority Act 1984 
(Cth) 
Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 
(Cth) 
Criminal Code Act 





(money laundering)  
                                                        
48 1. Commonwealth, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania. 1979—Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs; 2. South Australia. 
1979— Royal Commission into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs; 3. NSW. 1979—Royal Commission into Drug Trafficking; 4. Commonwealth and Victoria 




Driver Issue/Problem Source of Issue/Problem Constitutional/Legal 
Empowerment 
Government Action Legislative Action 
Terrorism 1970s several serious 
international terrorism attacks 
1978 Sydney Hilton bombing and 
resultant Mark Report 
2001 9/11 USA attacks 
2002 Bali Bombing 
External Affairs 51(xxix)-13 
international conventions 
concerning terrorism49 
Referred Powers by State-
51(xxvii) 
1979 Commonwealth 
(Cwth) Agreement with 
States on counter-
terrorism (CT)  
2002 States refer terrorism 
powers 
2003 Amended CT 
agreement  
2003–2005 Cwth CT 
legislation, and AFP CT 
investigation unit formed 
Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth)-Part 5.3  
Criminal Code 
Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2003 
(Cth) 
Anti-terrorism Act 






Australia ratifies treaties and 
conventions on war crimes and 
crimes against humanity 
Media coverage of exploitation of 







Federally funded research 
on issues 
Federal parliamentary 
reviews recommend new 
legislation and  
legislation passed 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
1994: Part 111 (child 
sexual tourism) and 
later moved to div. 
272 Criminal Code 
Act 1995  
                                                        
 49 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 
1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) (Montreal, 1971); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome, 
1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988); Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 1980); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 1979); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (New York, 1973); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New 
York, 1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 1999); International Convention for the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purposes of Detection (Montreal, 1991); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (New York 2005) 
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Driver Issue/Problem Source of Issue/Problem Constitutional/Legal 
Empowerment 
Government Action Legislative Action 
People smuggling problem 
(refugees and sex slaves) highly 
publicised by media 
 Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) 
1999: div. 270 Slavery 
and sexual servitude, 
2005: div. 271 
(people trafficking for 
sexual slavery)  
2002: div. 268 
(genocide and war 
crimes) compliments 
War Crimes Act 1945 
(Cth) 
2002 s.73 People 
Smuggling Criminal 
Code Act 1995 
Cybercrime Facilitation of existing crimes by 
cyber means—computers and 
computer networks 
New criminal offences using 
Internet and computers, not 
subject to existing law 
 
Posts, telegraphic, 
telephonic and other like 
services-51(v) 
External Affairs-51(xxix) 
Trade & Commerce-51(ii) 
Cwth funded research on 
problem for APMC 
Cwth parliamentary 
reviews recommended 
new legislation  
Cybercrime role for AFP 
and establish High Tech 
Crime Operations section 
(HTCO) and Australian High 
Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC) 
Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth)-Part 10.7  




Driver Issue/Problem Source of Issue/Problem Constitutional/Legal 
Empowerment 




1996 Port Arthur Massacre with 
35 people murdered (21 
wounded) by Martin Bryant using 
lawfully owned firearms 
Trade & Commerce-51(ii) 
Acquisition of property on 
just terms-51(xxxi) 
Cwth called APMC meeting 
and jurisdictions agreed to 
uniform firearms laws and 
action to decrease firearms 
Cwth imposes tax to fund 
‘gun buy-back’ (640,000 
firearms) 
National uniform gun laws 
passed by States and 
Territories 
Importation of firearms 
and parts restricted 





1996 and 1997 (Cth)  
Medicare Levy 
Amendment Act 1996 
(Cth) 





UN request for police peace-
keeping force for East Timor 
Regional instability in Pacific 
nations 
External Affairs 51 (xxix) AFP Unit for overseas 
deployment 
Agreement with State and 
Territory police agencies 
for secondment of officers 
Australian Federal 





NT aboriginal communities health 
and crime problems 
Power to make laws for 
territories Section 122  
Excised special areas of NT 
subject to special Cwth law 
Cwth fund additional 
police and infrastructure 
for NT  
NT National 
Emergency Response 
Act 2007 (Cth) and 
Appropriation (NT 
National Emergency 
Response) Bill (No.1 




Driver Issue/Problem Source of Issue/Problem Constitutional/Legal 
Empowerment 





Independent agency intelligence 
systems 
Mark Review & Royal 
Commissions into drugs and 
organised crime identified need 
for national criminal intelligence 
agency and systems 




1981 ABCI established as a 
Common Police Service by 
APMC 
1988 ABCI roll out national 
criminal intelligence 
system (ACID)  
2002 ACC took over 
national criminal 





concurrent ACC Act 







Standalone jurisdictional systems  
No uniform national standards 
and accreditation of laboratories 
and staff 




1980 APMC taskforce to 
investigate national 
forensic science body 
1992 National Institute of 
Forensic Science (NIFS) 
formed to provide national 
standards and 
accreditation agency 
2007 NFIS subsumed into 











Driver Issue/Problem Source of Issue/Problem Constitutional/Legal 
Empowerment 




Independent agency information 
systems 
Mark Report recommended 
national police information 
systems 
 




1990 National Exchange of 
Police Information (NEPI) 
2000 CrimTrac agency 








Ad hoc research and planning in 
police agencies 
Mark review recommendation for 
nation police research and 
planning agency. 
Criticism of police exhibit 
handling by Wilson Royal 
Commission 




1980 APMC Secretariat to 
report on establishing 
National Police Research 
Institute (NPRU) 
1983 NPRU established as 
NCPS 
2007 NPRU functions 
subsumed into ANZPAA 
National police 
interagency 
agreement for NPRU 




The concept of spillover as a driver of change for public goods in federations is well 
recognised and in the context of police services involving the investigation and 
enforcement of criminal law, is clearly applicable.  Spillover involves matters where 
the costs or benefits of an activity go beyond the borders of the jurisdiction in 
question.  In such cases it is beneficial for the delivery “of the public good at a 
higher level of government” (Geys and Konrad 2010, 4) as the lesser level is 
incapable of delivering the service because it may lack the resources, jurisdiction or 
political will.  The latter issue of political will is relevant because when the 
Federation was established there was no political need to change the status quo for 
policing.  Primarily crime was an issue that was confined within State borders and 
Commonwealth criminal laws were non-existent.  
The case of crime not spilling over State borders was for the first sixty years 
of Federation a major reason why policing remained the responsibility of the States.  
Importantly, it should be noted that the Australian federation is highly centralised 
and has only six States.  The federation is characterised by a huge land mass; small 
population; and the few large cities and major population centres are located far 
apart.  Thus, spillover has only been a recent phenomenon as opposed to the US for 
instance, which is highly populated and decentralised.  Spillovers have been a major 
issue for US policing since the 1920s and this is due to the large number of States, 
many small in area and in close proximity to one or several other States and large 
cities. 
In the case of the two tier Australia federal system, spillover is caught by the 
Commonwealth.  Geys and Konrad in the study of spillover involving the federal 
government of Germany, provide in their discussion an example concerning 
policing, specifically drug trafficking, which is “likely to entail considerable spillovers 
to other jurisdictions, which may ask for an assignment of this task to a higher level 
of government” (Geys and Konrad 2010, 5).  The history of drug trafficking in 
Australia has many parallels with the German experience (which is discussed later 
in Chapter Six). 
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In Australia, the incidence of spillover has in the case of policing led to the 
Commonwealth government taking responsibility in a number of areas, beginning in 
the 1980s and formally through constitutional means several times since 2002.  As 
the matrix shows, there were two main areas of spillover, organised crime and 
terrorism, which the States have been prepared to concede as national matters, 
and best dealt with by Commonwealth policing.  These two areas of spillover drove 
change and are considered in that context.  
5.3.1 Organised Crime 
Organised crime is a term much used in discussion on policing and crime yet 
defining it is not easy.  The ACC does not have a clear definition regardless that this 
aspect of crime is its central focus.  Its annual assessments discuss the aspects of 
organised crime like impact, risks and threats but never begin with a clear 
expression or definition of what is organised crime.  The FBI, perhaps the most 
experienced agency in the world when it comes to organised crime, defines it “as 
any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary 
objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their 
position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, 
graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their 
locales, region, or the country as a whole”. 50  A contemporary and Australian 
definition is offered by Gavin Briggs in his paper on the risk to critical infrastructure 
in the North West of Australia:  “Organised crime is a structure that includes two or 
more people whose purpose is to commit one or more serious crimes or offences 
for financial gain or material benefit” (Briggs 2010, 1). 
From a federalism perspective, it should understood that international and 
national characteristics of organised crime in Australia have had a significant impact 
on policing, prima facie, requiring a Commonwealth response because of its related 
enumerated powers i.e. foreign affairs; communication; and border control etc.  
The 2011 ACC organised crime assessment begins by identifying the key external 
characteristics of organised crime: “increased globalisation, escalating cross-border 
                                                        




movement of people, goods and money, emerging international markets and 
rapidly developing and emerging technologies provide a fertile operating 
environment for organised crime” (ACC 2011, 3).  Thus, from a federalism 
perspective the nature of organised crime brings the Commonwealth into play on 
jurisdictional grounds. 
Until the AFP was established, organised crime was clearly a State policing 
responsibility and was a developing area for policing from the 1970s.  The 
Commonwealth’s first serious interest in organised crime was in 1984 when it took 
the policy decision to establish the NCA and since then it has been an area of 
policing in which the Commonwealth has taken an increasing interest.   
It should be understood that policing and organised crime in Australia has 
been topical since the 1970s mainly because of the wide media reporting of the 
problems, in particular, associated police corruption.   Much of the reporting of 
these problems had a factual basis and emanated from the findings of the Royal 
Commissions undertaken into these matters at the Commonwealth and State level.  
The Williams, Woodward and Costigan inquiries investigated and identified cases of 
corruption involving police and organised crime (Woodward 1979; Costigan 1980; 
Williams 1980).  These independent investigations identified amongst other things, 
the inability of the existing police structure to deal effectively with the crime-
related problems like corruption, which stemmed from organised crime and 
operated nationally and beyond State borders.  Mark also identified the nature of 
the problem in 1978 when he commented on the deficiencies in policing in relation 
to organised crime.  He considered it was in the interests of the Commonwealth to 
be involved in policing in the areas of terrorism, narcotics and organised crime.  
Specifically these criminal matters were “serious wrong-doing which transcends 
State jurisdictions and affects the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole” 
(Mark 1978, 2). 
Apart from the formation of the AFP with an interest in this area of crime, 
the Commonwealth government took the unprecedented action in 1984 of 
establishing the National Crime Authority (NCA) to deal with organised crime or as 
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it was termed in the Act—relevant offence51.  This term fits within the current scope 
of the ACC’s organised crime operations.  The NCA was provided with exceptional 
powers including power to force witnesses to testify in camera and extensive covert 
surveillance powers.  The agency had a specific mandate to pursue organised crime 
and it operated in the main independently outside the normal policing 
arrangements and institutions.   In some cases it duplicated ongoing State police 
investigations and also independently investigated police and judicial malfeasance 
related to organised crime.   
The NCA was a controversial police body and antagonised the policing status 
quo (Baker 2004, 149) much of which was to do with its investigation of police 
corruption along with its secretive approach and having intrusive powers and 
extensive resources unavailable to the other policing agencies.  In 1994 the Coad 
Review of Commonwealth law enforcement was undertaken and this resulted in a 
number of recommendations that critically enhanced the AFP.  One of the 
recommendations implemented was ratifying the role of the AFP in the 
investigation of organised crime.  The investigation of organised crime was made 
unequivocally an AFP function and additional resourcing was provided. 
The global nature of organised crime affecting Australia was clearly 
evidenced in the findings of the royal commission inquiries of the 1970s and 1980s 
along with the well documented experience of other western nations with 
organised crime. Another important factor affecting Commonwealth police 
                                                        
51
 "relevant offence" means an offence- 
   (a)  that involves 2 or more offenders and substantial planning and 
        organization; 
   (b)  that involves, or is of a kind that ordinarily involves, the use of 
        sophisticated methods and techniques; 
   (c)  that is committed, or is of a kind that is ordinarily committed, in 
        conjunction with other offences of a like kind; and  
   (d)  that involves theft, fraud, tax evasion, currency violations, illegal 
        drug dealings, illegal gambling, obtaining financial benefit by vice 
        engaged in by others, extortion, violence, bribery or corruption of, 
        or by, an officer of the Commonwealth, an officer of a State or an 
        officer of a Territory, bankruptcy and company violations, harbouring 
        of criminals, forging of passports, armament dealings or illegal 
        importation or exportation of fauna into or out of Australia, or that 
        involves matters of the same general nature as one or more of the 
        foregoing, or that is of any other prescribed kind 
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agencies power to investigate organised crime is there must be a related 
enumerated power that legitimises it function in dealing with these matters.  In the 
context of spillover, the agency taking responsibility for matters must have the legal 
jurisdiction and operational capability to investigate these matters.  In Australia it is 
accepted there is a link between organised crime and the Commonwealth’s 
enumerated powers, which is recognised under the doctrine known as dual or 
multiple characterisation.  This can be summarised as Commonwealth laws do not 
have to be directly linked to the enumerated power but “the connection between 
the law and the power must be genuine and not ‘so inconsequential, tenuous or 
distant that [the law] cannot sensibly be described as a law with respect to the head 
of power’”52 (Ratnapala and Crowe 2012, 242).  An example of this is the 
connection between the external affairs power and international drug trafficking 
treaties, which provided the federal police with power to police this area in States 
and Territories.  Related to this is the fact that the Commonwealth under the 
external affairs power has ratified a number of international agreements, 
conventions and treaties concerning organised crime involving  money laundering, 
travel documentation and trading in chemicals (relative to narcotics, drug 
precursors and explosives).  Other enumerated powers concerning organised crime 
involve a range of postal and electronic communication crimes (like cybercrimes) 
along with immigration and trade related crimes.   
Jurisdiction in respect to the Commonwealth policing of organised crime 
may have been considered to be problematic up to 2003 but from thereon it has 
become unequivocally a function of Commonwealth policing.  In 2003 the 
Australian States took the action of collectively authorising the Commonwealth to 
establish the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) as a replacement for the NCA 
(Campbell 2002; Norberry 2002).  The Commonwealth Parliament also legislated to 
create additional criminal offences directly and indirectly concerned with organised 
crime and also provided additional investigation powers in this area (along with 
terrorism crime) for the AFP.  This recognition of the role of Commonwealth 
                                                        




policing in organised crime was a specific outcome from the Leaders’ Summit 
(Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers) on 15 April 2002.  The main outcome 
was a unanimous agreement “by all Leaders, which do indeed constitute an 
enhanced national framework for dealing with terrorism and transnational crime” 
(Campbell 2002, 6480). 
The ACC legislation provides for a Board (section 7B) responsible for 
overseeing the functions (section 7C) with the permanent Chair being the 
Commissioner of the AFP [section 7B (3)]. 53  The majority of the board members 
come from Commonwealth agencies and the State and Territory police 
commissioners are also board members.  There is an inter-governmental 
committee (IGC) established under the Act (section 8) constituted by one minister 
(generally the Police Minister) from each State and Territory and presided over by 
the Commonwealth Minister.  The IGC oversees the operation of the ACC and 
primarily investigates federally relevant criminal activity [section 7C (1) (c)].  
The key motivator for driving change in this area was summarised by 
Senator Campbell in the Australian Crime Commission Second Reading speech: “To 
give effect to the Leaders' Summit resolutions in relation to the establishment of 
the ACC, Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments have agreed that the 
ACC will be constituted by Commonwealth legislation as a Commonwealth law 
enforcement agency, supported by State and Territory legislation” (Campbell 2002, 
6480). 
This outcome from the Leaders’ Summit in 2002 provides evidence of 
spillover and this being a significant driver for the Commonwealth government’s 
expansion in policing.  The journey to reach this end began with the findings and 
recommendations of five royal commissions, the Mark review and significant 
milestones along the way that included the formation of the AFP, the establishment 
of the NCA, the Coad Review and the establishment of the ACC.  These milestones 
have been accompanied by the progressive increase in legislation and funding for 
law enforcement by the Commonwealth government for the policing of organised 
                                                        
53 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) 
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crime.  Commensurate to this has been the recognition by the States, as was spelt 
out in the Communique from the Summit that the policing of organised crime (and 
terrorism) was required to be undertaken at a higher level and “that the national 
interest would be served by all governments” (Gallop 2002).  The culmination of 
this approach was the 2003 constitutional referrals.  This event and the outcomes 
from it clearly provided good evidence of the reality of spillover in this area and also 
recognise how the States saw the benefit of such a national approach to this 
problem. 
5.3.2 Terrorism 
As a result of the Mark review, a formal inter-governmental agreement was 
established in Australia to provide appropriate counter terrorism (CT) 
arrangements, which fundamentally relied upon State police agencies for managing 
and responding to any terrorism incident.  Prior to the establishment of the 
national CT arrangements, terrorist acts were dealt with as State or Territory 
crimes. However, only the larger State police agencies had the staff and resources 
to respond to a terrorist attack and investigate the consequences.  Regardless, it 
was never tested whether the State police agencies were equipped and trained 
sufficiently to respond to a terrorist attack or deal with the aftermath.  After the 
formation of the AFP, the agency did not take on national CT responsibility and for 
many years was only concerned with CT in the Australian Capital Territory.  State 
police forces dominated the CT training and response arrangements established by 
the Commonwealth government in conjunction with States.   
The Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/State Cooperation for 
Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) was established in 1979 and operated as a 
section of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.  A critical aspect of 
the CT arrangements was the acceptance of the inability of police to deal with many 
potential terrorist attacks and the necessity to use elements of the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF), particularly the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) in times of 
emergency.  The arrangements for this to occur were based upon the doctrine of 
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Assistance to the Civilian Authority that is derived from section 119 of the 
Constitution: Protection of States from invasion and violence.   
The arrangements and CT structure remained in place until the end of the 
millennium when the Commonwealth began to take more responsibility at the 
expense of the States.  Commonwealth policing was subsequently given greater 
responsibilities and roles in CT across Australia, particularly investigation aspects. 
In 1995 the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) was introduced and this contained a 
definition of terrorism that has basically remained unchanged.  All State legislation 
where relevant applies the same definition.54  The definition at section 100.1 reads:   
terrorist act means an action or threat of action where:  
(a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subsection (3); and 
(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a 
political, religious or ideological cause; and   
(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:  
(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth 
or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign 
country; or  
(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public.  
Subsection (2) refers to actual death, harm, violence or threats while subsection (3) 
is where there is not violent intentions.  
The “9/11” terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001 and Bali Bombing in 2002 
motivated the Commonwealth to make counter-terrorism arrangements truly 
national and unambiguously a Commonwealth responsibility.  The formalisation 
involved a national agreement in October 2002 (Gallop 2002) and all States referred 
a limited power to allow the enactment of the Criminal Code Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth).  All States passed legislation55 to support and centralise 
                                                        
54 There is no equivalent terrorism legislation in State criminal law. 
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the Commonwealth’s new responsibilities for policing terrorism matters “to enable 
the making of national laws” (Williams 2011, 1152).  The Northern Territory and 
ACT did not have to pass laws “because the Commonwealth possesses plenary 
legislative power within those jurisdictions under s 122 of the Constitution” 
(Williams 2011, 1152).  The referral stipulated the Act was not to be amended 
without consultation with the States. The transfer of criminal law powers 
concerning terrorism is significant as it was provided under the referral section 
51(xxxvii) of the Constitution (Carney 2006a, 16) and from a Commonwealth 
policing perspective the AFP assumed a leadership role in this area of policing, 
particularly the investigation of terrorism activities, and a position previously left to 
the States with some Commonwealth involvement.  The AFP and other 
Commonwealth law enforcement and security agencies were further empowered in 
2004 and 2005 by additional legislation (Rimmer 2005), namely, Anti-Terrorism Act 
2004, Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth) and Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005, which 
amended and added additional powers to existing security and policing legislation, 
particularly the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
The introduction of specific Commonwealth criminal law concerning 
terrorism (Attorney-General 2012d) meant the reliance on State criminal law in 
these matters became redundant.  “The states possess considerable legislative 
responsibility in the field of criminal law.  Nevertheless, they decided against 
enacting their own comprehensive anti-terror law regimes” (Williams 2011, 1152).  
Interestingly, New South Wales and Victoria passed related legislation and these 
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only concerned police powers i.e. stop, search and detain etc., while it is assumed 
the other jurisdictions were happy to rely on existing powers. 56 
The referral of criminal law powers for terrorism enabled Commonwealth 
policing to have primacy in this area.  The 2002 Agreement between the respective 
governments on terrorism, at section 2.4 (d) stated that in the advent of a declared 
terrorist situation, regardless of the jurisdiction “the Commonwealth has 
responsibility in a declared national terrorist situation for determining policy and 
broad strategies in close consultation with affected States and territories” 
(Attorney-General 2002).  Prior to the agreement Commonwealth pre-eminence 
was not clear cut. 
It should be noted that there has been some disagreements between the 
Commonwealth and States over some aspects of terrorism laws.  As agreed in 2002, 
the Commonwealth was to consult with the State and Territory governments over 
any changes to terrorism legislation.  In 2005 some State and Territory 
governments complained publicly that the Commonwealth had not consulted with 
them in respect to some parts of additional terrorism legislation.  It should be noted 
the legislation that followed provided the Commonwealth with less powers than it 
desired, due to this opposition.  The opposition by the ACT Chief Minister was 
pivotal.  “A ‘Draft-in-Confidence’ version of the Bill was made public on 14 October 
2005 by Australian Capital Territory Chief Minister Jon Stanhope, thereby providing 
an extra opportunity for public debate, but also attracting an angry response from 
the Howard government” (Williams 2011, 1165).  Also concerns by the Victorian 
and Queensland governments (ABC 2005) led to changes to the bill and lessened 
the powers provided for Commonwealth officers.  The specific complaint by 
Premiers Bracks and Beattie aired on the 19 May 2005 ABC Lateline program.  Their 
complaint was that additional powers for Commonwealth officers had been added 
to the new legislation, after a meeting of Premiers and Chief Ministers with the 
Prime Minister, where this issue had not been discussed or agreed upon. 
                                                        
56 Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) and Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) 
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To exemplify the change in policing in respect to terrorism, the AFP Annual 
Report 2009–10 (AFP 2010, 58) provides a section concerning its Terrorism program 
and specified the outcomes from its work.  The report identifies 100 per cent of its 
operations as preventative—resulting in 5 terrorism arrests, 10 terrorism 
convictions and nine terrorism offenders before the courts awaiting hearings.  
These raw statistics indicate the AFP provides a significant amount of staff and 
resources to this labour intensive investigation area.  No other Australian police 
agency is involved with terrorism to this degree nor has it the legislative mandate to 
the extent Commonwealth agencies were granted at the behest of the States when 
they took the step of referring powers to the national government through the 
constitutional mechanism provided for such matters. 
Spillover in this area has driven the change in Commonwealth policing at the 
expense of sub-national agencies and importantly, by consent and at the behest of 
State governments.  Again, as in the case of organised crime, there was scant media 
reporting or political debate on the issue due to the consensual nature of the 
change.  There was a lack of State resistance that is uncharacteristic in the normal 
course of Commonwealth-State relations, especially when an area of government 
service is taken over by the Commonwealth.  An explanation for this State 
acceptance is not clear nor has it been the subject of other analysis.  It is possible to 
speculate that such a high cost and high risk area of responsibility was allowed to 
be taken by the Commonwealth because the States lacked the financial resources 
and were risk-averse.  Fundamentally, to resist the Commonwealth in this area 
would in political terms be detrimental as clearly the national and international 
nature of terrorism rests with the national government and its agencies. 
It would appear to have been a classic spillover situation.  In the 
communiqué from the Leaders Forum, mention was made of the 12 point plan to 
deal with terrorism and major organised crime and this included “providing the 
Commonwealth with a strategic role in terrorist situations” (Gallop 2002, 1).  There 
are grounds to think that identifying terrorism as being strategic in reality meant 
the States took the opportunity to transfer real and potential policing costs and 
political risks associated with terrorism, to the Commonwealth under the guise of 
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spillover.  At the end of the day the reality was the States by their actions were not 
losing anything apart from a potentially expensive and high risk area of law 
enforcement. 
5.4 New Commonwealth Responsibilities 
There has been a significant increase in the scope of criminal offences and activity 
since the 1980s that fall within the ambit of the Commonwealth government’s 
enumerated powers.  The existing sub-national criminal law in many cases simply 
lacked jurisdiction on constitutional grounds and the Commonwealth has elected to 
enact new criminal legislation and take primary responsibility for enforcement.  This 
is not to say the Commonwealth cannot empower State police agencies to 
investigate and enforce these matters as there are mechanisms in both the 
Constitution and through sub-constitutional processes for this to occur.  
Additionally, the Commonwealth government has shown that despite lacking 
jurisdiction in some policy areas, it has become involved where it perceived a 
national approach was required, like gun control when it intervened in this area of 
State responsibility, after the Port Arthur massacre in Tasmania. 
Since 1980 there have been a number of specific areas concerning policing 
where the Commonwealth has opted to legislate and expand the scope of functions 
for Commonwealth policing.  The areas that best exemplify the expansion of the 
scope of Commonwealth policing included crimes against humanity—including the 
exploitation of children and people smuggling; cybercrime (cyber meaning related 
to computers and computer networks); firearms control; international policing; and 
the recent Northern Territory intervention.  These matters are considered 
individually. 
5.4.1 Crimes Against Humanity  
A range of legislation was enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament after 1995, 
concerning the criminal code to satisfy the obligations required by the government 
in respect to a range of conventions and treaties it has ratified in the area of crimes 
against humanity.  The authority for these laws is derived from the government’s 
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external affairs power.  The appropriate legislation is singularly national and from a 
policing perspective relies upon the AFP as the front-line investigation and 
enforcement agency.  The range of relevant crimes present in the Commonwealth’s 
criminal code includes: 
3. Genocide and war crime-Division 268 
4. Slavery and sexual servitude-Division 270 
5. People trafficking-Division 271 
6. Child sex offences outside Australia-Division 272 
The AFP has responsibility for enforcement and investigation, while the ACC has 
also been given references to investigate specific crimes in this area (for specific 
time periods), for example, child sex offences and sexual servitude (prostitutes 
being brought into Australia by organised crime groups). 
5.4.2 Cybercrime 
Cybercrime has several aspects but can be regarded as two-dimensional—the first 
being crimes committed against a person’s or organisation’s computer or computer 
networks, while the second aspect is the use of this technology to commit or 
facilitate the commission of crimes, both established and new.  Of the new crimes, 
the best known include hacking into computers for secret or commercially sensitive 
information; computer blackmail and ransom; cyber-fraud and forgery using stolen 
identities; distribution of child pornography; and cyber-bullying and stalking.   
The Commonwealth Parliament passed legislation concerning cybercrime in 
2001 (Martyn 2001), specifically the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) and this established 
amongst other things in a range of legislation, specific criminal offences in part 
10.7, of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).  In the second reading speech by 
Commonwealth Attorney-General Daryl Williams, he stated the offences created by 
the Act were “based on the recommendations of the January 2001 Model Criminal 
Code” (Williams 2001, 28641).  This meant the Act had been agreed to by both the 
Commonwealth and States, and the States could also pass the same legislation.   
Interestingly not all jurisdictions passed concurrent legislation and rely upon the 
Commonwealth for policing this area.  The issue of jurisdiction was not contentious 
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and the Commonwealth was filling a significant gap in the criminal law where the 
States and Territories lacked legislation, and possibly jurisdiction as the 
Commonwealth enumerated power under section 51 (v) concerning 
communications covers all aspects of cybercrime.   
The Commonwealth provided additional resources to the AFP to establish 
the High Tech Crime Centre to deal with crime in this area.  The constitutional 
power for this area emanates from section 51 (v) ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, 
and other like services’.  An expansion of Commonwealth powers concerning 
cybercrime including those related to policing was proposed in April 2010 and 
conveyed to the States.  The basis of the change was the intention of the Australian 
government, pursuant to its external affairs powers, to ratify the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cyberspace.  This will clearly provide additional criminal law 
responsibilities for the Commonwealth and place additional responsibilities on 
Commonwealth policing.  The commensurate legislation, Cybercrime Legislation 
Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) was assented to on 12 September 2012. 
5.4.3 Firearms Control 
Firearm control is a State responsibility and the Commonwealth has no discernible 
powers in this area except in some of its Territories and in the trade (import) of 
ammunition, firearms and parts into Australia.  Police agencies in each of the states 
and two self-governing territories are the responsible agency for firearms control 
and regulation, which has been a State government responsibility since Federation.  
However, the issue of firearms control as a national policy matter was initiated by 
the Commonwealth government in 1996 as a consequence of the Port Arthur 
massacre in Tasmania (28 April 1996).  This focusing event (Birkland 1998; and 
Hollander and Patapan 2007), which involved the murder of 35 people and 
wounding of 21, caused national outrage.  The overwhelming issue was the fact 
that citizens (like the gunman) in most States were able to own military pattern 
firearms.  In response to the massacre the Prime Minister initiated action for the 
Commonwealth to intervene in this area of sub-national police responsibility.  The 
Prime Minister called a special meeting of the APMC on 10 May 1996 with the aim 
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of developing a national firearms policy to decrease and restrict firearms in a 
uniform manner across Australia.  A major problem had occurred and the States 
and Territories consented to the Commonwealth becoming an active participant in 
problem solving, regardless of lacking any obvious jurisdiction in this area of public 
policy. 
As a result of the meeting of the Police Ministers, they agreed to a 10-point 
plan for the regulation of firearms. This became known as the Nationwide 
Agreement on Firearms (APMC 1996).  The agreement included banning self-loading 
rifles, and self-loading and pump-action shotguns and a 12 month firearms amnesty 
and compensation scheme (the Gun Buy-back Scheme).  The Gun Buy-back Scheme 
involved each State and Territory establishing and operating a system allowing gun 
owners and dealers to surrender newly-prohibited weapons in return for 
compensation.  Arrangements were also made to compensate firearms dealers for 
loss of business relating to prohibited firearms. 
The Commonwealth‘s role involved policy development and coordination 
for the implementation of the scheme and the provision of funds to the States 
under the National Firearms Program Implementation Act 1996 (Cth).  This Act was 
supported by both sides of the Commonwealth Parliament on 25/6/1998.57  The 
Commonwealth funded both the administration of the scheme and the 
compensation payments made in relation to prohibited weapons.  According to the 
1997 Australian National Audit Office report on the Gun Buyback Scheme 
(Australian National Audit Office 1997), it secured the surrender of about 640,000 
newly-prohibited firearms nationwide.  The buy-back was funded as a result of the 
Commonwealth Parliament passing the Medicare Levy Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) 
to raise the predicted cost of $500 million through a one-off increase in the 
Medicare Levy.  
The implementation of the new nation-wide firearms policy was made much 
easier by the fact Australia did not have any manufacturers of firearms for the 
domestic market.  Thus, all firearms and spare parts had to be imported and the 
                                                        
57 See Hansard, Senate 25 June 1998, page 4083 
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Commonwealth’s constitutional power involving commerce across the national 
border under section 51 (ii) allowed it to control the supply into States and 
Territories.  The Commonwealth made it clear that it would use this power to 
prevent the States and Territories from circumventing the new policy.   
What this exercise in problem solving and effective policy making in a 
specific policing area demonstrated, was the Commonwealth had the ability to take 
up new responsibilities outside the traditional constitutional boundaries, when it 
had the appropriate motivation and the consent of the sub-national governments. 
5.4.4 International Policing 
As part of the Commonwealth’s external affairs responsibilities since the 1970s, it 
has provided police for international peace keeping sponsored by the United 
Nations Organisation (UN).  This commitment grew substantially in the late 1990s 
with the East Timor intervention and has expanded to the provision of police for 
capacity building in the Asia and Pacific region.  Motivating the capacity building 
initiative was the identification of international organised crime groups infiltrating 
the governments of a number of the small pacific island States and Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). The view of the Commonwealth government was these crime groups 
presented a substantial threat to political stability in these nations and this could 
result in regional instability affecting the interests of Australia (Boister 2004; 
McCusker 2006).   
The AFP provided a substantial amount of staff for this aspect of police 
operations and made arrangements to supplement staffing shortfalls from State 
and Territory forces.  The Commonwealth made full reimbursement of costs 
relating to secondment of those officers.  This new policing responsibility is owned 
exclusively by the Commonwealth under the section 51(xxix) external affairs power. 
There is another aspect to international policing that is simply the exchange 
of information and intelligence between Australian agencies and their international 
counterparts.  Specifically, Interpol is the main international agency for this aspect 
of policing and the AFP is the Australian representative. Originally the Victoria 
Police was the initial Interpol link, then the Commonwealth Police and in 1979 the 
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AFP became the responsible agency.  Additionally, other major police agencies in 
Asia, North America and Europe when dealing with Australian police agencies 
generally work through the AFP as the agency for communication and exchange of 
criminal information and intelligence.  The AFP also provides international liaison 
officers representing Australian police agencies in many nations across the world. 
Primarily Commonwealth policing is the conduit in all matters policing with 
the rest of the world.  This responsibility has developed in tandem with 
globalisation and the internationalism of crime.  Thus, constitutionally these new 
and expanding responsibilities pertaining to policing rest with Commonwealth 
policing. 
5.4.5 Northern Territory Intervention 
In 2007 the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) was 
enacted as a result of the problems identified in aboriginal communities in the 
Northern Territory, in respect to alcohol abuse, child sex offences, pornography and 
domestic and family violence (Magarey et al. 2007; Webb and Dow 2007).  The 
Commonwealth took the unilateral responsibility to address the problems and 
policing was integral to the success of the initiative.  Constitutionally the 
Commonwealth used its power under section 122 to intervene in the affairs of the 
Northern Territory.  To implement this initiative a significant policing presence was 
required to ensure enforcement of the new laws in a number of aboriginal 
communities that were excised and placed under Commonwealth control.   
The appropriation for policing in the first year included $7.4M for AFP 
deployment and $25.7M for the building of police stations and houses (Webb and 
Dow 2007, 4).  The Act allowed the excision of specified areas of the NT so specific 
offences in those areas could be policed by members of the AFP and NT Police.  
Fundamentally, the Commonwealth intervened in the Northern Territory’s affairs 
and compromised its perceived sovereignty (the reality of Territory status is the 
Commonwealth Parliament will always have sovereignty).   
This intervention in the affairs of a self-governing Territory was exceptional 
and unusual and specifically involved the Commonwealth policing areas of the 
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Territory usually the responsibility of the NT Police Force and in turn the NT 
Government.  The sovereignty of the local police and government was overridden 
by the Commonwealth.  AFP officers were brought into the NT to police new 
Commonwealth laws and operate independently from the local police.  The 
Commonwealth relied upon the plenary powers of section 122 of the Constitution 
to empower federal police.  It would appear this application of this Commonwealth 
power could not occur in a State, but regardless it demonstrated how the national 
government can intervene in policing by unilaterally adding new responsibilities.  It 
is considered such an exercise of Commonwealth power in policing would be 
problematic in a State. However, this is not to say it could not happen as the 
Commonwealth government has a history of expansion into traditional State 
government areas and in this instance the enumerated constitutional power 
concerning aboriginal people at section 51 (xxvi)—laws for any race of people, could 
in all possibility be applied. 
5.5 Economies of Scale 
Economies of Scale is a fundamental economic concept applicable and relevant to 
the operation of government and its agencies.  In respect to policing since 1980, like 
all others areas of the public sector there has been a deliberate policy of improving 
performance in respect to the resources provided by government.  Performance 
has been measured in quantitative terms of efficiency (productivity from inputs) 
and in qualitative terms of effectiveness (outcomes from programs). 
As policing was structured after Federation with only State agencies, 
traditionally each agency operated independently and used stand-alone networks, 
systems and manual databases to operate.  Most of these had a legislative basis in 
that they were authorised by law or their operation and accuracy was subject to 
judicial scrutiny.  Critically, access to information and intelligence provided by the 
systems had to be highly secure and the contents accurate.  The best example was 
the fingerprint records held by each agency and used for two specific and important 
evidentiary purposes.  They can be used jointly to identity an offender from latent 
fingerprints left at a crime scene, and secondly establish from the individual’s 
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fingerprints, their identity and past criminal record for the purposes of sentencing 
(or in a few cases evidence of the crime by establishing similar acts). 
The volume of crime increased substantially across Australia from the 1970s 
and especially into the 1980s (Walker and Henderson 2003; Mukherjee and Dagger 
1990) and one feature was criminal activity was operating across State and national 
borders.  Thus the cost in terms of efficiency for operating individual jurisdictional 
agency systems in areas like criminal records and criminal intelligence became 
burdensome.  Mark in his 1978 report pointed this out in his report where he 
advocated the Commonwealth should take a leading role in forensic science and 
identification (fingerprint identification and national database) for all the nation’s 
police agencies (Mark 1978)  The APMC, once formed, devoted a great deal of its 
energy to establishing a range of Common Police Services.   The strategy developed 
around the idea of  pooling resources and developing common nationwide systems 
and networks, thus providing only one system or network to exchange information 
in areas like fingerprint identification, criminal records, criminal intelligence and 
forensic identification, as opposed to eight.  The minutes of the APMC’s first eight 
meetings (NAA 2012f) demonstrate the extent of the interest in these national 
initiatives for policing.  The recommendations of the array of royal commissions 
into drugs and organised crime in the late 1970s and early 1980s recognised the 
need for common national systems in many areas of policing. 
Reforms in this area of policing had to be cognisant of the existing policing 
structure that operated within the federal architecture and was not therefore 
attuned to centralising systems and databases.  However, there was a common 
approach to centralise as demonstrated by the establishment of the various 
common services.  Thus Australian policing embraced the concept and 
implementation of national systems, which took the nomenclature of National 
Common Police Services (NCPS).  Importantly, the fact that the Commonwealth has 
been playing a leading role in these developments and has been the principal 
financier, illustrates once again Commonwealth activism.  
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5.5.1 National Common Police Services 
Common services were established from 1980 in the areas of information systems; 
criminal intelligence; forensic science; and research and development. This 
experience illustrates how change was driven and the important role of the 
Commonwealth.  The background to the developments have a history in federal 
politics in the 1970s and can be traced to Labor policy for policing undertaken by 
the Whitlam government (1972–75) and shortly after by the Fraser government 
(1975–1983).  In 1973, Whitlam announced the policy to transform the 
Commonwealth Police into a FBI-like agency that would take responsibility for 
national systems like the fingerprint and criminal records database (Whitlam 1985).  
Later this policy was further supported by the findings of the 1976 Bennett report 
concerning the Commonwealth Police that recommended, inter alia “provision of 
national services to all police agencies including criminal records and information, 
intelligence on the movement of criminals and organised crime, planning and 
research and forensic science” (NAA 2012c, 18–20).  The Cabinet, after considering 
the report, established an interdepartmental committee to report back on the 
Bennett recommendations including “(vii) discussion to be continued regarding the 
provision by the Commonwealth Police of common police services similar for 
example to the FBI and RCMP, e.g. Forensic Science Bureau and the National 
Planning and Research Unit” (NAA 2012c, 4).   
Several years later the Mark review acknowledged Bennett’s 
recommendation concerning common police services and the first meetings of the 
APMC had a common theme of beginning the process to develop and establish 
common police services.  The first four meetings of the APMC discussed the 
establishment and management of the inaugural common services and the 




Figure 5.2: Common Police Services Agenda Items at First Four APMC Meeting (NAA 2012f) 
Common 
Service  
APMC Meeting 1 @ Melbourne 
29/8/80 
APMC Meeting 2 @ Perth 5/6 
February 1981 
APMC Meeting 3 @ Sydney 
29/5/1981 




Item 2: Resolved to establish ABCI Item 1: Australian Bureau of 
Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) 
agreement between parties tabled.  
Commonwealth to meet all 
establishment and recurrent costs 
except seconded State police 
officers’ salaries. 
Item 2: First ABCI progress report Item 5: ABCI policy guidelines 
and procedures papers 
provided and to be 
considered at next meeting 
Forensic 
Science 
Item 3(iv): Task Group to report of 
national forensic science structure 
and funding 
Item 4: Naming (7) task force 
members and providing terms of 
reference to establish National 
Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) 
Item 3: Progress report by task 
force. Commonwealth offer to 
meet cost of Task Group study. 
Item 6: Interim report to be 




Item 3(iii): Establishment deferred 
to meeting#2 
Item 5: Agree in principle to 
locating national computer facility 
in NSW for National Exchange of 
Police Information (NEPI) 
Item 1: Pilot scheme undertaken 
and costs met by Commonwealth. 
Cost sharing proposal to be 




Item 3 (i): Poll members on 
establishing National Police 
Research Unit (NPRU) 
Item 2: Agreed to establish NPRU Item 5: Proposed cost sharing 
agreement of a third by 
Commonwealth and remainder by 
States and Territories.  Draft 
intergovernmental agreement and 
recommended location to be 
tabled at next meeting.  
Item1: Not all jurisdictions 
responded to draft 
agreement.  Matter to be 
tabled next meeting. 
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The common variable to all of these services is the fact that the 
Commonwealth government provided the bulk of the establishment and 
infrastructure costs and also later the recurrent administration and operating costs.  
The reason for the Commonwealth funding can be attributed to States having 
limited revenue-raising capability as compared with the national government.  
From a political perspective the Commonwealth was able to obtain an influential 
and powerful role in the shaping of the new national agencies and in turn enhance 
the Commonwealth government’s role in policing.  Presumably, this 
Commonwealth role was due to perceived efficiencies to be gained by police as a 
result of working with the new police services.  The direct effect was a significant 
change in the policing structure, with APMC looking to establish new common 
police services, national in focus and reliant upon Commonwealth government 
funding.  It should be noted the State and Territory police agencies contributed 
staff and funding for most services but at the end of the day their existence relied 
primarily upon Commonwealth support and resources. 
The common police services have evolved to where in 2010 they are an 
integral part of the national police structure.  Recently the nomenclature—common 
police services—has disappeared with the services operating out of individual 
agencies and continuing to provide national services in the same areas of policing.  
The services are now also provided to New Zealand Police (the only police agency in 
that nation). 
Individually there has been a shift from single common services to a more 
functional model clustering functions within an appropriate agency.  It should be 
noted common police services represent the use of sub-constitutional processes 
and institutions to operate and now are part of the wider COAG institutions. 
A brief description of the four main areas of common services demonstrates 
the centralising effect on policing in these policing areas. 
5.5.1.1 Criminal Intelligence 
The establishment of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) was the 
first attempt at creating a national agency staffed from all police agencies and 
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managed as a common police service with the APMC as the peak governance body 
(Norberry 2002, 5).  As pointed out by Recommendation 34 of the Woodward Royal 
Commission: “A single joint Commonwealth-State intelligence system should be 
established” (Woodward 1979, 1984) and this recommendation was also supported 
in other similar reviews at the time.  The APMC agreed to establish the ABCI at its 
second meeting after the Council’s formation.  The ABCI was primarily funded by 
the Commonwealth with the police jurisdictions paying the salaries of any staff.  
These arrangements were set out in the ABCI agreement (NAA 2012f).  In 2003 the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC) took over the ABCI and continues to provide 
the national criminal intelligence database and the platform that it operates across 
Australia.  A national agreement concerning the ACC provides the police ministers 
and commissioners with input into the agency’s service provision and operation.  
However, the Commonwealth government’s Attorney-General has the overall 
responsibility for the agency as it operates under Commonwealth legislation.  
Likewise, criminal intelligence is effectively operated and controlled by the 
Commonwealth government and no longer by the States after the closure of the 
ABCI. 
The ACC manages the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) and 
the Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (ALEIN).  ACID and ALEIN 
provide Commonwealth, State and Territory law enforcement and other regulatory 
authorities with a framework to securely store, retrieve, analyse and share criminal 
information and intelligence on a national and international basis (Norberry 2002). 
5.5.1.2 Forensic Science 
Forensic science is a general term for a range of scientific based investigation tools 
developed since the 1970s and now used extensively in criminal investigation 
because of the efficiency and objective nature of the evidence provided.  “Over the 
last 15 years considerable advancements have been made in forensic science as an 
investigative tool for police officers in criminal cases.  These advances have changed 
the way police services around the world have conducted criminal investigations 
from murder cases to computer crime” (Julian and Kelty 2010, 11).  It is not only 
DNA identification which is the best known forensic tool that has developed 
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significantly but also a range of other tools for forensic investigation in the areas of 
ballistics, textile identification, tool marks and toxicology.  The development of 
forensic science in policing is specifically linked to the developments in technology 
involving electronics and computing. 
The importance of forensic science in policing is three fold: it speeds up 
investigations by helping to both identify and discount suspects; it decreases the 
number of investigators required in some cases; and provides objective scientific 
evidence that speaks for itself and independently corroborates evidence provided 
by witnesses. Forensic science has increased both the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policing in Australia; however, it comes at a cost and for the smaller agencies in 
the 1970s and 1980s the cost was prohibitive. Thus, the sharing of technology and 
providing uniform national standards was critical. 
The Australian approach has been to establish a national agency to establish 
standards and maintain accreditation of the respective forensic laboratories and 
standards for the workforce in the field.  The development of training courses and 
national accreditation was also another responsibility for the agency.  
The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) was established in 1991 as a 
common police service under an Agreement signed off by the members of the 
APMC. The establishment of NIFS lagged behind the 1982 report by a task force set 
up by the APMC to report on “forensic science matters of common interest” (NAA 
2012d, 5). NIFS commenced operations in February 1992 and was located in 
Melbourne, and was ultimately accountable like the other common police services 
to the APMC. 
In 2008 NIFS governance arrangements changed as there was agreement by 
the Ministerial Council of Police and Emergency Management-Police (MCPEMP), 
previously known as APMC, in which NIFS would become a Directorate in the newly 
formed Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA).  
Clearly, reforms in this area have been driven by the need to achieve the 
most economic outcomes possible. 
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5.5.1.3 Criminal Information 
The first area of policing attracting formal cooperation between the States was with 
fingerprints.  In 1941 the New South Wales Police Fingerprint Bureau commenced 
operations as the Central Fingerprint Bureau for the nation with each agency 
contributing financially towards its cost.  This was the starting point for national 
police databases and the system of exchange of the information.  The Central 
Fingerprint Bureau operated as the database manager until 1990 when the National 
Exchange of Police Information (NEPI), a new common police service, was 
established. The fingerprint database was developed into the National Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) in 1987. This nationwide fingerprint 
identification system was at the time the only National computerised system of its 
type in the world. In 2001 the NAFIS System was replaced by the new SAGEM 
Morpho System operated by CrimTrac. 
NEPI existed until CrimTrac (CRIMTRAC 2012) was established in 2000.  It is 
an executive agency within the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Portfolio.  It was 
established under an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) between the 
Commonwealth and each of Australia’s police agencies. The IGA underpins 
CrimTrac’s mandate to lead the delivery of national information-sharing services for 
law enforcement agencies. In 2006, CrimTrac and all State and Territory police 
commissioners entered into a partnership Memorandum of Understanding, which 
supports the IGA.  The CrimTrac website comments “The success CrimTrac has 
achieved during this time is an excellent example of cooperative federalism, with 
the Commonwealth, States and territories working together to prevent, detect and 
reduce crime” (CRIMTRAC 2012). 
CrimTrac staff are employed as Commonwealth public servants and all 
intellectual property is vested and owned by the Commonwealth government.  The 
agency’s Board is constructed of a Commonwealth Attorney-General’s 
representative and the police commissioners who report to the Standing Council on 
Police and Emergency Management (SCPEM).  In 2009–10, the agency employed 
198 staff and it cost $52M to operate (CRIMTRAC 2010).  Again this centralised 
service has been driven by the need for economy and the Commonwealth has been 
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the primary developer.  Interestingly, the agency now makes a profit from its 
operations due to charging a fee for providing national police certificates, that 
many occupations require employees to obtain as a prerequisite for employment.  
5.5.1.4 Research and Development 
The issue of a police-centric research and development agency servicing the needs 
of all Australian police agencies was on the agenda of the first meeting of the APMC 
in 1980.  Subsequently at the sixth meeting in December 1982 the establishment of 
the National Police Research Unit (NPRU) was approved as another common police 
service.  The NPRU was located at Adelaide and existed until most of its roles were 
subsumed by ANZPAA when it was disestablished in 2007. 
5.6 Federalism and Driving Change  
The current policing model has primarily been achieved by changes and reforms 
driven by the Commonwealth that began in the 1970s.  The Commonwealth has 
been the most influential government in Australian for policing and this outcome 
has flown under the radar and attracted little or no attention academically, in the 
media or by the parliaments across the nation. 
The drivers of change have been identified but there were also policy 
processes and instruments that facilitated the acceptance of the problem solving 
drivers that must be recognised.  Commonwealth influence in public policy 
concerning policing began by its own initiative in 1980 by forming the APMC as the 
national forum and policy making body for policing.  The importance of this to the 
drivers is illustrated by considering the resolutions of the first eight APMC meetings 
(NAA 2012f)—where the States wanted something in return for allowing the 
Commonwealth to actively participate and at times implement its policies on 
policing.  The States needed funding for the significant reforms and technological 
developments that would spin off from the development of common services.  In 
most cases Commonwealth funding facilitated the driving of change in these areas 
that primarily benefited the Commonwealth’s influence and status in policing.  
Figure 5.3 illustrates the requests made on the Commonwealth government by the 
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State and Territory Police Ministers at the first eight meetings of the APMC for 
funding of new initiatives.  The Commonwealth was forthcoming with funding to 
develop the common police services and the success of these programs was due 
primarily to Commonwealth funding.  Clearly, this was a case of the Commonwealth 
driving change using sub-constitutional processes, reliant on the cooperation of the 
States and Territories to solve critical political problems faced by governments 
across the federation.  The States however were not impotent and forced to accept 
change, they clearly used their power to negotiate to achieve their desired 
outcomes. There was a quid-pro-quo, and the States had the ability to negotiate 




Figure 5.3: APMC Requests for Commonwealth Assistance at first eight Meetings 1980–1983 (NAA 2012f)  
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Problem solving and cooperation have been shown in the previous chapter on 
Australian federalism to be two of the key characteristics for change and obviously 
have played a role in the success of these drivers to change the structure of policing.  
There is clearly a link to how federalism has operated in recent times and what has 
occurred in the case of policing, which has been evidenced in this chapter.  The four 
key ingredients that characterise the change in policing—problems identified and 
needing urgent attention; States cooperating with the Commonwealth in problem 
solving; centralising some services; sharing or allocating responsibilities to one level—
have all been evidenced in the discussion on drivers. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The discussion on the drivers described the key events for Commonwealth policing 
after the AFP was formed.  This demonstrated how the usual resistance to 
Commonwealth intrusions into a traditional State responsibility and related powers 
were absent and in fact the States were supportive and fully cooperated with the 
Commonwealth.  It could be argued responsibility was to be concurrent in the spirit of 
cooperative federalism, but the reality is that in many of these areas that relate to 
spillovers and new responsibilities, the Commonwealth has become preeminent.   
The additional role for the Commonwealth is evidenced by the fact that most 
sub-national governments have not passed concurrent criminal legislation in these 
areas and their police agencies do not operate independently of Commonwealth 
agencies in any local investigations that relate to these crimes.  It must also be 
recognised that many new crimes have emerged for which the Commonwealth has the 
enumerated powers to deal with and for which the States lack jurisdiction.  The other 
driver of change considered—economies of scale—demonstrated that Commonwealth 
fiscal power is an instrument it has used to make inroads into policing and assume an 
influential role in this traditionally State controlled domain.  
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It is clear when considering the drivers of change that the experience of policing 
differs substantially to most other areas of government service delivery.  As noted in 
Chapter Three, in other State areas of responsibility like education and health, the 
Commonwealth’s driving of change and reform has been a constant source of conflict 
with the States, while policing has been characterised by State cooperation and 
consent.  The other key difference is the fact that the Commonwealth has driven 
change by directly entering policing and becoming operationally involved by delivering 
services in its own right—it operates its own police agencies.   
The process of change for Australian policing from a federalism perspective 
since 1980 is characterised by the cooperation of the States and Territories and lacks 
any of the usual conflict expected for such a significant change to the division of 
powers and increased centralisation.  As well, in a number of areas there is a sharing of 
responsibilities.  The fact that the Commonwealth was the substantive driver of change 
has been detailed, but the reason for State support has not been a matter widely 
discussed or researched.  However, in the case of uniform firearms laws; establishment 
of the ACC; APMC policy making; and the establishment and operation of Common 
Police Services, the States have negotiated favourable outcomes.  The outcomes 
achieved from these four cases are: buy-back of firearms and all administrative costs 
paid by the Commonwealth; ACC Board constituted by all the State and Territory police 
commissioners; Chair of APMC now and in its latest manifestation, changes annually 
between all jurisdictions (Commonwealth originally proposed it be the permanent 
Chair); and the common services were only established if the Commonwealth was 
principle financier.  
Why the States and Territories have supported change, regardless of effectively 
diminishing their policing scope in some areas, can only be speculated from the facts 
shown by the matters explored so far.  The States and Territories are faced with VFI 
and are cash-strapped and they understand that addressing the new and emerging 
crime problems is an expensive business.  The use of Commonwealth funded new 
technologies and central databases and communication systems makes police agencies 
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more effective and provides at the same time significant saving because of economies 
of scale.  With this in mind and knowing the Commonwealth has greater revenue 
capacity, leaving the problem solving to the Commonwealth, has benefits, regardless of 
losing sovereignty over some aspects of policing.  The fact that the leaders at the 2002 
Summit recognised the strategic nature of terrorism and organised crime and made 
these areas of crime a Commonwealth responsibility, is persuasive evidence of the 
recognition of the spillover of these matters that are of high-risk in the political arena.   
The ultimate result of the changes driven by the Commonwealth has been 
nationally integrated policing and it has been argued this entailed greater 
centralisation in some areas of policing, while sub-national agencies retained most of 
their existing responsibilities.  This resulted in a new national policing structure where 
the Commonwealth plays a significant role and operates as an equal with the other 
agencies.  
When all of the issues surrounding change are added up, it is clear from the 
police experience that how federalism operated over time played a role in the change 
to policing.  Clearly, cooperation between the federal partners, using both sub-
constitutional and constitutional mechanisms, played an important role.  At times the 
Commonwealth also took a forceful role as was the case following the Port Arthur 
massacre.  The Commonwealth has also used the APMC to gain influence, which was a 
tactic identified previously in the case of the national education forum.  The operation 
of federalism has played a major role in facilitating change. 
Why change occurred and what drove it has been explained in terms of the 
three specific types of drivers.  In considering these explanations, they centred on the 
need to solve confronting crime problems by governments.  In this case, problem 
solving as a general explanation fits with the conventional view on this aspect of 
federalism discussed in Chapter Three. 
Before considering the matter of the changes to Australian policing and the 
development of the new structure, it is appropriate to consider the Australian 
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experience in comparison with some other like federal nations, before concluding and 
addressing the primary research questions.  Considering the experience of other 
nations may help explain why Australian policing has changed and may also 
corroborate the findings that have become evident in the previous chapters.  
Importantly, the opportunity is provided to view the role of federalism in policing in 
these countries, and the extent of its influence over policing.  Therefore, an 
international comparison of Australian policing with four federal nations, that all share 





CHAPTER SIX: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF POLICING 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses an international comparison to test some findings from the previous 
chapters and put the Australian experience into perspective.  The predominant matter 
for the comparison is the proposition outlined in Chapter One: centralisation of 
policing is a trend that other western democratic federations have also experienced, 
regardless of decentralised policing structures and entrenched anti-centralisation 
political ideologies (Chapter One, section 1.3).  The previous chapters demonstrate that 
the main reason why policing in Australia experienced a centripetal shift is "the 
globalisation of crime and insecurity: complex crimes and conspiracies spanning 
numerous countries are said to require extensive international police collaboration” 
(Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, 1).  This aspect—internationalism of crime—means crime 
of this nature is generally left to the national government to be the first responder, and 
so by default it falls to the national police agency or agencies.   Other internal political 
factors are also at work to increase the role of national governments in policing.  Much 
of this can be attributed to changing federalism, which increases centralisation and in 
the case of Australia has encouraged the national integration of policing. 
Testing the centralisation proposition is done by using an orthodox 
methodology of identifying the basic elements of the policing model in each of the four 
federal nations selected—Canada, Germany, Switzerland and USA.  The primary 
consideration is how policing operates within the political system and government 
structure, then exploring the issue of increased federal government involvement.  The 
nations selected share a range of common elements in their political, legal and social 
systems that make a comparison for policing plausible.  Clearly, no two nations will be 
identical, but grouping Canada, Germany, Switzerland and USA with Australia is 
practicable and has been used in other areas of government services like education 
and health.   
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The chapter begins by identifying each of the nations used in the comparison 
then considers each nation separately.  Each nation is described in terms of the 
fundamental constitutional and political structures and then how policing operates 
within the political and government framework.  The practical operation of policing 
within the framework of government is the key issue in considering the extent of 
federal involvement in policing—the question asked is to what extent has federal 
involvement increased.  Importantly, this section considers the extent that crime has 
transcended from a local problem to one that requires a national approach.   As Casey 
summed up the recent international developments in policing and the impact they 
had:  “the average police officer’s operating environment passes much wider horizons: 
crime threats are increasingly global and most officers find themselves routinely 
dealing with international and transnational issues” (Casey 2010, xiii). 
This leads to a conclusion concerning these nations in respect to the key 
question of the change to policing—was it evidenced by increased centralisation and 
changed policing structures?  This importantly identifies the extent of change driven by 
federalism in these nations and leads to the final consideration of whether the 
experience of these nations supports the findings concerning the Australian 
experience.  
6.2 Comparative Nations 
The four nations used for the comparison are drawn from a group of Western 
federations that are similar to Australia in respect to the primary political setting of 
federalism. Additionally, there are several important common characteristics required 
for their selection that includes the nation having an effective democratic political 
system, an independent judiciary and a similar social environment.  As well all of the 
nations are members of the same major international institutions (UN, World Bank, 
IMF, Interpol, etc.) and are intertwined by means of international treaties and 
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agreements concerning policing, as well as other related political alliances and 
institutions.  
It should be noted there are some fundamental differences between the four 
nations in two important matters.  In the cornerstone matter of division of powers 
between national and sub-national governments: Canada and Switzerland are classified 
as decentralised while Germany and the US are considered centralised.  As to the 
actual operation of many government services like policing, the federal government in 
the US and Canada take a leading role in service provision, while Germany and 
Switzerland generally leave the administration and operation of federal services to sub-
national government.  Also in support of the choice of these four nations is the fact 
that many Australian comparative works relating to politics, public administration and 
public policy also use all or some of these nations as a matter of course for 
comparative purposes.   
Before considering the nations individually, Figure 6.1 provides a comparison of 
the four nations with Australia in respect to the fundamental national dimensions and 
the rudimentary government structures of federal government. 
Figure 6.1: Comparison of Primary Statistics for Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland and USA 
 Australia Canada Germany Switzerland USA 
Population (million) 22.6 34.3 82.1 7.7 313 
Area (Sq. km) 7.7 million 9.9 million 357,000 41,284 9.8 million 
States/Provinces/Lander/
Canton 




258 3 none none 6 
Local Governments 
(approximately) 
562 (ALGA) 3,700 15,000 3,000 39,000 (US 
Census 
Bureau) 
Gross National Income 
per capita ($US), 201059 
37,580 38,400 38,410 51,600 47,220 
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operate like the Australian States 




6.3  Canada   
Canada like Australia has a history of British colonisation and was constructed from a 
number of British colonies using a federal model for the political system.  Many of the 
original colonies have been restructured like the colony of Canada being deconstructed 
into the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and many new provinces have developed 
from territories.  Currently the structure of government consists of one national 
government, ten provinces, three territories and approximately 3700 local 
governments of varying sizes.   
The arrangement for government is contained in the Constitution and only 
recognises two levels of government, national and provincial.  Like Australia, there is 
provision for self-government of territories as is the case with the Yukon Territory.  The 
governance of indigenous communities is multi-faceted and can fall within the 
jurisdiction of federal or provincial government or both for services. 
Policing is predominantly a government-operated service and primarily a 
provincial responsibility that is generally devolved by provinces to the local 
government level.  Constitutionally, Canada is like Australia as there are no 
enumerated powers for the Federal government in respect to policing.  The 
Constitution is silent on the specific topic but in the chapter on enumerated powers for 
the provinces, under the heading of the Administration of Justice, this power is 
considered to render policing a provincial (State) responsibility (Robertson 2012, 345).  
Unlike Australia, where all residual powers not enumerated in the Constitution fall to 
the States by default, Canada has the opposite predisposition so that generally residual 
matters are considered to be in the jurisdiction of the Federal government (Fenna 
2007a, 180).  Interestingly, Canada is generally regarded as a decentralised federation, 
akin to Switzerland in many respects (Fenna 2007a, 188) as opposed to Australia being 
highly centralised. 
At Federation in 1867 there was no provision for federal policing in the 
Constitution, but shortly after there was a need for policing in the newly acquired 
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western territories.  This was the start of federal policing and in 1873 the North West 
Mounted Police (NWMP)60 was established by the federal government to police the 
new territory.  From there the agency, renamed the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) in 1920, has progressed to its iconic position as the largest police agency in the 
nation and one of the most recognised police agencies in the world.   
In 1905 the NWMP was first contracted by a province to supply police services 
and that trend continued to the present where only two large provinces, Ontario and 
Quebec, provide their own police agency.  Currently, the other eight provinces and all 
the territories and many indigenous communities are policed by the RCMP.  However, 
all major cities in Canada have their own police forces and these can be traced to the 
original establishment of the cities.  A large percentage of policing is represented by 
these city agencies and RCMP representation is not commonly visible in these 
population centres. 
By contrast with Australia and the United States, responsibility for the criminal 
law in Canada was allocated to the national government.  Thus, the federal parliament 
is the sole source of the primary criminal law.  This centralises and in many respects 
takes away from the provinces control of what the police do in their jurisdiction 
involving the criminal law enforcement function.  Additionally, the 1982 Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms centralises criminal law procedures and policy and 
places it squarely in the hands of the national government.  In every police 
investigation the procedure must comply with this federal law regardless of the 
agency’s jurisdictional roots.  It would appear the Canadian policing model in many 
respects is the product of the Constitution power of the federal government and this 
should be considered in more detail. 
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 Renamed the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in 1920 
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6.3.1 Constitutional Arrangements and Policing 
Constitutionally, policing is a provincial responsibility located under the heading of 
Administration of Justice in the Province.61 In the case of Territories where there was 
no sub-national government, by default the responsibility falls to the federal 
government unless there is responsible government legislation in place, like the Yukon 
Territory.  Included in the enumerated powers of provincial constitutions, along with 
provisions of Territorial self-government Acts is the power for the respective 
governments to provide policing services within their jurisdiction.  This resulted in each 
provincial parliament62 along with the Yukon,63 enacting police legislation establishing 
police agencies, providing for their governance and functions along with detailing the 
powers of police officers employed by the agency.  Police agencies are statutory 
authorities and their governance structure (generally titled commissions) is detailed in 
the respective acts. 
The provincial Acts generally detail the obligation placed on local governments 
like cities, municipalities and towns to provide policing services or to contract for such 
services or by default where the municipality is small, allow the provincial government 
to provide the service (John Howard Society of Alberta 1997, 3–4; Statistics Canada 
2010, 9–10; Robertson 2012, 345).  There are provisions in the legislation to allow the 
RCMP or other police agencies such as provincial police or adjoining municipal agency, 
to provide the policing service at either provincial or local level (Robertson 2012, 345).  
When the option is taken, a formal contract is entered into by the parties with a 
specific cost sharing formula.   
The RCMP service is provided at a fixed cost to the user for 
extensive contracted periods, at least 20 years.  Police Services 
Agreements are based on cost share. Provinces and territories pay 
                                                        
61 The Constitution Act 1867: section 92 (14) 
62 Alberta Police Act, RSA 2011, c P.17; Police Act, RSBC 2011, c 367; Provincial Police Act, CCSM 2011, c. 
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70% of RCMP costs and the federal government pays 30%.  
Municipal agreements are based on a number of different cost 
share formulas, which are dependent on population size, and 
when a municipality signed its first policing agreement with the 
RCMP (RCMP 2013a).   
An example is the province of Alberta renewed its contract in 1992 with the 
RCMP for another 20 years (to 2012) and agreed to pay annually 70 percent of the 
service provision costs (Cooper and Koop 2003, 6–18).  (The contract was renewed in 
2011 for period 2012–2032)  
All areas of crime that are the subject of federal legislation and national in 
character are the responsibility of the RCMP.  Examples include organised crime, illicit 
drug manufacture, drug importation and trafficking, terrorism, crimes against 
humanity including human trafficking and technology based cybercrime and money-
laundering and Internet scams (Statistics Canada 2010, 9).  These areas of crime 
developed after Federation and the federal government chose in the case of these 
matters to apply its residual powers and make enforcement the responsibility of the 
RCMP.  The internationalism of crime since the 1970s has affected Canada and the 
RCMP has taken the lead role in combating international organised crime.   
On the RCMP website, Serious and Organized Crime page—the impact of 
organised crime and the concern for this type of crime is expressed and the link to 
international influences is recognised:  
Organized crime affects the daily lives of Canadians.……Globalization 
and rapid advances in technology have contributed to the expansion 
and internationalization of organized crime activities; Canadians can 
easily fall victim to organized crime groups operating outside of our 
borders, (identity theft, internet, e-mail scams, phishing, etc.), making 
it a global problem that cannot be fought solely within our borders. 
…..The violence and corrupting effect of organized crime groups are 
mainstays of primary activities, which greatly affect every Canadian’s 
right to safety and security (RCMP 2013c). 
The structure of policing and the arrangements for policing in Canada have 
developed in a way where the federal government is the largest individual provider of 
policing services regardless of the constitutional responsibilities being primarily a 
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provincial one.   In 2010 the RCMP provided policing services to eight provinces, three 
territories, 190 municipalities, 184 aboriginal communities and three international 
airports (CPIC 2010).  The RCMP operates under federal legislation64 and has a 
Commissioner appointed by the federal government “who under the direction of the 
Minister has the control and management of the Force and all matters connected 
therewith” (s. 5(1) RCMP Act 1985). The Minister for Public Safety is the responsible 
minister.  
Policing in Canada therefore has three tiers of government providers: national; 
provincial; and local (inclusive of cities and municipalities).  In total according to the 
National Directory of police agencies (CPIC 2010) there are 460 police agencies, with 
the RCMP being the largest and providing over 50 per cent of policing services for the 
nation (CPIC 2010).  
What is equally, if not more, significant from a comparative perspective is the 
role of local government.  Cities and municipalities according to provincial legislation 
are required to provide police services unless they are a very small community.  This 
results in the substantial number of municipal police agencies and importantly all the 
major cities, including the national capital Ottawa, provide their own police agencies.  
Interestingly, like Australia and the USA, local government is not recognised in the 
federal Constitution but is recognised in the provincial constitutions. 
6.3.2 Policing in Practice 
Although the federal government does not have primary constitutional responsibility 
for policing, the national police agency is the largest single police service provider in 
the country and operates in all jurisdictions to provide services of varying degrees.  The 
function of police agencies in all jurisdictions, regardless of their ownership, has a base 
which entails the maintenance of law and order akin to the fundamental role of 
Australia’s State and Territory police agencies.  The respective police legislation like 
British Columbia’s Police Act, RSBC 1996, Chapter 367, tasks the police under section 7 
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with “duties and functions respecting the preservation of peace, the prevention of 
crime and offences against the law and the administration of justice”.  Similarly, the 
other provincial Acts concerning policing replicate these words in respect to the 
general police role. 
The actual practice in Canada is generally different from the theoretical 
arrangements of policing being a sub-national responsibility and this reality is the nub 
of criticism concerning the role of the federal government in policing.  The provision of 
police services outside its prime national jurisdiction by the RCMP according to some 
critics is detrimental to Provinces and local communities (Cooper and Koop 2003, 10–
11; Macleod 1994, 188–189; Beare and Murray 2007, 113–114).  The RCMP is a 
national organisation and the main criticism is it cannot provide a service sensitive to 
local needs and consistent with community expectations.  This lack of local control is 
the price local jurisdictions pay when they contract the RCMP to provide local policing 
services.  The response to this criticism is the respective Acts provide checks and 
balances to control the contractors and the functions they undertake.  It would appear 
this is the case, and the RCMP must take notice of local input; however, the extent that 
they act upon the feedback is obviously the key issue. 
Another matter concerning policing is what actually occurs in respect to policy, 
as the independent police agencies (agencies not contracted from RCMP) must be 
cognisant of federal policy due to conditions put on federal funding, which 
independent agencies rely upon in many areas.  Agencies that exist in their own right in 
Canada have access to federal funds under a range of policing grants and funds like the 
Police Officer Recruitment Fund that began in 2008 and has cost $400M to date. The 
other main areas of funding are in Aboriginal policing and anti-gangs squads.  The 
funding is conditional on achieving performance goals and standards in most cases and 




The governance arrangements for each level of police agency are set out in the 
provincial police legislation enabling the establishment of statutory authorities within 
provinces and detailing governance structures. The structures include management 
and oversight by provincial ministers along with commissions, committees, boards and 
panels, and governance arrangements permitting input by independent and local 
community representatives (Robertson 2012, 349).  Apart from ministerial governance 
provisions, those concerning other representative bodies have never been included in 
Australian police legislation or are a feature of agency governance. 
In the case of provinces not contracting to the RCMP (Ontario and Quebec), the 
governance of the provincial force is undertaken by a police commission established to 
represent the community.  The aim of the arrangements is to avoid the perception of 
direct political control and allow local input with the aim of making the police more 
attuned to community needs.  In the case of independent municipal and city police 
departments, many have established police boards to oversee the operation of the 
police but many local police agencies are governed directly by municipal councils or 
their committees.  
When considering governance it is not a straightforward and linear matter in 
the agencies that contract services in from other agencies, in particular when 
contracting the RCMP.  As noted, the RCMP contracts to provinces and municipalities 
and the degree of local control by definition cannot be fully local.  As argued in a Fraser 
Institute discussion paper on the perceived shortcomings of contracting policing out to 
the RCMP in Alberta: “the province could supply better police service because the 
provincial government is more responsive to local needs, local culture, and local 
context than is the federal government” (Cooper and Koop 2003, 6).  The RCMP is a 
federal organisation and it operates a uniform service across the nation.  Thus, in the 
case of governance for issues like personnel, equipment, operating practices and 
procedures these cannot be tailored to each province or municipality. 
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The RCMP also provides national and uniform services to support police 
agencies across the nation.  National information exchange, criminal records and 
intelligence, communications, forensic science services and training are provided by 
the RCMP. 
6.3.3 Centralisation and Canadian Policing 
Federal policing has grown significantly since Confederation in 1867 irrespective of the 
fact so many sub-national governments contract the RCMP for local services.  With 
residual matters falling to the national government under the constitution, the RCMP 
has been tasked with many crime matters that have developed since the 19th century.  
Examples of new policing functions include crimes against humanity, cybercrime, drug 
trafficking, national security threats inclusive of those derived from terrorism and 
organised crime (Murphy 2007 454).  The federal government has developed a policy 
to expand its role in policing since the 1960s by the RCMP providing seven national 
services for all police agencies across the nation in areas such as criminal records, 
criminal intelligence, forensic science and identification, training and research (RCMP 
2013b).   
Like Australia since the 1970s, globalisation and increased mobility of criminals 
and the volume of crime at all levels committed across local, provincial and national 
borders have increased significantly (Ferguson 2005, 272–274).  The increased volume 
of crime appears to be a common phenomenon for most Western nations and has 
been identified as one of the main outcomes of the unprecedented and rapid social 
change that took place since the 1960s.  The fact of globalisation over this period was 
also a critical factor that affected Canadian policing at all levels.  Importantly, the 
Constitution provided that the emerging international related policing matters could 
rest with the national government and this has facilitated this growth.   Additionally, 
the provision of a large range of policing services on a national basis has also placed 
federal policing in Canada in a powerful position to influence policy and practices at the 
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lesser levels of policing.  Overall federal policing has grown but the critical question is 
has this translated into increased centralisation of policing?  
The extent of the centralisation of policing in Canada is clearly to a lesser 
degree than Australia.  At a first glance Canadian policing appears to have become 
more centralised in recent times but in reality there has only been incremental change, 
much less than Australia.  The fact of contracting-in police services from the national 
police agency, RCMP, in some areas of policing, injects a variable that makes it difficult 
to make comparisons with the other nations.  More RCMP police in the field does not 
necessarily translate into more centralisation as the main areas for policing—the cities 
maintain their own police forces.  The Canadian system ensures police agencies that 
contract-in the RCMP are accountable to formal governing bodies and to standards set 
by provincial legislation and policy.  Overall, this limits the influence of federal policing 
policy and control but at the end of the day the use of the RCMP by communities and 
provinces has a centralising effect. 
The policing model emerging from Canada provides the federal government 
with a strong position of influence on policing across the nation.  In many instances—
the eight provinces that contract in the RCMP—this degrades the powers of the sub-
national governments and has a centralising effect on policing.  It appears the main 
reason for this situation at provincial and local government level is the fundamental 
issue of cost as the government subsidises policing when it is provided by the RCMP to 
the point that cost wins out over independence.  Additionally, critical national support 
services in all areas of policing are provided by federal policing—giving additional cost 
savings for local policing and in turn the respective provincial and local government.   
Regardless of this trend towards centralised control in some provincial and local 
government areas, in comparison with Australia the communities being policed have 
greater input into the governance and functions of local police for provision is made in 
all police statutes for this to a varying degree.  No such provisions exist for Australia’s 
eight agencies in contrast with the Canadian model that embraces and mandates the 
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requirement for community and local input for all levels of policing.  The extent of 
centralisation is therefore diluted because of the governance powers provided to the 
community being policed. 
The federal government on the face of it provides a more centralised police 
service than Australia and uses the primary mechanism of fiscal power and the uniform 
criminal law to directly influence sub-national governments and in turn the policing 
services it provides.  It is also helped by the constitution’s construction where residual 
matters fall to the federal government.  Like Australia of recent times there has been a 
centralisation trend in policing and it is expected to continue (Smith 1994, 187–191; 
Cooper and Koop 2003, 6); however in reality it has been less than the Australia 
experience.   
The recent experience of policing in Canada, like Australia, is primarily the 
product of political and social development and it is difficult to compare experiences 
due to the fundamental difference in policing structures and intergovernmental 
arrangements.  It can be concluded that the increased volume of international crime is 
expanding (RCMP2013c) and the federal police agency’s role in policing remains well in 
check due to the decentralised nature of policing, and in government as a whole 
(Fenna 2012b, 583).  It should also be noted that the nature of policing is underpinned 
by a decentralised political culture that permeates areas like policing.   
When all the factors are taken into account concerning the recent Canadian 
policing experience, it only supports one conclusion concerning Australian policing—
that international influences and in particular the growth of international crime have 
been the main drivers influencing centralisation of policing.  Regardless, Canadian 
policing continues to be recognised as decentralised. 
6.4 Germany 
Germany is the newest of the federations covered here, having undergone dramatic 
changes to the political model during the twentieth century.  The current German 
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federation was established with the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, 
while the current policing model is derived from the post-war West German model.  
The Grundgesetz (Constitution or ‘Basic Law’) was adopted in 1949 and without doubt 
from a policing perspective differs substantially from Australia and many other nations.  
Primarily, this is because it contains enumerated policing powers and emphasises the 
decentralising of policing responsibilities and constrains federal policing functions 
(Ritsert and Pekar 2009, 18; Frevel and Kuschewski 2009, 52).  Overall, when German 
federalism is considered in respect to centralisation, it has been classified by some 
commentators, as being similar to Australia and a “centralized federation” (Braun 
2011, 35) and grouped with Australia in respect to being centralised (Fenna 2012b, 
588). 
This approach to policing in the Constitution was shaped by a number of events 
and experiences including the activities of the centralised police force under the Nazis; 
the post-war occupation that split the country into East and West Germany; and finally 
the 1990 reunification.  These events and experiences were influential on the political 
architecture of the German federation and in turn the development of policing.  One 
significant feature in the 1949 Constitution was the specific restriction of federal 
policing, as prior centralisation of policing had been used as an effective tool to control 
political dissent in the Nazi and East German States.  
Since 1990 there have been significant changes for policing accompanied by 
ongoing changes to Bund (federal) and Land (state) police arrangements leading to the 
current policing structure and arrangements.  Notably, federal policing has become less 
restricted.  Recently it has significantly increased in size with a trend towards 
centralisation (Frevel and Kuschewski 2009; Rickards and Ritsert 2008; Ritsert and 
Pekar 2009).  The notable change in German policing is that the model that initially 
emphasised decentralisation is becoming increasingly centralised.  Interestingly, this 
has been done in an overt manner and can be plainly viewed in amendments to the 
Constitution that expanded the scope of federal policing functions and responsibilities 
across the nation (Frevel and Kuschewski 2009, 54).   
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6.4.1 Constitutional Arrangements and Policing 
In contrast to the constitutions of Australia, Canada and USA the Grundgesetz is easily 
amended.  Under past constitutions policing was generally centralised, especially under 
National Socialism.  After the war, East Germany continued in the centralised mode 
while West Germany went in the opposite direction and became highly decentralised. 
At reunification the centralised East German police force (Volkspolizei) operated 
as a paramilitary force and was to go through a significant change in order to become 
part of the new decentralised policing structure.  The West had policing decentralised 
with each of the 11 Länder providing a police force responsible for all aspects of 
policing in its jurisdiction including providing law enforcement services for the federal 
government administration (BKA 2011a and b; Rickards and Ritsert 2008, 4–5).   
The foundations of the current policing structure began in West Germany when 
in 1951 the federal government established two police agencies: the paramilitary 
border police (Bundesgrenzschutz, BGS) with a role to secure the borders and control 
movement across them (Rickards and Ritsert 2008, 3–4) and the Federal Criminal 
Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA).  The BKA was a central agency and worked 
with State police and coordinated the information and intelligence exchange between 
the police forces.  It did not have an operational role and relied upon the State police 
agencies (Landespolizei) to undertake law enforcement operations on its behalf.  There 
were clear parallels with Australian policing up to the 1970s. 
At reunification the Constitution allocated policing as primarily a sub-national 
government power at Article 70 and only permitted federal police agencies to operate 
in respect to matters contained in the Article.  Later the federal role for policing was 
expanded and was detailed in Article 74.  This allowed federal police to investigate 
matters of national importance, involving criminal activity that transcended State 
borders or was national in nature including the provision of services in the national 
interest.  The criterion was later expanded to provide central services and coordinate 
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and exchange information and intelligence between police forces along with 
international liaison. 
The expanded powers allowed the BKA to also establish its own investigation 
arm to be responsible for specific federal crimes; assist Länder forces when required; 
or when directed by the Minister for Interior, undertake specific investigations.  The 
BKA has grown significantly since its establishment to the point where it is now plays 
an expanded and critical role in German policing. 
The Constitution currently provides for a two-tier police structure which 
allocates the Bund and Länder police with police duties and roles, of which the majority 
are undertaken by the Länder police forces and involves the prevention, investigation 
and prosecution of crime, including where requested federal matters.  They also 
include maintaining public order and providing traffic police.  Many cities also have a 
Municipal Security force (Städtischer Ordnungsdienst or Ordnungsamt) that performs 
minor police-type functions.  
The current structure of federal policing was the product of constitutional 
reforms in 2005 that provided the BKA with a greater role in policing.  The role of the 
BKA expanded significantly due to European unification and “the BKA has become the 
central German coordinating institution for police activities” (Rickards and Ritsert 2008, 
4).  From a policing perspective the role of the BKA is comparable with the AFP.  The 
BKA has expanded its staff from 482 in 1955, 3,979 in 1990 and 5,500 in 2009 (BKA 
2011a) and the numbers are expanding with the increased role of the national 
government in policing.   
The key characteristic of German policing for comparative purposes is the 
important function the Constitution plays in the assignment of policing functions.  
Since reunification it has specifically articulated every change to the policing 
arrangements, structures and the functions of the respective police agencies in the two 
tiers of government.  One result of this approach is less jurisdictional tensions exist as 
all roles and relationships are in theory clearly defined in the Constitution. 
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The clarity of the role and responsibilities of the BKA and sub-national agencies 
is also assisted by the fact the criminal law is constitutionally a national responsibility 
and all police work is conducted under one law so there is less chance of jurisdictional 
disputes between the respective agencies.  
6.4.2 Policing in Practice 
The police forces in each of the 16 Länder are organised differently but in common 
with all such forces they are established under their respective Land constitution and 
the primary responsibility of each force falls to a Land government minister, the 
Minister of the Interior.  The Länder have different internal structures and operate 
independently from each other in most areas but operate under a common criminal 
law along with many other laws concerned with policing.  Within each Land there are 
internal organisational structures but much of the policing units and activities are 
common.  Governance of the Landespolizeien is the direct responsibility of the Minister 
of the Interior (Rickards and Ritsert 2008, 3; Ritsert and Pekar 2009, 18). 
The federal police agencies are under the direct control of the national 
government, in particular the Minister of the Interior.  However, the governance of the 
federal agencies and Land police agencies is not a matter of clear demarcation as there 
are mechanisms in place providing input for all ministers.  The General Conference of 
the Bund and Land Interior Ministers provides a formal opportunity for Länder and the 
federal government to influence policy and discuss common issues concerning the 
respective agencies and is the peak body for policy making in policing (Ritsert and 
Pekar 2009, 20–24; Rickards and Ritsert 2008, 3–4).  
Like Australia, the governance of policing is primarily the responsibility of a 
respective minister in the executive government and certainly differs for instance from 
the complex Canadian arrangements.  The Landespolizei function relative to crime and 
public order and the accompanying traffic matters mirror the functions of any 
Australian State police agency. Land policing has not changed significantly and the size 
of the 16 agencies has remained much the same.  On the other hand, constitutional 
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changes have expanded federal policing.  Federal policing responsibilities have 
increased along with commensurate increases in personnel and funding.  Like other 
Western nations the recent experience of policing is that the nature of crime has 
changed significantly and has become more organised, sophisticated and respects no 
borders, both national and international.  Additionally, policing has changed to the 
extent to which it needed centralised national support services to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness, with the obvious choice of service provider being a federal police 
agency like the BKA (BKA 2011a, Ritsert and Pekar 2009, 20–24). 
The level of crime and incidence of terrorism has been increasing significantly 
since the 1970s in Germany (like other Western and European nations) and the 
independent State force structure was not capable of responding to the increasing 
problems.  This gap created the opportunity for the federal agencies, especially the 
BKA, to fill the void and in turn the Constitution was amended to enhance the functions 
of the BKA.  Primarily the amendments increased the BKA’s role in operational policing 
to the point it has become a significant investigation agency in its own right for some 
areas like organised crime and terrorism.  This has increased its influence and role in 
policing across the nation. 
The increasing functions of the BKA have also included support for State forces 
in the area of criminal investigation, information and intelligence coordination and 
exchange, national forensic services and standards and the development of police 
methods and strategies for law enforcement. The BKA is also the representative for 
German policing in Europolicing and Interpol, thus all Länder agencies have to rely on 
the federal agency for information and intelligence of an international nature.  This is 
very significant for the 16 Länder agencies given that most Länder border on one or 
more of the nine other nations bordering Germany.  This is an important issue for the 
Länder as the EU arrangements have effectively made the national borders porous 
(Ritsert and Pekar 2009, 25).  
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Because of Germany’s style of ‘administrative federalism’ where policy is 
typically made centrally but implemented and administered locally, federal policing 
continues to play a lesser role as the Länder agencies continue to undertake much of 
the operational and investigative policing matters on behalf of the federal government.   
The issue of jurisdiction is less of an issue than in Australia because the criminal 
law is enforced by Land police and related procedures are owned by the federal 
government.  The uniformity of the law makes the issue of jurisdiction relatively 
insignificant for police as they go about their functions.  Giving weight to this 
proposition is Frevel and Kuschewski who identified three elements providing “a 
certain uniformity in the police in Germany” (Frevel and Kuschewski 2009, 53) allowing 
the police agencies across Germany to work together with the federal police and 
mitigating the potential for jurisdictional problems.  The three elements are: 
 The General Conference of the Bund and Länder Interior Ministers makes 
uniform (national) policy on internal security that is coordinated through the 
federal government; 
 Länder police rely on federal criminal and traffic law and procedure; and 
 Upper level managers of all police forces are trained together at the German 
Police University. 
Although these three elements are primarily strategic in nature, they facilitate 
the smooth operation of policing between the internal borders and the effective 
national operation of the smaller federal police agency. 
It should be noted that recent statistics provided by Ritsert and Pekar show that 
in the years 2001–2007 (inclusive) federal police numbers increased while Länder 
numbers decreased: “this may be interpreted as an indicator for the increasing 
relevance of the federal police services” (Ritsert and Pekar 2009, 23).  Much of the 
increase has been attributed to the expansion of the federal police jurisdiction with the 
BKA investigating of organised drug crime, terrorism, white-collar crime, cyber-crime 
and human trafficking, nationally, and not relying on the traditional arrangements with 
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State agencies.  This has meant for many areas of policing, federal police have replaced 
Länder investigators in order to fulfil expanded operational functions and in addition 
they now also provide centralised support services to Länder police.   
When all of the information concerning the national government and its 
agencies is considered, it supports the view of many commentators on German policing 
that the federal police are playing an ever increasing role: “The total number of police 
officers at federal level has increased from 2001 to 2007.  Compared with the 
decreasing number on the federal states’ level this may be interpreted as an indicator 
for the increasing relevance of the federal police services” (Ritsert and Pekar 2009, 23).  
Whether this increased role is outside the strict letter of the respective article in the 
Constitution is not contentious but there is no doubt that policing in practice is 
becoming increasingly centralised. 
6.4.3 Centralisation and German Policing 
The German Constitution is a modern one, and in contrast to Australia is relatively easy 
to amend—in fact in its short history it has been changed several times in respect to 
policing.  When considering the German policing model from a comparative 
perspective, what is obviously different is the German Constitution recognised the 
need for a national police force in a modern federal state and provided the appropriate 
enumerated powers.  The Constitution was amended to recognise the requirement for 
federal policing agencies and details the functions and responsibilities it plays within 
the national political arrangements and this articulates the national policing structure 
and how it operates.  This resulted in increased centralisation being undertaken 
formally and unambiguously within the federation.   
It is worth noting that the German policing model has many similarities with 
Australia, including policing being owned by government, with one major national 
agency and the Länder providing the other 16 police agencies.  The functions of the 
Landespolizei are similar to their Australian equivalent State agencies and likewise the 
BKA and its counterpart, the AFP.  Both federal agencies’ growth rate over the past 
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decade has outstripped the State agencies and the expansion has been due to 
increased responsibilities and funding provided to address new and emerging crime 
problems (including terrorism) spilling over to the federal government.  Additionally, 
the provision of national services by the federal agency has been an important factor in 
respect to the efficient operation of Länder agencies. 
It is clear that the centralising trend in Germany has many parallels with 
Australia.  Regardless of the constitutional differences to facilitate change both federal 
governments have expanded the national agency and the rate of growth have both 
been greater than the State and Länder agencies.  Drivers of change for Germany have 
been similar with the BKA for instance expanding into operational policing areas 
concerning terrorism and organised crime along with taking some responsibilities for 
new and emerging crimes.  However, in many instances responsibility for operational 
investigations is being shared or primarily undertaken by the Länder agencies. 
The chief difference in the comparative experiences lies in the continuing 
strong role for the sub-national police forces in Germany resulting from the particular 
character of German federalism.  Regardless, the German experience of giving federal 
policing a greater role in many aspects of policing and others being shared supports the 
findings in the previous chapters concerning the Australian experience.  For instance, 
spillovers, new federal crimes and the need for efficiency, like in Australia, have driven 
the contemporary change to German policing.  The effective operation of federalism, 
like in Australia, has been central to the change in policing in Germany. 
6.5 Switzerland 
The Swiss federation has existed longer in its present form than any of the federations 
except the USA, and much longer in its earlier incarnation.  A major difference between 
Switzerland and most other federations is the ease at which the constitution can be 
changed, a regular activity for its citizens considered to be the rule rather than the 
exception.  Swiss federalism recognises three levels of government—
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municipal/communal, cantonal and Federal, and this structure is reflected in the Swiss 
policing model allowing policing to be conducted on three levels.   
It should be understood from the outset that Swiss federalism is recognised as 
the most decentralised of the four nations and it is one of the most decentralised 
nations in the world (Linder 2010; Fenna 2012b, 588).  Under the Constitution of the 
Helvetic Confederations, policing is a responsibility for the 26 cantons.  They in turn 
allow many local government entities and large cities to provide police forces.  The 
federal government has its own police agency, which is regulated in the Constitution to 
a range of specific functions.  Police in all jurisdictions use the Federal criminal code 
and the cantons provide the judicial structure used to administer the law—similar to 
Australia.  Overall, policing is provided at the canton, municipal and commune level 
with some Federal involvement and the policing model can be characterised as highly 
decentralised (Federal Department of Justice and Police 2011; Federal Office of Police 
2011). 
6.5.1 Constitutional Arrangements and Policing 
Swiss policing is a three tier structure that consists of: one Federal agency; 26 cantonal 
police corps; and over one hundred municipal and communal police corps.  Policing is 
primarily the responsibility of the sub-national governments (cantonal and local) and 
the national government only plays a small role and has limited powers and resources 
(Federal Office of Police 2011 ).  The explicit constitutional position is policing per se is 
owned by the Cantons.   The management of police agencies is independent of Federal 
government and governance of them is the responsibility of the respective canton or 
local authority.   
In 2000 all Federal agencies involved in policing were amalgamated into one 
single agency to take responsibility for Federal police issues including the support of 
the sub-national police agencies.  The Federal Office of Police (fedpol) is the sole 
national agency and currently the agency employs 780 staff and is based in the national 
capital, Bern.   The agency is governed by the Federal Department of Justice and Police. 
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The bulk of police still work at the sub-national level and are responsible for all 
police functions not assigned to fedpol.  The bulk of the work undertaken by sub-
national police agencies is similar to what Australian State police agencies undertake 
but they also provide law enforcement and investigation services for the Federal 
government.  The individual police agencies vary greatly in the way they operate and 
what infrastructure is provided.  The cantonal police fundamentally deal with law and 
order, traffic and criminal investigation.  Some cantons allow their municipalities and 
communes to have their own police and most of these police forces are responsible for 
only minor law and order functions and parking.  In some larger cities the municipal 
police also deal with traffic and in Zurich, Winterthur and Lausanne they also 
investigate crime.  The cantons are responsible for providing basic training for police 
recruits who serve at canton as well as in municipal and communal forces.   
Policing in Switzerland is very much a sub-national responsibility and even 
though recent amendments have increased the role of Federal policing, it remains 
secondary in the national policing structure. 
6.5.2 Policing in Practice 
Policing in Switzerland appears to have no obvious blurring of roles and responsibilities 
between the tiers of government police agencies.  Where crime problems are multi-
jurisdictional in character and involve joint operations between agencies, fedpol has a 
mandate to coordinate operations and it would appear individual agencies preserve 
the status quo and continue to be responsible to the respective sub-national 
governments for operational policing.  The Federal government does not play a role in 
the policy making for the sub-national agencies unlike most other federations where 
Federal governments are able to obtain influence through funding, legislation and 
policy, although the criminal law is national. 
The Federal police are restricted to national roles and have a structure divided 
into four divisions: criminal investigations of serious crime; security of Federal 
personnel and property; support services for all police agencies; and national and 
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international liaison and co-ordination of police services and criminal investigations 
(Federal Department of Justice and Police 2011; Federal Office of Police 2011).  One of 
the reasons why sub-national policing maintains its independence and increasing 
centralisation does not appear to be an issue, is the strong support for decentralisation 
at all levels of politics.   
Federal government administration and agencies are controlled by the 
executive government, the seven people Federal Council.  The members are elected by 
the bicameral parliament; National Council and Council of States and like the national 
parliament have a decentralised focus on government.  The 46 member Council of 
States membership is elected from the respective cantons and provides a political 
perspective from that level that directly influences and fosters a decentralised 
approach to services like policing.   The Council is but one of the strong sub-national 
influences that permeates the governance of policing by the Federal Department of 
Justice and Police.   
Regardless of the entrenched power of the cantons, in reality there is a 
centralising trend that sees the Federal government increasing its role in policing and 
related policy, although it would appear in comparison with other Federal nations to 
be much less.  This trend is evidenced by the 2000 reforms of Federal policing that 
entailed the recognition of globalisation and Europeanisation as being responsible for 
the growth of crimes of a national and international character, requiring primarily a 
federal government response to effectively counter the threat.  Obvious examples 
included drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime.  There has been a 
change “that touches core aspects of sovereign statehood and in particular, the 
canton’s traditional police monopoly” (Lavenex 2006, 246) and this is due to the impact 
of “Europeanisation and internationalism” (Lavenex 2006, 246) and is strengthening 
the Federal police at the expense of sub-national units.   
Swiss policing is clearly an area of government service problematic for the 
confederation as by necessity the changed nature of crime problems and threats faced 
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by policing now requires greater Federal involvement and resourcing.  This is 
diminishing some of the traditional sub-national government control of policing.  This 
in the case of Switzerland (like most other western nations) is simply the way of the 
world and the product of increasing crime, technology, Europeanisation and 
globalisation. 
6.5.3 Centralisation and Swiss Policing 
The Swiss policing model is much different in structure to Australia because of policing 
being decidedly decentralised.  The ethos of Swiss federalism plays an important role in 
forming the policing model as the emphasis on sub-national independence and the 
national government’s machinery of government being limited, has strongly influenced 
the development of policing across the nation.  This is reflected in the structure and 
powers of Federal policing, which clearly defers to the sub-national jurisdictions and is 
constrained wherever possible. 
However, like Australia and many other Western nations there has been a 
change to policing at odds with the traditional decentralised approach to government 
services.  There has been a trend towards centralisation and expansion in the scope of 
federal police functions, resulting in additional resources and powers.  The sub-
national agencies must now work more closely with their federal counterparts.  These 
changes have been irresistible because of the common problems experienced by all 
Western nations since the 1970s associated with increased crime rates of an 
international nature (Lemieux 2010).  In the case of Europe, the Europol agency was 
formed in 1993 and has expanded significantly with a mandate to fight international 
organised crime and terrorism.  Switzerland is not a member of the EU but is a member 
of Europol as it entered into a formal agreement in 2006 and is in effect a full member 
(Federal Office of Police 2013).  The causes of increased crime have been mainly 
attributed to globalisation and associated criminal activity concerning organised crime, 
terrorism, new and developing crime in the form of cybercrime and white collar crime.  
The Swiss decentralised policing structure (like many other modern Western nations) 
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was incapable of addressing the externally driven crime and terrorism problems and 
had to change to become more effective and this required a shift toward a more 
centralised policing model.  Nonetheless the Swiss model remains significantly less 
centralised than Australia because of the Federal government’s reliance on sub-
national police agencies for most investigation and enforcement activity and the 
general resistance to centralisation in Swiss Federalism. 
In respect to the Australian policing experience there is certainly a clear parallel 
with the Swiss accepting the need for the federal government to play a greater policing 
role and the recent evidence of that was the formation of the Federal Police.  However, 
the Swiss never took the next step and provided the Federal agency with exclusive 
responsibility for specific functions and maintained the reliance on cantonal and local 
policing for most of the operational policing functions for federal investigations. 
6.6. United States of America 
The final case to be considered is the United States (US).  Consideration of the US is 
essential for any policing comparison because the US is considered to be a leader in 
many areas of policing and law enforcement, as well as being the largest and most 
influential federal nation in the world.  From a political and public policy perspective 
considering the US is logical as it is a federation with a related colonial history to 
Australia and has similar legal and judicial processes and institutions—and indeed 
provided the template for much of Australia’s federal system. 
In any comparative exercise like this involving the US, the great icons of the 
American polity and government, the Constitution and Bill of Rights (the first 10 
amendments, ratified in 1791) are central.  The Constitution provides an enumerated 
list of federal government powers and assigns Congress supremacy in the exercise of 
those powers. It does not enumerate State powers, but instead leaves the States with 
all powers not explicitly denied them. Like Australia, which followed the US design, 
172 
 
residual powers fall to the States and as policing is not an enumerated power of the 
federal government, it is considered to be a State responsibility.   
The US policing model as it stands reflects the nation’s political and social 
history and provides a model that substantially differentiates it from the Australian 
model and many other Western democracies.  The history of settlement saw policing 
established on a town and county level with States and the Federal government 
maintaining their distance and allowing police agencies to be established individually 
on a local basis and hence resulting in a highly decentralised police structure (Sturma 
1987).  The decentralised nature of policing has made US policing different from most 
other nations as primarily it is provided by local government rather than the States or 
the federal government.  It is interesting to note that like Australia and Canada, local 
government is not recognised in the US Constitution.   
Policing is, however, not solely a local government responsibility as the States 
and the Federal government do play a role in policing.  Each State has a single police 
agency and there are some 65 federal policing agencies.  The size of these State and 
Federal agencies and their functions vary greatly and they generally do not duplicate 
local policing functions.  Policing in the US also has an unusual structural characteristic 
by having a large private policing component.  This area of policing is well developed 
and highly sophisticated in many areas and is provided by corporate bodies including a 
substantial number that are statutory authorities like port authorities, transit 
authorities, housing authorities and school boards.  Private policing can trace its history 
to the Pinkertons65 in the 1860s and has been the focus of many legal and political 
disputes for over 150 years (Enion 2012, 537–539), which has resulted in a substantial 
body of law on the topic (Steverson 2007, 20–21; Enion 2012).  What is unequivocal is 
private policing is a legitimate and integral component of the US policing structure. 
                                                        
65 The Pinkerton detective agency was began in 1850 in Chicago and is still providing private 




Historically private policing has been there to fill the gaps in policing left by 
local agencies that generally did not have the resources or perceived jurisdiction to 
police private or statutory controlled properties.  Also noteworthy was the fact in the 
19th century, federal and State governments simply refused to police newly settled 
areas or remote areas and the only alternative was private policing  (Sturma 198766). 
When the diverse component parts constituting US policing are tallied it 
provides a very complex structure made up of thousands of individual agencies, most 
with different agendas and accompanied by the obvious jurisdictional problems.  The 
primary problem with the policing model is the inability to have a system of effective 
coordination and cooperation between agencies.  In many respects the model of 
policing and its structure is the product of the Constitution and the focus of 
independence for communities and thus the tradition of police agencies being locally 
owned, governed and operated independently.  This outline of US policing and how it 
operates has had a central theme of constitutionality and this is explored further. 
6.6.1 Constitutional Arrangements for Policing 
The 10th Amendment of the Constitution concerning the residual powers being the 
responsibility of the States is considered to provide the basis for policing being 
primarily a sub-national responsibility (Gaines and Kappelor 2011, 7).  This law allows 
the States to delegate to their political subdivisions the authority to establish agencies 
to preserve and protect the safety, health and welfare of the community.  This 
approach by the States has maintained the decentralised police structure and 
domination by local government policing at municipal and county level.   
Constitutionally, the Federal government has the power to enforce its law and 
establish police agencies for that purpose, while States also rely on the Constitution 
and Bill of Rights to authorise police agencies at State, local government and in some 
cases private sector level (Enion 2012). 
                                                        
66 Sturma’s book was a comparative analysis of Frontier Policing of Australia and the US and clearly 
demonstrated the significant difference between the role undertaken by government on each frontier 
i.e. concerted role in the Australian colonies vis-à-vis insignificant role in US States and Territories.  
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Three significant dimensions of US policing are: 
 The Constitution permits the federal government to establish and operate 
policing agencies to enforce federal laws.  Unique to the USA, the federal 
government has established an agency for each established law enforcement 
area and not relied upon a single or several police agencies.  This approach 
currently provides 65 agencies employing 105,000, enforcing specific agency 
legislation and operating independently across the nation (Follensdal 2010; 
USDOJ 2013a).    
 General policing of the community is undertaken at local government level by 
autonomous and independent police agencies to the extent there are so many 
agencies in the USA, the true number of agencies and officers employed can 
only be estimated.  The US Justice Department 2008 census of law enforcement 
agencies identified 17,360 police agencies and 1.133 million persons employed 
on a full-time basis, including 765,000 sworn officers.  Significantly 49 per cent 
of the agencies had fewer than 10 employees and 64 per cent less than 100.  
Agencies with more than 100 officers accounted for 36 per cent and agencies 
with more than 500 employees accounted for 1 per cent and those with more 
than 1000 employees accounted for just 0.46 per cent (USDOJ 2013b). 
 There are a large number of private agencies that provide police services.  In 
2008, 9.6 per cent (1,733) of the 17,360 police agencies were of this type 
(USDOJ 2013b).  
Practicably, policing in the US from a political perspective has been considered 
to be a State responsibility for which the States delegate down to local government or 
allow corporate and statutory bodies to take responsibility to be the service provider.  
Additionally, the federal government is enabled to establish independent agencies for 
policing of specific areas of federal laws.  However, in the case of some agencies like 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) some of its functions—such as criminals 
committing crimes in several States or fleeing justice and travelling to another State—
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triggers investigation and arrest powers for State crimes thus blurring the demarcation 
lines between national and sub-national government policing responsibilities.   
6.6.2 Policing in Practice 
The recent background to contemporary US policing has like most other Western 
nations has been shaped by rapid social change in the 1960s and 1970s.  The main 
outcome of this experience was significant increases in both the volume and nature of 
crime throughout the country (Steverson 2007).  At local level, the primary functions of 
the vast amount of public policing agencies are similar to what Australian police do at 
the State police agency level.  There are clear differences with the functions 
undertaken by county police and State police and these agencies also significantly 
differ between themselves across the USA.   
Local agencies all have different governance arrangements and can generally be 
described as being subject to direct political control in smaller agencies while in many 
of the larger cities like Los Angeles they are governed by a board of commissioners.  
However, the States continue to exert a significant policy making role (Bulman-Pozen 
and Gerken 2009; Scavo, Kearney, and Kilroy 2008; Scarborough 2006) through 
legislation and policy and this can influence the functions of police.  State criminal laws, 
courts and funding provides this level of government with the mechanisms to influence 
local police, akin to how Canadian provincial governments are also able to gain 
leverage and influence over policing at this local government level.  
In respect to the national government influencing policing at a local level, at 
times it has exerted a significant pressure through the means of legislation and 
funding.  A past example was in 1919 with the 18th Amendment to the Constitution and 
passing of the Volstead Act leading to Prohibition.  This legislation affected police in 
respect to enforcement of liquor laws and has also been attributed with being 
responsible for the circumstances that resulted in the growth of organised crime in 
America.  The federal government introduced the legislation and with the dearth of its 
own police agencies, relied on the decentralised and local government police agencies 
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to enforce its law (Steverson 2007, 22). The failure of the enforcement of this law 
demonstrated two important features of policing: the national government had no 
effective control of local grass roots policing; and it required its own police to enforce 
the prohibition law.  These shortcomings led to the invigoration of several small 
investigation agencies within the federal government and were the precursor to the 
structure of federal policing as it is today.  The model of policing at all levels was 
irreversibly affected by what happened in the 1920s and 1930s (Steverson 2007). 
In respect to the problem of influencing local policing across the USA and the 
functions undertaken, including those concerning federal law, this has been 
problematic.  This has been a recognised issue for governments and since the 1970s 
federal funding for local police agencies has been the major instrument to influence 
policing at the local level.  Primarily this has been done by providing grants tied with 
specific conditions and outcomes being mandated in order to achieve additional 
funding.  Contemporary programs have included the 1994 Community Orientated 
Policing Services (COPS) program that has continued since its inception.  The program 
provides grants “to help law enforcement agencies to hire more community policing 
officers, to acquire new technologies and equipment, to hire civilians for administrative 
tasks, and to promote innovative approaches to solving crime” (USDOJ 2013c; Koper 
2003).  The Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program (LLEBG) ran from 1996 to 
2004 and funding ranged from $424 million a year to $115 million in 2004.  Both State 
police and some 1200 local agencies received conditional grants “aimed at units of 
local government to reduce crime and improve public safety’ (Bauer 2004, 1).  
Additional grants are also available for matters concerning federal policy interests such 
as 19 different categories of grants concerning violence against women.   
Recently the Federal government took a legislative approach to influence local 
policing functions through legislation that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This 
involved the Patriot Act of 2001 and had a mixed response from police agencies and 
demonstrated the local government agencies were the product of State governments 
and at the end of the day accountable to them.  In the States of Alaska, California, 
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Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana and Vermont legislation “denouncing the Act 
as an assault on civil liberties” (Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2009, 1278) was passed.  
The result of the action by these States was more symbolic than effective and nothing 
came of their protest: “Because the states are not autonomous sovereigns standing to 
one side of the federal scheme, they are unable to back their rhetoric with concrete 
action” (Bulman-Pozen 2009, 1280).  Additionally, five States passed legislation 
directing police officers not to enforce portions of the Act (Scavo, Kearney, and Kilroy 
2008, 1278).  What this State-led resistance to a federal law demonstrated about US 
policing was sub-national agencies were also responsible for enforcing federal law.   
Overall, the Patriot Act and other post-9/11 legislation illustrated the strong 
position of the national government in US policing, when it wants to flex its 
constitutional muscle.  In addition the use of grants is a successful mechanism to 
influence police-related policy at State and local government level.  However, the 
highly decentralised structure of policing, with over 17,000 agencies, makes auditing 
compliance of the agencies in respect to legislation or conditional grants very difficult 
and probably not very practicable.  It would appear logical to conclude the influence of 
the federal government in policing is diluted by the large amount of local agencies 
operating across all parts of the USA. 
The US government like Australia and most other nations has expanded the 
scope of federal policing since the 1980s and it is now a large part of policing, much 
larger than most other nations.  Therefore, federal policing merits additional 
consideration because of the sheer size of resources expended in this area and its 
impact on the centralisation of policing. 
6.6.3 Federal Policing 
The functions undertaken by each of the 65 Federal policing agencies are generally 
linked to a specific power of the federal government.   Several of the current large 
agencies were derived from small units that were established administratively in the 
1920s and steadily grew to the point where by the 1970s they become major agencies 
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in their own right.  Prime examples are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Both bureaus were 
established in the lawless years67 following the start of prohibition which was 
characterised as a period of great violence orchestrated by organised crime groups 
across the US, in particular the major cities.  This crime problem was sheeted home to 
the government’s prohibition laws, and led to the need for a federal response to 
address the related national crime wave.  These police agencies took up the challenge 
accordingly and have never looked back.  Both agencies and other agencies like the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are well known today and provide, along with 
the 62 other federal agencies, a model of federal policing unique in the world.   
 Individual agencies are established administratively to deal with individual 
criminal problems.  From a functional perspective, where a national crime problem 
arises, in many cases a new policing agency is established to address the problem.  This 
approach is different to Australia and Canada where the single policing agency expands 
its scope of functions to address the problem.  Perhaps the most recent and best 
example of the US approach was the establishment of the Department of Homeland 
Security, established to deal with terrorism on home soil after 9/11.   
The US from a national policing perspective has been the world leader in 
providing support services for all police agencies, akin to those central services 
provided by in other nations and Australia by the national government or its police 
agency.  In 1924 the FBI established a national fingerprint identification and database 
and has expanded this system in recent times and operates the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC), which provides a national repository of criminal records and 
the related fingerprint and DNA information.  The Department of Justice and the 
Department of Homeland Security co-manage the US National Central Bureau (USNCB) 
providing international liaison for all US police agencies.  Although the federal 
government provides less support services than the other governments it is still 
                                                        
67 The History of the FBI (FBI 2013) provides a detailed description of this period and the effect it had on 
policing in the US at all levels.  The lawless years were formative for the development of federal policing. 
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substantial and influential in respect to compliance by all agencies to national policing 
policy, set by Washington. 
6.6.4 Centralisation and US Policing 
Since the late 1920s successive federal governments chose to expand the scope and 
range of federal policing and this is clear evidence of the centralisation emanating out 
of Washington.  From a federalism perspective the US has used a range of mechanisms 
including legislation, funding and to a lesser degree the provision of nationally 
coordinated services to influence policing.  Fiscal support to the vast amount of sub-
national police agencies has been critical for the federal government to achieve the 
policy goals it set for policing.   This modus operandi has been applied effectively since 
the 1970s and its use has increased substantially in response to the 9/11 events.   
Unlike Australia, the rich history of States’ rights permeates much of the 
division of power between federal policing and the thousands of sub-national agencies.  
The US policing model is dominated by local government policing, for this is where the 
majority of policing resources are applied.  The governance and management of the 
agencies rests with thousands of divergent political bodies while there are only eight in 
Australia.  Police governance in comparison with Australia differs greatly at a local level 
because of the highly decentralised nature of policing.  Local communities, especially 
municipal governments, are provided with input for the control and management of an 
agency, while at a State and national level, control of the respective agencies is 
centralised like Australia. 
The stark difference in the structure and governance of police agencies 
between the two nations evidences the difficulty in making any meaningful 
comparisons.  There is however one important similarity with the structure of US and 
Australian policing, which is the recent expansion of federal policing after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.  The US government has become more involved in policing but its 
involvement remains not as influential or involved as Australia and most other 
federations under consideration.  Decentralisation of policing is the one constant in the 
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model of US policing and its effect characterises a model of policing significantly 
different to Australia.  
6.7 The Australian Comparison 
While there are five quite different federal systems to consider in the comparison, it is 
equally clear that within the limits set by those differences common trends and 
common drivers of those trends are evident.  Like Australia, and regardless of the 
entrenched political ideology in nations, an increased role for the federal government 
in policing has occurred to varying degrees.  This trend has been driven by the spillover 
of crime that has made solving crime problems beyond the jurisdiction and resources 
of sub-national governments.  New criminal laws and new federal policing functions 
are the consequence of the changing world that is causing the globalisation and 
internationalisation of crime.  National governments are simply best equipped in all 
respect to respond and this is occurring in Australia and to varying degrees in the other 
four nations. 
There are some important observations that have been derived from the 
comparison, but before these are discussed the table following describes the key 
dimensions of the respective jurisdictions and is an aide to the final analysis. 
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of Policing Dimensions for Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and USA  
Dimensions Canada Germany Switzerland USA Australia 
Policing enumerated 
power in Constitution 
No  Federal Police Article 73 
State Article 70 
Article 43a(1) Cantons 
responsible 
No  No  
Police Structure 
Federal Police Agency 
 
1—Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) 
 
2—Federal Crime Police 
Office (BKA ) & German 
Federal Police (BPOL) 
 















16 Land forces 
 
26 Canton forces 
 
50 State Police Forces 6 State and a Territory 
Police Forces 
Local Government Police 
Agency 
Approx. 460  Nil 300 plus  Approx. 15,500 in 2008  Nil 
Governance  
Responsible Office or 
Body 
Federal: Minister for 
Public Safety  
Provincial: Minister for 
Justice  
Local: Board, 
Commission or Council  
Federal and State: 
Minister of the Interior  
Federal: Minister for 
Justice and Police 







State and Local: Agency 





Federal: Minister for 
Home Affairs and 
Justice 




Dimensions Canada Germany Switzerland USA Australia 
Funding Federal government has 
funding agreements in 
place for policing at all 
levels and this varies 
depending on the 
nature of the 
arrangement.  National 
support services funded 
by federal government. 
Federal government is 
the main source for all 
police funding across the 
federation.   
Federal, Canton & 
Municipal/Communal 
governments fund 
policing agencies from 
local funding sources.  
Federal government is 
also an important 
source. 
Direct funding from 
governing 
Federal/State/municipal 
government sources.  
Federal grants provided 
to agencies for specific 
purposes.  National 
services funded by 
federal government. 
Direct funding from 
Commonwealth and 
State government.  
Small amount of 
Commonwealth grants 
provided directly to 
State agencies and 
part of funding for 
national police 
services. 
National Policy Domain  
 
No national policy 
forum established 
between national and 
provincial government. 
General conference of 
the National and State 
Interior Ministers. 
Conference of Cantonal 
Justice and Police 
Directors(CCJPD) 
Conference of Cantonal 
Police Commanders 
(CCPCS) 
Swiss Association of 
Municipal Police Chiefs 
(SAMPC) 







Senior Officers Group 
(SOG)—Police 
Commissioners 
Criminal Law Federal Federal Federal  Federal, State and Local  Federal and State 
Traffic Law  Federal & State Federal Federal and Canton State & Local 
government 
State (Uniform 
national traffic code) 
Judicial System Provincial Federal & State Federal Federal, State and Local  State 
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Dimensions Canada Germany Switzerland USA Australia 
National Services 
National Criminal ID & 
Fingerprint record 
System –  
 




Federal Crime Police 
Office (BKA)  
 
Federal Office of Police 
(fedpol) 
 






National DNA Database CPIC BKA Fedpol NCIC Combined DNA 





RCMP, National Police 







Individual agencies and 
federal agencies 
National Institute of 
Forensic Science 
(NIFS)  
International Liaison RCMP BKA Fedpol US National Central 
Bureau (USNCB) 
AFP 
Advanced Training Canadian Police College German Police 
University 
Swiss Police Institute Individual agencies Individual agencies 
Federal Agency Funding 
& Resources 2000 - 2010 
Increased Increased Increased Increased Increased 
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6.8 Conclusion  
This international comparison was applied to determine if the Australian experience 
concerning policing shifting from being a strictly sub-national responsibility to being 
nationally-integrated and federally-driven, only occurred in Australia or whether 
such changes have been experienced in other nations.  The key issue explored was 
the increased role of the federal government and the extent of centralisation in 
policing as compared to the Australian experience.  The conclusion made is these 
other nations had a similar experience to Australian policing.  Policing changed in 
Australia and this has also been the case for these other nations. 
The comparison has shown that this experience and trend of greater federal 
involvement in policing occurred to varying degrees in the four federal nations 
considered.  It clearly indicates this trend is international in character for western 
federal nations and that Australia’s similar experience was not exceptional.   
On a scale for federal government expansion measured by centralisation 
Germany and the USA would be closer to Australia, followed by Canada and lastly 
by Switzerland.  The obvious reason for these ratings has much to do with the 
internal political arrangements and degree of decentralisation in the federations 
overall.  Most important was the influential decentralised federalism philosophy in 
nations like Switzerland and Canada. 
The investigation of the experience of the other nations clearly identified 
the common trend that national governments were expanding their role in policing 
in both operational and support areas.  The issues and events driving the expansion 
of the federal role in policing have been strategic in nature and primarily centred on 
spillovers and new and emerging crime problems, many of which emanated from 
outside of municipal, county, state and national borders.  The fact that national 
governments were best endowed both constitutionally and fiscally to respond to 
these new crime problems and threats that spilt-over sub-national government’s 
capacity to respond, has been critical to change.  In most instances the increase in 
crime was a result of globalisation and the successful operation of international 
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crime groups.  This placed the focus on the national government in the first place as 
it was the only appropriate level of government to respond with suitable laws and 
the resources to police this new and extra criminal activity.  This has been the case 
in Canada, Germany and Switzerland that own the whole of the criminal law.  In the 
case of the US and Australia, the States have generally accepted and as is the case 
recently in Australia, consented and encouraged the national government to take 
on specific responsibilities for criminal laws concerning terrorism, organised crime 
and cybercrime. 
National government in all of the jurisdictions have also used their fiscal 
power to provide national support services and without doubt made sub-national 
police at all levels reliant upon these services.  As with the other influences 
mentioned, this has to varying degrees been another explanation for integrating 
and centralising some police services and responsibilities. 
The expansion of the scope of federal policing agencies and national 
government services provided to policing evidences a more strategic approach to 
policing by governments and this continues to gain momentum.  Australia and the 
other nations have been on a centripetal journey in the recent past—however, the 
extent of the distance travelled by Australia has been greater than the other 
nations.  The evidence from this chapter clearly supports the findings from the 
previous chapters that the increased role of the federal government in policing is a 
real trend and not just an Australian peculiarity—centralisation has increased.  It is 
the manifestation of changed federalism, to varying degrees, in all of the nations.  
The role of federalism in each of these nations has also been observed in 
regard to how the recent changes to policing have occurred.  As argued so far, the 
Australian approach has been characterised by State consent and support, while in 
nations like Canada, Switzerland and the USA where policing is decentralised and 
primarily operated by local government, States play a small role.  Federal influence 
is diluted as the national government has to deal with thousands of agencies in the 
USA, hundreds in Canada and Switzerland. Germany is closer to Australia in respect 
to the federal influence and its role in policing.  However, the German Länder still 
provide a significant amount of federal law enforcement on their own terms. 
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In the context of federalism this comparison showed that Australian 
federalism may operate more effectively given the way change has been negotiated 





CHAPTER SEVEN: THE NEW MODEL OF AUSTRALIAN POLICING 
To what extent, how, and why has policing shifted from being a strictly 
State or sub-national matter in Australia to being nationally-integrated 
and Commonwealth-driven? 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis and brings together the discussion from the 
preceding chapters and applies that to the final analyses in order to answer the 
primary research question in the context of the principal themes of policing and 
federalism in Australia since 1970.  In answering the question, it also establishes 
that the case study of policing demonstrates the effective operation of federalism 
to achieve the paradigm shift.  In particular, the change to policing was 
accomplished efficiently and unobtrusively by the federal partners, which 
centralised some aspects of policing and nationally integrated the whole domain. 
The first conclusion reached is that over the period of the four decades, 
Australian policing was transformed from an exclusively State responsibility to a 
concurrent one, national in character.  The second conclusion is that the change 
was done in a consensual way.  There was a paradigm shift in the structure of 
policing after 1979 because the Commonwealth for the first time took full charge of 
its policing responsibilities and as a result policing in Australia changed. 
In the context of Australian federalism and how it has generally become 
more centralised across a range of areas, parallel experiences can be shown for 
policing.  However, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, policing has travelled 
a different and smoother road than most other areas of government services to 
achieve its level of centralisation and national integration of services.  This study of 
policing represents a new case study on how Australian federalism can operate and 
offers another view on how and why change was undertaken in an area of 
government service within the confines of a federal political system. 
This chapter begins by describing the key observations about Australian 
policing that were derived from the previous analyses and discussion.  This is done 
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by addressing each of the three parts of the primary question: the extent, how and 
why policing changed over the 40 year period between 1970 and 2010.    
The next part of the chapter centres on the key questions surrounding the 
experience of policing and federalism.  This considers the range of contemporary 
descriptions of how federalism operates and explanations of why change occurred, 
as identified in Chapter Three.  Primarily, the postulations in the literature used in 
Chapter 3 are tested concerning the changing nature of Australian policing in order 
to ascertain if they explain the contemporary police experience.  In addition to 
these views, the proposition has been put forward that the case study of Australian 
policing identified and provided a new view of how federalism can operate to 
manifest change.  It is argued that this new federalism approach has resulted in the 
change to policing characterised by increased centralisation and sharing of other 
responsibilities—nationally integrated policing.   
Finally, the conclusion is made that centres on identifying whether there is a 
fundamental explanation for why policing experienced a paradigm shift, or have 
there been other influences and causes?  Has the function of federalism played a 
role and if so, what was it? What will become clear is that the case study on change 
to Australian policing demonstrates that its experience differed from other areas 
within government and it cannot be assumed policing is just like any other 
government activity.  From a federalism perspective, the policing journey has taken 
a different route than would be expected, but the final destination has been the 
same as most other travellers.   
7.2 The Extent of Change to Australia Policing 1970 to 2010 
The extent of the change to Australian policing since the 1970s centres on the fact 
that the Commonwealth is now involved in policing, a position it never took up in 
any meaningful way until 1979.  It is recognised that all of the eight police agencies 
in Australia have changed and grew substantially since the 1970s.  However, 
because the Commonwealth’s main agency, the AFP, grew from a zero base in 1979 
to its position of now being one of the larger police agencies, the focus in this 
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aspect is Commonwealth policing.  The extent of change in respect to the 
Commonwealth is demonstrated by the sheer size of Commonwealth policing in 
terms of resources, functions and the role it now plays in policing. 
Briefly, the background to the Commonwealth’s expansion is at Federation 
(in 1901) policing was the sole responsibility of State governments and the 
Commonwealth had no police agency to enforce its laws.  Policing was delivered by 
the six State police agencies and when matters relating to the Commonwealth 
government required police action, the State police forces acted as the agents of 
the Commonwealth government (Bryett, Harison and Shaw 1994, 77).   
In 1957 the first serious attempt was made by the Commonwealth to enter 
into policing by legislating to establish the Commonwealth Police Force.68  This 
Commonwealth police agency was ineffective and only policed a limited number of 
Commonwealth laws and was disbanded in 1979.  The establishment of the AFP in 
late 1979 amalgamated all Commonwealth police agencies (except the Northern 
Territory Police Force) into one agency and aspired to provide the entire policing 
needs of the Commonwealth—supplanting the reliance on State police agencies.  At 
this time the body of Commonwealth criminal law was insubstantial and all 
prosecutions of Commonwealth crimes were undertaken in State courts, applying 
local procedure and evidentiary rules, along with local sentencing regimes. 
This brings us to the point of identifying how the Commonwealth expanded 
into this State domain.  The three aspects of this relate to the resourcing, law 
enforcement functions and the leadership role it now plays in policing. 
7.2.1 Resourcing of Commonwealth Policing 
The increased volume of resources provided for policing from government coffers 
evidences the extent of change since 1980.  More resources resulted in more 
policing services being provided across the federation and the evidence of this is 
contained in the range of data and information in the statistics (Appendix A).  What 
some of the tables and charts in the appendix reveals is policing since 1980 has 
                                                        
68 Established by the Commonwealth Police Act 1957 (Cth).  However, the Act was assented to on 12 
December 1957 but never commenced until 21 April 1960.  The Act ceased on 19 October 1979. 
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expanded in all of the eight mainstream agencies, in terms of personnel and 
funding, and at a greater rate than both increases in population and CPI.  
Importantly, the extent of growth by the Commonwealth agencies since 1980, and 
more recently after 2000, has been at a greater rate than of the State and Territory 
police agencies. 
In 1980, when the AFP effectively began to operate, it employed 1489 staff 
or 4.9 per cent of the nation’s 30,520 sworn police officers and it cost $80 million to 
operate (AFP 2009, 145).  Over the 30 year period statistics show the number of 
personnel employed by the AFP increased by 144 per cent—as compared with the 
average State and Territory increases of 117 per cent between 1980 and 2010.  
Funding for the AFP was $237m or 7 per cent of the national total in 1993/9469 and 
by 2009/10, 14 per cent or $1.34bn of the total national expenditure70 on policing 
was provided for Commonwealth policing.   
The charts that follow demonstrate how funding increased and the share of 
the national aggregate funding for all police agencies.  The total Commonwealth 
funding was the aggregate of the AFP and National Crime Authority (NCA) for 1993–
94 and AFP and Australian Crime Commission (ACC) for 2009–10.   
Figure 7.1: Australian Police Agencies71 Funding ($m) 1993–94 
 
Source: AFP, State and Territory Police—Appendix A Table 5; and for the NCA—
Coad Report 1994, 64. 
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 See Chart 12 of Appendix A 
70 See Chart 13 of Appendix A 
71 Commonwealth Police funding is the aggregate of AFP and National Crime Authority (NCA) 











Figure 7.2: Australian Police Agencies72 Expenditure ($m) 2009–10  
 
Source: AFP, State and Territory Police—Appendix A Table 5; and for ACC—Annual 
Report 2011. 
When the expenditure on the Commonwealth and State police agencies is 
compared, as demonstrated from the financial information, there has been a 
greater growth by the Commonwealth.  Notwithstanding the obvious focus on the 
AFP, it should be noted that the Commonwealth’s other police agency, the ACC, 
also employed 484 full-time and 62 part-time employees and had a budget of $95m 
in 2009-10 (Australian Crime Commission 2010).73   
7.2.2 Expanded Policing Functions 
Underpinning the Commonwealth’s expansion into policing has been the significant 
increase in the scope and range of offences Commonwealth officers have to 
investigate.  Since the 1990s a concerted program to expand the body of 
Commonwealth criminal law (Appendix D provides a summary of additional 
Commonwealth criminal laws) has been undertaken and as a consequence there is 
generally no longer any reliance on State and Territory laws.  Most importantly in 
1995 the Commonwealth introduced a criminal code and a raft of criminal law 
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 Commonwealth Police funding is the aggregate of AFP and Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
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 It should be noted that some of the States maintained additional law enforcement agencies, some 
with a policing focus like the NSW Crime Commission—107 staff and $18M budget (New South 
Wales Crime Commission 2010) and the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission—319 staff 
and $46M budget (Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission 2010).  In Victoria the Office of 
Police Integrity has a $21M budget (Office of Police Intergrity 2010) and investigates allegations of 
police corruption, and in WA the Corruption and Crime Commission has powers concerning 
organised crime but they are not exercised (Crime and Corruption Commission 2010).  SA, NT and 












markedly expanding the volume of criminal offences, laws of evidence and criminal 
procedure.  This has led to a considerable increase in the functions pertaining to 
law enforcement that Commonwealth police officers can investigate.   
More recently, in 2002 and 2003 a further expansion of Commonwealth 
policing functions occurred when under section 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution, the 
States referred terrorism and organised crime criminal law powers to the 
Commonwealth.  This action by the Commonwealth in the case of terrorism laws 
was described as a “federal phenomenon” (Williams 2011, 1152) by prominent 
legal academic George Williams.  He went further and stated about the referral by 
the States—“The states possess considerable legislative responsibility in the field of 
criminal law.  Nevertheless, they decided against enacting their own comprehensive 
anti-terror law regimes” (Williams 2011, 1152).  In 2004, legislation permitting 
Commonwealth officers to investigate State criminal offences was also passed by 
the Parliament.74  This was considered necessary to complement the additional 
functions relating to terrorism and organised crime (Ellison 2004). 
7.2.3 Commonwealth Leadership in Policing 
In 1980 the Commonwealth invited State and Territory governments to join a 
national council of police ministers.  They accepted and the APMC was established 
and continues to operate (now titled SCPEM) as the national policy making body for 
policing.  This initiative placed the Commonwealth government on an equal footing 
with the States and has been critical to expanding the national government’s role in 
policing.  In many instances the Commonwealth has played an important leadership 
role in the Council and this further power has been mainly generated because of its 
fiscal strength.   
There is clear evidence the Commonwealth government from the outset 
wanted to play a leadership role in the Council and it has funded a range of 
initiatives which ensured the Commonwealth government participation became 
indispensable.  This has resulted in nation-wide support services for police agencies 
                                                        
74 Australian Federal Police and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth). 
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being national in character and operated effectively under the auspices of the 
Commonwealth government.   
7.2.4 Key Characteristics of the Extent of Change 
The extent of change in the context of the research question is succinctly described 
as nationally-integrated and has been achieved by 2010.  Paramount to the national 
integration has been the extent of Commonwealth involvement for this to occur, 
which has been demonstrated and reiterated.  What is important to recognise in 
respect to the federalism aspect of this change are two key characteristics of the 
extent of growth when the Commonwealth went into the policing domain.  First, 
this added another provider, hitherto non-existent.  This is unique in the history of 
government service providers in the federation—especially when the States had 
sole ownership for over seventy years and the domain became national in character 
with this Commonwealth involvement. 
The second factor is the time frame for change.  Without doubt, for such an 
extent of change to occur in the space of only twenty odd years i.e. 1980–2000, is 
exceptional.  Other areas of government services have a history since Federation of 
the Commonwealth trying to become involved.  In most of these cases as 
demonstrated by the case studies on education and health, any changes have only 
been incremental and the extent of Commonwealth involvement only involved the 
policy making domains, rather than direct service provision in its own right. 
7.3 How Policing Changed  
The extent of change to policing in Australia as described previously had a clear 
emphasis on the Commonwealth’s initiatives since the 1980s.  This has led to 
policing being described as nationally-integrated—essentially meaning some 
responsibilities have been centralised, others are operated concurrently and the 
States in many traditional areas of policing, continue to have sole responsibility.  
The hallmark of national integration is the few police agencies (as compared to 
most other nations) are operating as equals.  This leads to the next part of 
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answering the research question—we know the extent of change, but how was it 
changed? 
There has been a range of mechanisms used to change or shape government 
activity in the federal political setting (Hollander and Patapan 2007, 280).  The 
literature concerning Australian federalism for the period of the 1970 to 2010, 
referred to in Chapter Three, shed light on how change was undertaken across 
government in Australia.  The competing views considered many of the 
mechanisms used for changing or shaping the division of powers in specific areas 
and policy domains.  Most concentrated on Commonwealth activism where the 
national government had led the reform and change-process in areas of service 
delivery across the two levels of government.   
None of the literature specifically considered policing; however, it is 
assumed they are relevant as they characterise and describe the mechanisms used 
to facilitate and increase centralisation generally and the Commonwealth’s role 
specifically.  The foremost mechanisms included both those characterised as 
constitutional and sub-constitutional, and are considered in the context of how 
policing was changed. The mechanisms considered are—federal fiscal power; 
intergovernmental relations; and legislative mechanisms. 
7.3.1 Federal Fiscal Power 
The fiscal power of the Commonwealth, underpinned by the fact of Vertical Fiscal 
Imbalance (VFI) makes the sub-national service providers bound to the 
Commonwealth government for funding to operate many services.  In return for 
funding, which is usually conditional, the Commonwealth can set or influence policy 
in the domain.  Most of the literature recognised Commonwealth fiscal power as an 
influence in most areas of State service delivery, which led to increased 
centralisation.  This has not been the case for policing.  Instead, the Commonwealth 
has used direct and untied funding to gain influence by funding the original 
common police services and continuing in that vein, even though they are in their 
new manifestations and have rebadged their titles and structures.  Just as 
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importantly, in 2010 $1.435bn75 was provided to the Commonwealth’s own 
agencies to fund their policing operations that placed them in a position of 
significance in the national policing structure.76   
The Commonwealth’s fiscal power continues to be an important mechanism 
for influencing policing and allows it to play a major role in policing operations 
across the nation.  Primarily this is because it is the only level of government with 
the resources to finance the expansion of policing—in this case by increasing the 
scope of Commonwealth policing.  Clearly, the type of funding mechanisms used in 
policing differs from those applied to areas like education and health services.  
Funding to sub-national governments in these and other areas is generally 
conditional and directly funds a large proportion of the service delivery operation—
without Commonwealth funding these services cannot effectively operate.  By 
contrast, in policing, it was the funding of APMC initiatives like the common 
services for the States and most importantly, providing police services in its own 
right. 
7.3.2 Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) 
The structure of contemporary Commonwealth-State arrangements and relations 
has been greatly influenced by mechanisms that are centred on intergovernmental 
relations (IGR).  IGR have also been described by some commentators on Australian 
federalism as: collaborative federalism (Painter 1998); cooperative federalism 
(Selway 2001; Fenna 2007a; Jones 2008; Twomey 2008; Wiltshire 2008a; Fenna 
2012b); executive federalism (Menzies 2012; Wiltshire 2008a); and multi-level 
governance (Painter 2001).   
The mechanisms are brought to life by the establishment and operation of 
councils and committees, made up of representatives of the members of the 
federation at Commonwealth and sub-national government level.  Membership 
now includes representatives of local government and in many instances New 
                                                        
75
 Constituted by 2009/10 AFP funding of $1.34B (Table 5 Appendix A) and $95M (ACC Annual 
Report 2009/10) in the same year for the ACC to operate—a total of $1.434B. 
76 Table 5, Chart 5, Chart 11 and Chart 13 of Appendix A verify the fact of the size of the funding to 
the AFP has increased substantially to this point. 
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Zealand (as for police).  Leadership is vested in national ministerial councils and 
their current involvement with COAG has been a feature of Commonwealth-State 
arrangements over the past decade.  Essentially these are sub-constitutional 
processes that facilitate cooperation and more recently harmonisation (Fenna 
2012b, 590) across the spectrum of government services.  Participation in these 
national bodies has been considered by most researchers as an important feature 
of how change has been facilitated.   
This mechanism in the case of policing can be traced back to the formative 
years for Commonwealth policing when the APMC was established. It continues to 
operate effectively.  The common police services and their current manifestations 
evidence the use of these mechanisms.  Currently, under the COAG umbrella the 
peak body facilitating IGR in policing is the Standing Council on Police and 
Emergency Management (SCPEM)77. Under the Council is an array of other bodies 
that are responsible for a range of issues that encompasses policing.  As with most 
other areas of government service delivery, the development and use of IGR as a 
mechanism to achieve change has been critical for policing in Australia since 1979.  
The evidence is clear from the previous chapters that the Commonwealth has 
fostered a cooperative approach to change, garnered by consensus and resulting in 
the national integration of many policing functions. 
In respect to any discussion of IGR, it should be acknowledged that a group 
of commentators take the view in the scheme of intergovernmental relations, that 
the Commonwealth has the propensity to be opportunistic and coercive when the 
circumstances arise or it has the desire to seek a specific outcome.  These 
commentators recognise the fact that intergovernmental relations is a major aspect 
of contemporary federalism but are of the view that the Commonwealth at times 
uses this mechanism to facilitate its own agenda or impose its own policy (Painter 
1998; Painter 2001; Selway 2001; Fenna 2007a; Jones 2008; Twomey 2008; 
Wiltshire 2008a; Fenna 2012b).  The main characteristic of this approach has been 
conflict and resistance by the States.  However, the changes (national integration 
                                                        
77 The Secretariat for SCPEM like the original APMC is operated by the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department, Canberra. 
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and centralisation) to policing have not generally involved that type of experience.  
The only case that could come under this mantle was the Commonwealth led 
response to the Port Arthur massacre.  The initial Commonwealth response could 
be classified as coercive but what followed was clearly cooperation between the 
governments to change policy. 
7.3.3 Legislative Mechanisms 
There are a range of legislative mechanisms associated with processes and 
instruments of a constitutional nature.  The mechanisms used to change policing 
have been relatively straight forward and threefold.  First, the legislating of new 
laws pertaining to crime and prosecution of offenders, directly related to the 
Commonwealth’s enumerated powers, has expanded the functions of its police.  
The most common examples have been legislation related to the external affairs, 
communications, border protection, finance and environment enumerated powers.   
The External Affairs power, under section 51 (xxix) of the Constitution is the 
prime example of how the Commonwealth government has expanded its powers.  
From a political perspective this power has been used often by the Commonwealth 
government to intervene in the affairs of the States and in the case of policing it has 
been used in a range of areas related to terrorism and organised crime.  It is 
important to recognise the simple fact that the Commonwealth powers 
unequivocally place many aspects of policing services outside the constitutional 
jurisdiction of State governments.  When linked with the new and emerging crime 
problems that are concomitant to globalisation and internationalism of crime, this 
federalism influence has been integral to increasing centralisation of some 
functions of policing. 
The second type of legislative mechanism used recently involved legislation 
concerning terrorism and organised crime.  Legislative power was provided to the 
Commonwealth by the States using the referral of powers under section 51 (xxxvii) 
of the Constitution.  In 2002 and 2003 referrals were made by the States ceding 
significant criminal law powers to the Commonwealth in the areas of terrorism and 
organised crime.  Using the referral mechanism is the most unequivocal and 
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indisputable means to increase Commonwealth powers in a specific area and since 
Federation it has been rarely used.  In these recent cases the referral power has 
been used to increase the functions of Commonwealth policing that has in some 
instances lessened the responsibilities of State policing. 
The last aspect of this mechanism is filling legislation gaps that have come 
into existence because the aged constitution had not envisaged the need for 
enumerated powers for the Commonwealth or the States in these areas.  Obvious 
examples relate to air navigation and aircraft, electronic technology involved with 
computers and communications, along with complex international financial 
markets.  As pointed out previously the Commonwealth has passed a raft of 
legislation to cover new and emerging crimes and without doubt as a mechanism, 
this has changed policing in Australia, and importantly, facilitated a national 
approach. 
The outstanding fact concerning legislative change has been the fact that 
since 1979 there has been bipartisan support at the Commonwealth level, and also 
apparently at the sub-national level of politics, for legislation that directly or 
indirectly has expanded the Commonwealth’s role in policing. 
7.3.4 Characterisation of How Policing Changed 
The characterisation of how policing changed—nationally-integrated and 
Commonwealth driven—has been detailed in the summary of mechanisms.  The 
outcome has been two fold—greater centralisation of some areas of policing, 
hitherto non-existent before 1979; and shared or clear demarcation of 
responsibilities by State agencies.  Interestingly, when the police experience is 
viewed in comparison with areas such as education and health, as considered in 
previous chapters, there are similar mechanisms involved but these were applied 
differently by the Commonwealth.   
Fundamentally, the Commonwealth relies on tied grants to achieve its goals 
in most other areas of State government responsibility where it takes an interest, 
but in the case of policing it uses different instruments—it operates its own agency 
and finances support agencies.  The use of IGR as a facilitating mechanism is 
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commonplace and important to all areas of government, including policing.  While 
the use of legislative mechanisms is not all that well used across government, it has 
been a critical mechanism for the expansion of Commonwealth policing in terms of 
negotiating the respective changes to the scope and range of functions between 
the federal partners.   
When viewed through the prism of federalism policing provides a different 
account of how change, i.e. centralisation of some functions and national 
integration of the operation of policing, has occurred using the normal mechanisms 
in the Commonwealth’s armoury.  Policing changed over this very short period of 
time—to a system of national-integration—because there was bipartisan support 
for change; there was cooperation between the federal partners; and change was 
consensual.  Such hallmarks of change, according to much of the federalism 
literature, are unusual and seldom experienced.  Clearly, a new federalism 
approach has emerged and deserves to be acknowledged. 
7.4 Why Policing Changed 
Knowing what drove the shift of policing from being a strictly State or sub-national 
responsibility to being nationally-integrated is the essence of the thesis’s 
hypothesis.  Essentially the answer is two-fold and the first part was provided in 
Chapter Five where the principal drivers of change to policing were identified.  
These drivers directly related to the mechanisms applied to expand Commonwealth 
policing and in turn were responsible for changing the national policing model.  
They were identified as: Spillover; New Commonwealth Responsibilities; and 
Economies of Scale.   
The discussion on drivers also corroborated the fact that the most critical 
development for Commonwealth policing occurred in 1979 when the AFP was 
established.  This was the seminal event that heralded the determined entry into 
policing of the Commonwealth government.  After this, the persistent growth of 
Commonwealth policing ensured it would take a prominent role in the national 
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policing domain as opposed to the insignificant and constrained role it took for the 
first seventy-eight years of Federation.   
The other important development that drove change, initially to sub-
national and then Commonwealth policing, was the changed social and in turn 
political environment of Australia and the western world from the 1970s.  Social 
change led to a range of crime problems, of a volume and nature never experienced 
previously.  Australia’s isolation from the rest of the world diminished and problems 
arose both directly and indirectly from international sources, many in the area of 
crime, which had an impact on Australian society and in turn on governments.  
Governments’ response to escalating crime problems in the main focussed on 
policing solutions and as a result Australian policing expanded and changed in many 
respects.   
Strategically, the expansion of Commonwealth policing has been the result 
of political decisions at all levels—federalism in action.   The political decisions were 
driven by the need for solutions to serious crime problems and threats being faced 
by all governments.  The expansion of Commonwealth policing filled the gap that 
existed in respect to crime problems where the State agencies lacked jurisdiction, 
resources or it could be inferred the desire or political will to deal with these 
problems.  Thus, many crime problems like cybercrime, terrorism and organised 
crime have evolved to become primary Commonwealth problems vis-à-vis State 
government.  This attitude of the States clearly opened the door to greater 
Commonwealth involvement in policing. 
From a federalism perspective, explaining why this change occurred to 
policing, one is drawn to the pragmatic federalism view as the experience of 
policing appears to have been driven by the need to solve problems once they were 
identified or there was a significant focusing event.  In most of the cases cited in 
Chapter Five for instance, the Commonwealth was willing to be the problem-
solver—the States consented, and the rest is history! 
Interestingly, the approach to these new crime problems, particularly those 
of a national and international nature by a federal government like Australia’s can 
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be two-fold: either allocate the responsibility to lesser government or make it a 
responsibility for a national agency.  The decentralised approach, where the federal 
government leaves operational policing concerning national matters to local police 
is the case in many nations, including the federations of Germany and Switzerland.  
These nations make the laws and the States administer and enforce them.  By 
contrast, the USA and Canada like Australia are more centralised in their approach 
to these aspects of policing (not necessarily in other areas) and have national police 
agencies retaining control and operational responsibility for these crime matters.   
Clearly, Australia was in the decentralised category until 1979, but since 
then has become increasingly centralised with the Commonwealth government 
calculatingly adopting the policy to significantly increase the resources for 
Commonwealth policing.  To undertake the change to Commonwealth policing the 
cooperation and consent of the States was critical.  The States took the unusual 
action of supporting the Commonwealth’s involvement in policing functions usually 
considered as belonging to the States.  The 2002 and 2003 cases of the State 
governments referring criminal law powers concerning organised crime and 
terrorism, along with the related responsibility for criminal intelligence, to the 
Commonwealth government, were clear examples of spillover driving change.  This 
led to the expansion of the scope for Commonwealth policing at the behest of 
governments, a situation at odds with the traditional attitude of State governments 
in other areas of service delivery that they jealously protect. 
7.4.1 Characteristics of Change 
There are two further aspects to consider in why policing became nationally-
integrated.  Firstly, in relation to federal politics and political ideologies it should be 
understood that the restructuring and subsequent reforms and changes to 
Commonwealth policing have enjoyed bipartisan political support at the 
Commonwealth level since 1979.  Additionally, there is no evidence that at a State 
level this has not also been the case.  The fact of bipartisan support for change 
should be taken into account when considering why policing became national in 
character.   
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Bipartisan support can be traced back to the political aspirations of both the 
Whitlam and Fraser Commonwealth governments and their common policy 
position on policing in the 1970s.  Though politically opposed and outwardly 
espousing different federalism ideologies, in practice Fraser’s coalition government 
followed the centralist lead of Whitlam.  The common policy positions of the two 
political parties since 1979 has led to a bipartisan position at a federal level by both 
major parties.  This current policy position is unusual in federal politics but has been 
a critical reason why policing changed. 
The role of sub-national politics has also been integral to driving change in 
policing.  The support by this level of government for the Commonwealth’s 
initiatives and intrusions into policing has been an important factor in the change to 
the national policing structure.  Prima facie, this is a position at odds with what 
would be expected in the normal operation of Australian federalism—opposition to 
centralisation is generally expected from the States.  This uncharacteristic support 
for the Commonwealth was exemplified in the outcomes from the Leaders summit 
on terrorism and multi-jurisdictional crime convened on the 4 April 2002.  The 
Communiqué from the summit and the agreements that emanated from it 
endorsed the expansion of Commonwealth policing and effectively handed over 
responsibility for policing of terrorism and organised crime to the Commonwealth 
government (see Appendix E for copies of the related documents).   
The Agreements that followed explicitly recognised the strategic leadership 
role in policing that the Commonwealth government was expected to play in these 
two areas.  From a political perspective the Summit demonstrated the States 
willingly passed these functions of policing to the Commonwealth, which deviates 
from conventional federalism orthodoxies and showed that policing has been 
treated differently to most other areas within the ambit of Commonwealth-State 
relations.   
Why the States have treated policing differently in the negotiations over 
powers in this case has not been a topic researched to any degree.  What can be 
speculated is there are a number of factors, some political in character, which are 
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worthy of consideration as they could be the reason for the States policy position.  
These include: 
1. Perceived budget savings because the Commonwealth agreed to take total 
responsibility for these areas of policing e.g. cybercrime, terrorism and 
organised crime;  
2. Diminution of responsibility for areas of high political risk, again examples of 
areas concerning terrorism and organised crime are valid; and 
3. New areas of responsibility taken by the Commonwealth where there is 
nothing to lose in terms of State responsibilities or federal funding—what 
you never had you cannot lose.  In support of this view is the fact that the 
seven State and Territory agencies, according to their annual reports, were 
expanding and fully absorbed with their normal functions.  The allocation of 
these new areas of criminal investigation to the Commonwealth did not take 
away any of their mainstream functions.  The police agencies were certainly 
not losing any functions and it would appear taking on these new areas 
would be problematic as they would require additional expertise and 
funding. 
The characteristics of change to policing in Australia can be viewed in two 
ways.  From a political point of view it is evident that there was bipartisanship, 
cooperation and consensus at all levels of government, which provided a logical 
explanation as to why policing was able to become national in character.  The State 
gate-keepers have been happy to let the Commonwealth drive change and this is 
the main reason why the paradigm shift happened.   
The other way to view the change in policing is to view it from a federalism 
perspective and consider whether changes across the board to federalism had a 
hand in driving the change in policing. 
7.5 Policing and Federalism 
As was noted in Chapter Three, which considered federalism in detail, there are a 
range of descriptions and explanations on how and why federalism has changed 
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and what effect this has had on government activities across all governments in 
Australia.  
The answers elicited so far as to why policing changed appear 
straightforward—the Commonwealth government since the 1970s pursued a policy 
to establish Commonwealth policing as an essential component of the national 
policing framework and this was supported by States.  A critical outcome from this 
was increased centralisation in respect to a number of aspects of policing.  The 
degree of sub-national support has been generally unequivocal and many examples 
of this have been provided in the discussion to date. 
In the history of federalism, this centralisation trend has not been unusual 
and the proposition can be considered that it was in the normal evolution in 
federalism that changed policing.  So is there any credence to this conclusion and 
do the mainstream explanations in the federalism literature clarify why policing 
changed?  
7.5.1 Changing Federalism—Descriptions and Explanations 
The evolution of Australian federalism is reasonably well documented and there are 
a range of competing views as to the extent of change, how and why it changed.  
Clearly, much of this literature has considered parallel questions like those already 
asked about policing.  The selected literature drawn from Chapter Three centred on 
descriptions and explanations about Australian federalism and their relevance and 
ability to explain the policing paradigm shift.  Three federalism perspectives are 
used to explore further into the experience of policing. 
7.5.2 Cooperative Federalism 
As mentioned previously, cooperative federalism relates to the mechanism of 
intergovernmental relations (IGR).  Other descriptors that are aligned to 
cooperative federalism are—collaborative federalism (Painter 1998); executive 
federalism (Menzies 2012; Wiltshire 2008a); and multi-level governance (Painter 
2001).  The explanations principally focus on how change took place and the use of 
mechanisms that are sometimes characterised as undemocratic because they allow 
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unelected and unaccountable government officers to operate the business of 
government outside the constitution’s institutions i.e. parliaments.  The most 
obvious result from this form of federalism is increased centralisation and has been 
described as “creeping centralism” (Twomey 2008, 57), or “centralisation by 
stealth” (Wiltshire 2008, 591) that “undermines the constitutional forms on which 
constituent units, and the union itself, were based” (Painter 2001, 149).   
The effect of cooperative federalism in the day-to-day operation of 
governments according to the literature has been significant and is seen in a 
positive light by some authors as it enables the federal structure (constitutional and 
institutional framework) to keep up with the “profoundly different economic and 
social conditions” (Fenna 2012a, 40).  Menzies considered this federalism 
characteristic allowed “intergovernmental decision-making within the context of 
the global economy” (Menzies 2012, 2). Regardless of the cases for and against 
cooperative federalism it is clear it has been around for some time and provides 
benefits to governments.   
An important aspect of the cooperative approach is whether there has been 
pressure on the States by the Commonwealth to change and agree with federal 
initiatives and reforms.  Obviously, cooperation is a two way street but from the 
evidence so far e.g. the Commonwealth’s fiscal power at the APMC; and activism in 
the 2002 summit, it could be argued federal government resources and activism 
have been a powerful influence to pressure State cooperation.  On the other hand 
it has also been shown the States negotiated positive outcomes for their 
jurisdictions. 
The influence of cooperative federalism on policing is clearly demonstrable.  
A range of developments have emanated from cooperative institutions ranging 
from the APMC to the important 2002 COAG Leaders Summit on terrorism and 
multijurisdictional crime.  Additionally, the fact that Commonwealth organisations 
like the ACC contain significant representation from the States demonstrates the 
continued influence of cooperative federalism on policing and their ability to 
negotiate positive outcomes. 
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There is clear evidence in the matters of spillover, new criminal 
responsibilities and economies of scale, which have shown that a significant 
amount of problem solving was undertaken within the confines of cooperative 
institutions.  In the case of the shift of policing to a national structure, the 
cooperative approach was a significant influence in how this occurred. 
 
7.5.3 Australian Policing as Pragmatic Federalism 
The historic transition from purely state-based policing to a much more nationally-
integrated approach with a considerable Commonwealth government role has 
exhibited a very different character from the centralising trends in other policy 
fields such as health and education. In those fields, there is abundant evidence of 
coercive and opportunistic federalism, with the Commonwealth using “its fiscal and 
constitutional superiority to implement its own agenda” (Jones 2008, 7). With 
policing, by contrast, a pragmatic adjustment to the emergence of new problems 
has indeed occurred.  
The basis of the argument is the Commonwealth is taking more 
responsibility for problem solving in respect to emerging issues and problems that 
have an impact across the whole of the nation.  It was clear in the discussion the 
drivers of Spillover and New Commonwealth Responsibilities, new crime problems 
were being addressed by the Commonwealth and the State governments were 
cognisant but chose to be inactive.   
The foundation of pragmatic federalism is that change comes about within 
the tiers of government as a result of problems being defined and solutions being 
required (Hollander and Patapan 2007, 291).  In the case of policing this led to 
Commonwealth activity in areas traditionally reserved for sub-national 
governments i.e. the criminal law and the enforcement of those laws.  The best 
examples in support of this view are provided in recent cases of State criminal law 
powers being ceded to the Commonwealth government and in other instances of 
expanded Commonwealth criminal law and policing powers.   
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Another means of supporting the argument that crime problems were 
important drivers of policing change is to consider a number of events (some could 
be classified as focusing events) and actions by government since 1978, which 
sought solutions through Commonwealth government involvement.   These events 
were responsible for changing key aspects of Australian policing and when viewed 
through the lens of problem solving, the outcomes were predictable.  The examples 
used to support the argument represent significant events affecting Australia that 
required governments to come up with solutions to some very serious problems.  
Figure 7.3 outlines the matters for consideration. 
Figure 7.3: Events affecting Policing 1978–2007 
Year Event Action 
 
1978 Sydney Hilton Bombing  Mark review commissioned, with 
recommendations resulting in AFP, APMC, 
National Counter Terrorist Plan and Common 
National Police Services being established. 
 
1980 Woodward and Williams 
Royal Commission Inquiry 




AFP investigation powers and role in the 
investigation of organised crime mandated. 
 
1996 Port Arthur Massacre and 
national gun control  
APMC special meeting established national 
gun control policy and uniform national laws 
with Commonwealth funded gun buyback. 
 
1999 East Timor Intervention  
 
Federal Police peace keeping force requested 
by the UN and AFP provided a force. 
 
2001/02 9/11 and Bali Bombing  Preeminent national counter terrorist role 
given to AFP.  National laws and related 
criminal law power referred by States to the 
Commonwealth government. 
National terrorism and counter-terrorism 
investigation responsibility allocated to AFP. 
2007 NT Intervention  Evidence of child sex crime, domestic and 
family violence being committed in aboriginal 
communities in the NT. New Commonwealth 
laws created for enforcement by police in NT.  




The list of events demonstrated government action was problem driven 
once the problem has been identified, and fits with the Hollander and Patapan 
hypothesis.  The need for problem solving has also increased since the 1980s 
because of globalisation and the inordinate amount of crime problems emanating 
from this phenomenon of an international nature.  Constitutionally, the 
Commonwealth government is the primary responder to problems of this nature 
because of its external affairs power.  The States can deal with international 
matters only if invited by the Commonwealth or at the very least in a manner the 
Commonwealth determines.  Consideration of these events exemplifies the 
effectiveness of pragmatic solutions and the fact that this explanation of federalism 
in action explains the change in policing. 
An important point to note about this discussion is that the pragmatic 
federalism explanation may not necessarily relate to every area of government 
activity.  Fenna (2012b) argues that pragmatic federalism could not be attributed as 
a change process for all domains of government activity—there is credence in the 
theory, but it may only be relevant to some individual domains.  If policing is one of 
those domains, we need to establish the ways in which it differs from those other 
policy fields such that the more national dimension has been established so 
smoothly and pragmatically.  Those differences seem clear: none of the 
developments have involved any intrusion into traditional areas of state policing 
responsibility.  Nationalisation has been a process complementing the traditional 
state role and providing solutions for entirely new challenges that transcend State 
boundaries and exceed state capacities. 
7.6 Summary 
Both cooperative federalism and pragmatic federalism have been identified as 
providing a description and an explanation respectively, on the change to policing.  
They complement each other and have been a foil to the Commonwealth’s 
coercive/opportunistic approach to the States.  This is not to say that from time-to-
time unilateral decision making is not required from the Commonwealth.  As seen 
over the past years, at times Commonwealth leadership is essential to address 
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problems beyond the capacity of the States or where they do not want to take 
responsibility.  The important examples of the gun and national firearms control 
case, terrorism laws, organised crime laws and the NT intervention demonstrated 
how and why the Commonwealth must have the ability to centralise power in some 
cases, based upon what it considers to be in the national interest. 
What should be noted in all of the cases mentioned is in every instance the 
cooperative nature of federalism afforded all of the sub-national governments 
some input into the final outcomes.  There was and continues to be the ability by 
the States to negotiate outcomes.  Some critics will dispute this but the evidence of 
policing has clearly demonstrated the Commonwealth’s approach to federalism is 
not a one-way street.   
Understanding pragmatic federalism has afforded a viable explanation of 
the change to policing, as problem-solving beyond the capability and jurisdiction of 
the States requires the higher level of government to take responsibility.   
Cooperative federalism along with pragmatic federalism appears to describe 
and explain some aspects of change, but they are not complete explanations.  This 
begs the question—is there another type of federalism that fully explains the 
change?  Perhaps considering the outcomes from the previous chapters can assist 
in answering the question. 
Chapter Three discussed Australian federalism and how after the Whitlam 
era change had occurred in federalism that affected all areas and levels of 
government.  Overall, there was a centralism trend and this was also the case for 
policing, like many other areas previously a sole State responsibility.  The chapter 
discussed several competing descriptions and explanations of federalism to explain 
change and the most relevant for policing appeared to be cooperative and 
pragmatic federalism.  At this stage both had weight and the following chapters 
needed to test them against the policing experience since the 1970s. 
Chapter Four focussed on the change to policing and concluded a paradigm 
change had occurred in policing since the formation of the AFP, and it had become 
nationally integrated with the Commonwealth expanding its role in policing with 
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the support of the States.  The key facts of the change were that it was 
Commonwealth driven yet done cooperatively and was motivated by the need to 
solve new and emerging crime problems.  Explaining what drove change led to the 
next chapter. 
Chapter Five concluded that the main drivers of change to policing all had 
relevance to federal powers and the paradigm change in crime in Australia.  High 
levels of national and international crime now required federal involvement in State 
matters.  Thus, the Commonwealth was the primary leader of change with the 
States allowing federal expansion and even giving up responsibilities for areas of 
criminal law by constitutional means.  From a federalism perspective it was clear 
that change was undertaken by cooperative means and problem solving was driving 
change. 
Chapter Six sought to compare the Australian experience of policing with 
four other similar western federations and the conclusion was they had similar 
policing experiences.  From the perspective of federalism there was a centralisation 
trend to varying degrees.  Rapid changes to crime in all of these countries required 
the expansion of federal policing and clearly cooperation between levels of levels of 
government was important to implement change.   
All of the conclusions have cited centralisation and all levels of government 
working together to be common in change to policing.  The important fact about 
this observation as ascertained in the previous analysis is the States since the 1980s 
have continued to support the Commonwealth’s expansion into policing.  This State 
support is based on pragmatism.  For instance, Australia like other western nations 
has been greatly impacted by globalisation and in particular in the case of policing, 
the internationalisation of crime—and the best means to deal with the problems is 
through national institutions and structures.  This view is certainly supported by the 
experience of policing in some other federal nations, detailed in Chapter Six.  
However, to actually implement change there must be effective mechanisms in 
place for this to occur and what is evident from the other chapters is cooperation 
between the Commonwealth and States facilitated change. 
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The conclusion drawn from the discussion was that federalism has played a 
major role in change, yet it appears in the case of policing there is not one similar 
federalism case study to explain how and why it occurred.  As mentioned 
previously, the proposition put forward is by means of cooperative federalism 
change was undertaken and this was driven by the need for the federal partners to 
solve pressing crime problems. This proposition recognises the importance of 
aspects of both cooperative and pragmatic federalism.  However, it is not an 
absolute explanation because there have been other experiences and policy 
decisions unique to policing. 
The characteristics of policing in the federal environment are now the 
Commonwealth and the States operate as equals and negotiate demarcations in 
some cases, while operating concurrently in many other areas.  The hallmark of this 
approach to federalism is Commonwealth policing shares the work as an equal with 
State agencies and by amicable negotiation the governments have allocated 
responsibilities for policing across the nation.  This is how federalism has worked for 
policing and changed it to be increasingly centralised and overall nationally 
integrated. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Since Federation and particularly after 1979, Australian policing when viewed as a 
model in the context of government services has changed to such a degree, that the 
extent of the change is best described as a paradigm shift.  Originally modelled on 
colonial policing and treated solely as a State responsibility until 1979, effective 
change began in that year when the Commonwealth implemented a 1976 policy 
decision to provide its own policing services.  Change was driven by the 
Commonwealth government and unusually enjoyed bipartisan support in the 
parliament to establish a fully effective Commonwealth policing agency.   
Interestingly, up to 1972 the two main parties took diametrically opposed 
views on Commonwealth policing and these were the reverse of their usual 
ideological positions.  Labor opposed every attempt to establish Commonwealth 
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policing agencies while conservative-coalition governments passed legislation in 
this area in 1919, 1925 and 1957, against fervent Labor opposition.  The reason for 
change to the Labor policing policy, first espoused in 1972 by aspiring Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam in his electioneering, was never articulated or actually 
resulted in any change.  Several years on a more systematic approach was taken by 
the Fraser coalition government that included a formal policy development process 
and resulted in a Cabinet approved policing policy in 1976 (NAA 2012b and c), 
which in essence has remained unaltered to the present.  
The new Commonwealth policy developed a mainstream national police 
agency to undertake all police business for the Commonwealth government and to 
place that agency on an equal footing with the sub-national agencies.  
Commonwealth policing came of age after the formation of the AFP in 1979 and has 
prospered to the point where in 2010 the AFP was arguably the third equal largest 
police agency in Australia, and is still prospering.  It has to be noted in the context 
of Commonwealth expansion, the seven subnational agencies also grew 
substantially and at a greater rate than population growth, but overall at a lower 
rate than their federal counterpart.   
The major factor behind the expansion of police agencies was the increase 
in crime across Australia in respect to the size and complexity of the problems.  
Traditional policing structures and arrangements between governments and police 
agencies in the 1970s were clearly inadequate and could not effectively respond to 
all of the crime problems.  The solution advocated and actioned by the 
Commonwealth government was to provide its own agency as a problem solver for 
many of the new crime problems emerging across the nation.  What followed after 
1979 was the deliberate expansion of the Commonwealth’s role in policing, which 
was the beginning of a concerted effort to carve out a role for the national 
government. 
This formative change in policing led to policing developing as a national 
policy domain and being nationally integrated, vis-à-vis being a solely State 
government responsibility.  Commonwealth policing has continued to grow in terms 
of scope and range of functions and more recently in 2002 and 2003 undertook 
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additional responsibility for policing terrorism and organised crime.  These areas of 
policing, with the consent and encouragement of the States, become prime 
responsibilities for the Commonwealth and its criminal law.  This addition to 
Commonwealth policing responsibilities was done in an unusual manner for such an 
undertaking of a political nature in the context of federal relations.  Voluntarily, the 
States expanded Commonwealth policing by using formal constitutional means to 
assign responsibility for terrorism and organised crime to the Commonwealth 
Parliament. 
Along with terrorism and organised crime, some other high-end changes to 
Commonwealth policing took place from the 1990s involving a range of areas of 
police functions being undertaken by Commonwealth policing to fill the gaps that 
State governments’ were unwilling to undertake because of a range of reasons—
principally that they lacked jurisdiction, resources or the political will to take on 
such responsibilities.  The development of cybercrime and the policing response 
well-illustrated how many emerging crime problems, as a matter of practice, by 
default are now left to Commonwealth policing.   
The result of all of this is that Australian policing underwent a paradigm shift 
after 1980.  A new federalism approach, combining both old and new aspects of 
contemporary approaches manifested change. This approach to federalism was 
characterised by cooperative processes for problem solving and the States 
negotiating a role for the Commonwealth as a service provider in its own right.  This 
facilitated policing becoming truly national in character and no longer a State 
responsibility, as envisaged by the founders of the Constitution.   
The success of the Commonwealth’s policy to expand its role in policing has 
relied on the unusual position of the States supporting the program of change and 
reform.  This approach to policing by the States can only be described as 
inconsistent with the way the States normally defend their control of their service 
domains.  The ongoing conflict between the Commonwealth and the States over 
similar issues surrounding centralisation in other areas such as education and 
health is unrelenting and was a continuous theme in the previous chapter on 
Australian federalism.  It is a feature of federalism that has been associated with 
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the relationships between governments since Federation.  Why then has the 
experience of policing in this area been so different? 
The conclusion drawn from discussion in this and the previous chapters is 
that the expansion of Commonwealth policing was green-lighted by the States 
primarily because of the nature of the crime problems faced.  The inference is 
drawn that the problems were not addressed locally for they were seen as a 
Commonwealth responsibility based on the view of the States—conveniently yet 
inconsistently with the position taken in other domains, they lacked the jurisdiction 
and resources to deal with the problems.  Pragmatism won out over sovereignty 
and there are absolutely no indications that this concerted policy approach to 
policing by the States will change. Importantly, however, the States retained policy 
and operational influence, and kept control over most of their core functions.  
The model of Australian policing is now more centralised, nationally 
integrated and the Commonwealth government has taken a position of leadership. 
Commonwealth policing is well on its way to taking a position of prominence and 
that can be attributed to a unique situation—the development of a new approach 
to allocating policing responsibilities.  Implicit in all of these changes has been 
consensus by the States to the Commonwealth becoming an equal partner, 
allowing it to centralise some functions and cooperating in policing becoming 
nationally integrated.  
From a federalism perspective, the final question is whether normative 
federalism notions can explain the case of policing since 1970.  To a degree they do, 
however it is argued that the case study of policing clearly identifies a new way of 
doing business between the federal partners.  The usual combative approach to 
change between the federal partners has been missing in the councils, committees 
and summits. Australian policing has changed significantly since 1970 and this has 
been undertaken differently than would be expected in the normal course of 
Commonwealth-State relations.  This has been a new and interesting experience for 
Australian federalism—the new policing model demonstrates change can be done 
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This provides a number of statistical analyses in respect to 
policing using specific data on personnel and funding in respect 
to the eight Australian police agencies.  In addition a number of 
comparative statistical analyses are provided, which use 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Population data as it relates to 
the two policing data sets.  A range of tables and charts in the 




This concerns Colonial Policing in Australia and explains the 
background to post-Federation policing.  This is important as the 
highly centralised nature of Australian policing is the direct 







This details the current statutory provisions relating to the 
functions of Australian police agencies. 
D 
Commonwealth 
Criminal Law  
This is a summarised history of Commonwealth criminal law 
reform from 1980 to 2010 and is derived from current a 
Parliamentary Library electronic document concerning the 







This provides copies of three documents referred to in a number 
of chapters.  They are: 
Communique from Leaders Forum 4 April 2002 
Agreement 5 April 2002 





These NAA documents are key documents and referred to in 
most chapters and are provided for ease of reference as access 
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The Appendix provides many of the statistics used in the main body of the thesis 
and they relate to two key areas pertaining to the operation of Australian police 
agencies: 
(i) Personnel—concerns the employment of Personnel by police 
agencies; and  
(ii) Funding—concerns funding provided annually by governments’ 
for police agencies.   
As policing is a government service in Australia, the data collected originated 
from the eight governments which operate police agencies. The data was sourced 
directly from agency and government documents.  There are two independent 
agencies charged with collecting statistics concerning government agencies and 
their products have been a major source for the data and information contained in 
the appendix.  The statistics concern the eight public police agencies, namely: 
7. Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
8. New South Wales Police Force (NSWPOL) 
9. Northern Territory Police Force (NTPOL) 
10. Queensland Police Service (QPOL) 
11. South Australia Police (SAPOL) 
12. Tasmania Police Service (TASPOL) 
13. Victoria Police Force (VICPOL) 
14. Western Australia Police Force (WAPOL) 
The two independent research agencies from which data was accessed are: 
 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS); and  
 Commonwealth Productivity Commission (CPC). 
 
A2 BACKGROUND TO THE COLLECTION OF POLICE AGENCY STATISTICS 
There are currently eight police agencies in Australia; six state police agencies 
existed as colonial forces at Federation in 1901 while the Northern Territory agency 
was formed in 1931.  The AFP is the newest agency and was established in 1979 by 
Commonwealth legislation and provides policing for the Commonwealth 




Statistics and the collection of the relevant data and information, like the study 
of Australian policing were virtually non-existent from Federation to the 1970s.  The 
collection and analysis of statistics to underpin the knowledge base for policing has 
only developed momentum since the 1990s.  In respect to the period for study, 




In the first period the only source of statistics on a national basis for all the 
agencies was the Commonwealth Year Book series published by the ABS.  This 
provided a compilation of statistics concerning personnel and limited information 
on expenditure by the agencies.  In 1995 the CPC published its first annual Report 
on Government Services (ROGS) which provided the first uniform and national 
series to focus on policing.  This provided a credible series of statistics concerning 
police agency personnel and funding, which continues to be a major source for 
research on policing in Australia. 
Other sources of statistical data and information available included: 
1. Federal, state and territory budget papers 
2. Agency annual reports 
3. AFP publication “The first thirty years”, chapter seven: Key Facts 1979–2009 
(AFP 2009).  
The two specific areas used for the general analysis of policing on a national 
basis are: 
1. Personnel, the human resource inputs into this labour intensive business;  
2. Government Funding, as policing does not generate income.   
The specific sources of data for these two statistical areas are provided as a 
footnote to the main tables.  Also used for comparative purposes are population 
and consumer price index (CPI) information, both derived from official government 
sources. 
A3 TABLES AND CHARTS 
The collection of tables and charts are based upon the information provided by the 
respective sources identified previously.  There are 12 tables and 13 charts 
239 
 
A3.1 PERSONNEL STATISTICS 
The sources of these statistics are — State and Territory Police data derived from 
two sources: Report on Government Services (ROGS), Police Services attachments; 
and Year Book Australia.  Data sourced for individual years as follows: 
3. 1980/81: 1982 Year Book, 226 
4. 1981/82–1983/84: 1985 Year Book, 234 
5. 1984/85–1985/86: 1988 Year Book, 446 
6. 1986/87–1988/89: 1992 Year Book, 340 
7. 1989/90: 1994 Year Book, 349 
8. 1990/91–1992/93: 1995 Year Book, 351 
9. 1993/94–1996/97: ROGS 1997, 11A.2 Police Services Attachment, All 
jurisdiction data, 686 - 693 
10. 1997/98–20001/02: ROGS 2003, 5A Police services attachment, 5A.1 
Descriptors 
11. 2002/03: ROGS 2004, 5A Police services attachment, 5A.1. 
12. 2003/04–2009/10: ROGS 2011, 6A Police services attachment, 6A.1. 
 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) data derived as follows: 
13. 1980/81–2007/08: The First Thirty Years, chapter 7, Key Facts, 1979-
2009 (AFP 2010, Australian Federal Police 2009) 
14. 2008/09 and 2009/10: AFP Annual Report 2010 (Australian Federal 
Police 2010  
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Table 1: Australian Police Agencies Personnel 1980/81–2009/10 
Personnel 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 
NSW 9468 9388 9797 10432 10608 10743 11608 12280 12568 12903 
Vic 8196 8329 8499 8507 8444 8732 8796 9229 9678 9443 
Qld 4554 4543 4869 4686 4775 4872 5072 5085 5219 5524 
WA 2656 2693 2824 2888 2890 3168 3287 3243 3572 3751 
SA 3220 3249 3297 3286 3373 3493 3646 3549 3564 3424 
Tas 1029 1041 1006 1009 1019 1025 1010 1028 1075 1072 
NT 543 566 634 640 662 669 681 748 746 708 
State & Territory 29666 29809 30926 31448 31771 32702 34100 35162 36422 36825 
AFP 2395 2702 2490 2467 3308 3113 3186 3368 3188 3118 






Personnel 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 
NSW 13203 12593 12971 15963 16509 16509 17014 17421 17260 16868 
Vic 9726 9877 9954 12053 12181 12429 12215 11824 11598 11456 
Qld 5895 6271 6377 7858 8220 8464 8882 9478 9765 7319 
WA 3994 4107 4211 5147 5255 6099 6157 6114 6047 5900 
SA 3535 3673 3782 4354 4276 4080 4021 4147 4293 4432 
Tas 993 1018 1025 1357 1381 1384 1438 1440 1411 1407 
NT 693 669 694 904 948 1018 1036 1078 1055 1091 
State & Territory 38039 38208 39014 47636 48770 49983 50763 51502 51429 48473 
AFP 3217 3154 3060 2949 2963 2772 2667 2549 2601 2638 






Personnel 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Percentage 
NSW 16951 17735 18059 18921 18503 18570 19311 18822 19153 18955 100% 
Vic 11739 12148 12514 12764 13035 13445 13686 13755 13901 14380 75% 
Qld 10855 11193 11407 11701 11950 12370 12900 13570 14222 14406 216% 
WA 5945 5957 5954 6013 6172 6353 6523 7016 7474 7379 178% 
SA 4557 4681 4745 4698 4861 5088 5140 5333 5431 5565 73% 
Tas 1421 1453 1446 1482 1504 1560 1598 1613 1602 1573 53% 
NT 1120 1160 1157 1239 1340 1386 1391 1464 1587 1637 201% 
State & Territory 52588 54327 55282 56818 57365 58772 60549 61573 63370 63895 115% 
AFP 2851 3051 3496 3653 3601 4178 4695 5257 5113 5833 144% 





























Table 2: Australian Police Agencies Personnel Growth 1980/81–1989/90 
Personnel 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 Percentage 
NSW 9468 9388 9797 10432 10608 10743 11608 12280 12568 12903 36% 
Vic 8196 8329 8499 8507 8444 8732 8796 9229 9678 9443 15% 
Qld 4554 4543 4869 4686 4775 4872 5072 5085 5219 5524 21% 
WA 2656 2693 2824 2888 2890 3168 3287 3243 3572 3751 41% 
SA 3220 3249 3297 3286 3373 3493 3646 3549 3564 3424 6% 
Tas 1029 1041 1006 1009 1019 1025 1010 1028 1075 1072 4% 
NT 543 566 634 640 662 669 681 748 746 708 30% 
State & 
Territory 
29666 29809 30926 31448 31771 32702 34100 35162 36422 36825 
24% 
AFP 2395 2702 2490 2467 3308 3113 3186 3368 3188 3118 30% 

































Table 3: Australian Police Agencies Personnel Growth 1980/81–1999/2000 
Personnel 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 
NSW 9468 9388 9797 10432 10608 10743 11608 12280 12568 12903 
Vic 8196 8329 8499 8507 8444 8732 8796 9229 9678 9443 
Qld 4554 4543 4869 4686 4775 4872 5072 5085 5219 5524 
WA 2656 2693 2824 2888 2890 3168 3287 3243 3572 3751 
SA 3220 3249 3297 3286 3373 3493 3646 3549 3564 3424 
Tas 1029 1041 1006 1009 1019 1025 1010 1028 1075 1072 
NT 543 566 634 640 662 669 681 748 746 708 
State & Territory 29666 29809 30926 31448 31771 32702 34100 35162 36422 36825 
AFP 2395 2702 2490 2467 3308 3113 3186 3368 3188 3118 
Australia 32061 32511 33416 33915 35079 35815 37286 38530 39610 39943 
 
Personnel 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 Percentage 
NSW 13203 12593 12971 15963 16509 16509 17014 17421 17260 16868 78% 
Vic 9726 9877 9954 12053 12181 12429 12215 11824 11598 11456 40% 
Qld 5895 6271 6377 7858 8220 8464 8882 9478 9765 7319 61% 
WA 3994 4107 4211 5147 5255 6099 6157 6114 6047 5900 122% 
SA 3535 3673 3782 4354 4276 4080 4021 4147 4293 4432 38% 
Tas 993 1018 1025 1357 1381 1384 1438 1440 1411 1407 37% 
NT 693 669 694 904 948 1018 1036 1078 1055 1091 101% 
State & Territory 38039 38208 39014 47636 48770 49983 50763 51502 51429 48473 
63% 
AFP 3217 3154 3060 2949 2963 2772 2667 2549 2601 2638 10% 
Australia 41256 41362 42074 50585 51733 52755 53430 54051 54030 51111 59% 
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Table 4: Australian Police Agencies Personnel Growth 2000/01–2009/10 
Agency 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Percentage 
NSW 16951 17735 18059 18921 18503 18570 19311 18822 19153 18955 12% 
Vic 11739 12148 12514 12764 13035 13445 13686 13755 13901 14380 22% 
Qld 10855 11193 11407 11701 11950 12370 12900 13570 14222 14406 33% 
WA 5945 5957 5954 6013 6172 6353 6523 7016 7474 7379 24% 
SA 4557 4681 4745 4698 4861 5088 5140 5333 5431 5565 22% 
Tas 1421 1453 1446 1482 1504 1560 1598 1613 1602 1573 11% 
NT 1120 1160 1157 1239 1340 1386 1391 1464 1587 1637 46% 
State & 
Territory 
52588 54327 55282 56818 57365 58772 60549 61573 63370 63895 22% 
AFP 2851 3051 3496 3653 3601 4178 4695 5257 5113 5833 105% 





Chart 4: Australian Police Agencies Personnel Growth 2000/01 – 2009/10 
 
 






















A3.2 AUSTRALIAN POLICING FUNDING STATISTICS 
Source:  
 State and Territory Police data derived from Report on Government Services (ROGS) 
Police Services as follows: 
1993/94–1995/96: ROGS 1997, 11A.2 Police Services Attachment, All jurisdiction 
data 
1996/97: ROGS 1998, 5A Police services attachment, 5A.2 Descriptors, 285 - 293 
1997/98: ROGS 1999, 6A Police services attachment, 6A.1 Descriptors, 410-425 
1998/99–2002/03: ROGS 2004, 5A Police services attachment, 5A.1 Descriptors.  
Note: 1988/89 NT Police data derived from ROGS 2003, 5A Police services 
attachment, 5A.1 Descriptors, Table 5A.8 
2003/04: ROGS 2005, 5A Police services attachment, 5A.1 Descriptors 
2004/05–2009/10: ROGS 2011, 6A Police services attachment, 6A.1 Descriptors 
 Australian Federal Police (AFP) data derived as follows: 
1993/94–2007/08: The First Thirty Years, chapter 7, Key Facts, 1979-2009 (Australian 
Federal Police 2009) 
2008/09 and 2009/10: AFP Annual Report 2010 (Australian Federal Police 2010) 
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Table 5: Australian Police Agencies Funding Growth 1993/94–2009/10 
 
Funding $m 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 
NSW 1032.63 1120.614 1180.445 1212.478 1263.324 1523.2 1448.6 
Vic 714.635 877.591 974.08 1007.541 976.468 1051.7 1067.7 
Qld 464.376 497.277 580.85 597.146 628.455 665.7 767.4 
WA 311.292 315.671 363.329 401.69 425.163 383.9 492.6 
SA 284.903 297.877 310.547 312.698 288.017 314.1 342.8 
Tas 72.055 76.522 83.464 90.089 95.333 100.6 100.7 
NT 63.278 68.323 76.949 79.666 89.457 91.1 99.7 
State & Territory 2943.169 3253.875 3569.664 3701.308 3766.217 4130.3 4319.5 
AFP 237.078 274.835 245.227 281.427 278.43 274.878 353.806 









2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Percentage 
NSW 1637.8 1597.3 1798.7 1885.3 1940.9 2092.4 2282.9 2448.3 2543.9 2707 162% 
Vic 1031.2 1097.9 1186.8 1251.6 1332.9 1469.1 1543.9 1619.2 1709.1 1842.5 158% 
Qld 815.1 882.9 936.8 1009.8 1053.3 1183.9 1279.6 1416.2 1526.9 1672.1 260% 
WA 488 538.4 570.5 616.7 676.9 718.3 791.9 861.2 958.2 1019 227% 
SA 365.7 393.6 426.5 428.5 480.8 517.7 543.9 595.8 643 659.8 132% 
Tas 104.1 114.3 120 114.5 138.8 150.5 162.5 177.2 186.6 202.1 180% 
NT 102.7 117.5 126.3 146.4 158.7 174.6 187.2 211.6 240.6 259.9 311% 
State & 
Territory 
4544.6 4741.9 5165.6 5452.8 5782.3 6306.5 6791.9 7329.5 7808.3 8362.4 184% 
AFP 370.603 408.584 584.19 676.259 801.95 909.27 1094.303 1252.694 1242.458 1345.338 467% 


































Table 6: Australian Police Agencies Funding Growth 1993/94–1999/2000 
Funding $m 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 Percentage 
NSW 1032.63 1120.614 1180.445 1212.478 1263.324 1523.2 1448.6 40% 
Vic 714.635 877.591 974.08 1007.541 976.468 1051.7 1067.7 49% 
Qld 464.376 497.277 580.85 597.146 628.455 665.7 767.4 65% 
WA 311.292 315.671 363.329 401.69 425.163 383.9 492.6 58% 
SA 284.903 297.877 310.547 312.698 288.017 314.1 342.8 20% 
Tas 72.055 76.522 83.464 90.089 95.333 100.6 100.7 40% 
NT 63.278 68.323 76.949 79.666 89.457 91.1 99.7 58% 
State & 
Territory 
2943.169 3253.875 3569.664 3701.308 3766.217 4130.3 4319.5 
47% 
AFP 237.078 274.835 245.227 281.427 278.43 274.878 353.806 49% 

































Table 7: Australian Police Agencies Funding 2000/01–2009/10 
Funding 
$m 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Percentage 
NSW 1637.8 1597.3 1798.7 1885.3 1940.9 2092.4 2282.9 2448.3 2543.9 2707 65% 
Vic 1031.2 1097.9 1186.8 1251.6 1332.9 1469.1 1543.9 1619.2 1709.1 1842.5 79% 
Qld 815.1 882.9 936.8 1009.8 1053.3 1183.9 1279.6 1416.2 1526.9 1672.1 105% 
WA 488 538.4 570.5 616.7 676.9 718.3 791.9 861.2 958.2 1019 109% 
SA 365.7 393.6 426.5 428.5 480.8 517.7 543.9 595.8 643 659.8 80% 
Tas 104.1 114.3 120 114.5 138.8 150.5 162.5 177.2 186.6 202.1 94% 
NT 102.7 117.5 126.3 146.4 158.7 174.6 187.2 211.6 240.6 259.9 153% 
State & 
Territory 
4544.6 4741.9 5165.6 5452.8 5782.3 6306.5 6791.9 7329.5 7808.3 8362.4 84% 
AFP 370.603 408.584 584.19 676.259 801.95 909.27 1094.303 1252.694 1242.458 1345.338 263% 




























A3.3 AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE STATISTICS 
Data concerning the AFP is based on the document “The First Thirty Years” (Australian 
Federal Police 2009) which provided at Chapter 7: Key Facts, 1979-2009.  This chapter 
provides personnel statistics collected in a uniform manner for the period.  However, they 
also include Protective Services staff figures which are separated in most of the related 
tables.  This approach was taken because the function of protective services is inconsistent 
with the definition of policing used in the research. 
It should be noted between 1984 and 2002 the protective services function was undertaken 
by a separate federal agency and personnel were transferred from the AFP in 1984 to the 
agency, Australian Protective Services (APS). Later the APS was disestablished and function 
was returned to the AFP in 2002 along with the staff.  It should be noted some figures 
changed substantially concerning AFP personnel totals and this is explained by those 
structural changes. 
Police personnel (excluding protective services) categories for the AFP after 1993 were able 
to be divided between ACT and National personnel because the ROGS provided both 
personnel and funding data from then on.  In respect to AFP personnel categories, by 
subtracting the ACT total in the ROGS from the total AFP total in The First Thirty Years 
document, this enabled the construction of the respective tables and charts.  
There was no data provided for 1981-82 in the AFP document concerning personnel.  The 
total used – 2702, represents AFP sworn police officers which was extracted from the 1984 
Australian Year Book (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1984 234). 
The AFP funding data is provided from The First Thirty Years, Chapter 7: Key Facts, 1979-
2009 (Australian Federal Police 2009). 
AFP funding data for the periods 2008-09 and 2009-10 was obtained from the 2010 AFP 
Annual Report (Australian Federal Police 2010). 
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Table 8: AFP Personnel Components 1980/81–2009/10 
Category 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90  
Sworn  2020   2094 2033 2838 2568 2642 2713 2532 2401  
Support 375   396 434 470 545 544 655 656 717  
Total  2395 2702 2490 2467 3308 3113 3186 3368 3188 3118  
Protective Services 1393   833 878              
Combined Total  3788   3323 3345 3308 3113 3186 3368 3188 3118  
ACT Policing                      
National Policing                      
 
Category 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 
Sworn  2543 2453 2394 2302 2291 2117 2027 1931 1887 1976 2032 
Support 674 701 666 647 672 655 640 618 714 662 819 
Total  3217 3154 3060 2949 2963 2772 2667 2549 2601 2638 2851 
Protective Services                       
Combined Total 3217 3154 3060 2949 2963 2772 2667 2549 2601 2638 2851 
ACT Policing       729 723 723 723 728 730 720 775 




Category 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Percentage 
Sworn 2043 2297 2326 2310 2396 2501 2855 2842 3200 58% 
Support 1008 1199 1327 1291 1782 2194 2402 2271 2633 602% 
Total  3051 3496 3653 3601 4178 4695 5257 5113 5833 144% 
Protective Services     1145 1206 1257 1341 1341 1219 1067 -23% 
Combined Total 3051 3496 4798 4807 5435 6036 6598 6332 6900 82% 
ACT Policing 782 799 809 802 815 833 882 945 935 28% 














































































































































































































Table 9: AFP Personnel Components Growth 1990/91–1999/2000 
 
  1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 Percentage 
Total Personnel 3217 3154 3060 2949 2963 2772 2667 2549 2601 2638 -18% 
ACT Policing       729 723 723 723 728 730 720 -1% 
























Table 10: AFP Personnel Components Growth 2001/02–2009/10 
 
 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Percentage 
Total Personnel 2851 3051 3496 3653 3601 4178 4695 5257 5113 5833 105% 
ACT Policing 775 782 799 809 802 815 833 882 945 935 21% 















2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Total Personnel ACT Policing National Policing
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A3.4 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS 
1. Source of Australian Police Agencies funding comparison — data derived from Table 
5. 
2. Source of Personnel Growth — data derived from Table 1.  
3. Source of Consumer Price Index (CPI) — data have been derived from the 1301.0 
Australian Year Book Series from ABS series available from 
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/home/year+book+products?ope
ndocument#from-banner=LNTable 1and  
4. Source of Population statistics — data derived from two ABS series; 3101.0 
Australian Demographic Statistics and 3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population 
Statistics, 2008, both available from http://www.abs.gov.au/ 
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AFP $M 237.08 274.84 245.23 281.43 278.43 274.88 353.81 370.6 408.58 584.19 676.26 801.95 909.27 1094.3 1252.7 1242.5 1345.3






















































Table 11: Comparison of Growth of CPI, Population, AFP Personnel and State and Territory Personnel 1981–2010 
Year CPI percentage Population State & Territory Police Personnel AFP Personnel 
1981 10 14807370 29666 2395 
1982 10.4 15054117 29809 2702 
1983 12.5 15288891 30926 2490 
1984 8.5 15483496 31448 2467 
1985 5.6 15677282 31771 3308 
1986 11.5 15900566 32702 3113 
1987 13.9 16138769 34100 3186 
1988 11.9 16394641 35162 3368 
1989 12.8 16687082 36422 3188 
1990 7.4 16936723 36825 3118 
1991 5.3 17169768 38039 3217 
1992 2 17387023 38208 3154 
1993 1 17581284 39014 3060 
1994 1.8 17759999 47636 2949 
1995 3.2 17951481 48770 2963 
1996 4.2 18196054 49983 2772 
1997 1.3 18420320 50763 2667 
1998 0 18609115 51502 2549 
1999 1.2 18814276 51429 2601 
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Year CPI percentage Population State & Territory Police Personnel AFP Personnel 
2000 2.4 19038338 48473 2638 
2001 6 19272644 52588 2851 
2002 2.9 19533972 54327 3051 
2003 3.1 19770963 55282 3496 
2004 2.4 20011882 56818 3653 
2005 2.4 20252132 57365 3601 
2006 3.1 20544064 58772 4178 
2007 3 20848760 60549 4695 
2008 3.4 21180632 61573 5257 
2009 3.1 21951700 63370 5113 
2010 2.3 22299800 63895 5833 
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CPI increase 46.25% 




Table 12: Comparison of growth for Population, Police Personnel and Funding Growth 2000/01–2009/10 
 
Percentage Increase NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT AFP Australia 
Population  12 16 26 22 10 8 17 17 17 
Personnel 12 22 33 24 22 11 46 105 26 












NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT AFP Australia
Population % 12 16 26 22 10 8 17 17 17
Personnel % 12 22 33 24 22 11 46 105 26




















The history of colonial policing has not been widely researched and there are only a 
few works that trace the development of policing in the Australian colonies from 
first settlement to Federation.  Bryett (Bryett, Harison and Shaw 1994), Sturma 
(Sturma 1987), Milte and Weber (Milte and Weber 1977) provide insight into this 
period, and in particular they deal with the organisation and function of police in 
this 113 year period.  Consideration of colonial policing is important as many of its 
characteristics were transferred to policing at Federation and are still found in 
contemporary Australian policing. 
Policing in Australia began with the first settlement by the British in 1788 
and the establishment of the penal settlement at Botany Bay, which later moved to 
Port Jackson or what is now known as Sydney.  Martial law was the basis of policing 
and this existed for some time with the military units garrisoned in the colony being 
the primary agents of the government for the maintenance of order and law 
enforcement.  The fear of a convict rebellion (Sturma 1987, 18), was for the 
formative years of settlement a matter which underpinned the provision of policing 
and how it was structured.  Some 165,000 convicts were transported to the 
Australian colonies from 1788 to 1868 and it was only during the gold rushes 
between 1851 and 1871 that significant numbers of free settlers arrived.  Some 
370,000 immigrants arrived as gold miners and settlers in that twenty year period, 
which diluted the convict heritage of the colonies.  Prior to 1851 convicts and ex-
convicts formed a large percentage of the population and the fear of this group by 
government and free-settlers was tangible (Milte and Weber 1977, 23).  
From the one colony of New South Wales (NSW) in 1788, new colonies 
developed as exploration and new settlements were established along the 
continental coast and on the island of Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania).  By the time 
of the end of colonial rule in 1901 there were six well established and politically 
mature colonies, all with a central system of policing and a single police force. 
There have been three stages to the development of policing in colonial 
Australia. The first stage involved policing by the military in New South Wales.  The 
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second stage was policing became a civil responsibility and was initially based on 
the Irish Constabulary model, and the last stage saw policing moved from the Irish 
model to Peel’s civilian model and being centralised.  This later policing model was 
what was taken by the new States to Federation.   
Perhaps the most important and lasting characteristics of colonial policing is 
the fact that from the first European settlement, policing has been considered one 
of the central responsibilities of government.  This position has not changed over 
time and remains a key characteristic of the contemporary Australian policing 
model.   
B.2 Colonial Development 
The three stages in the development of colonial policing are considered separately 
and they provide an interesting insight into how Australian policing developed to 
Federation in 1901.  However, before dealing with policing a brief outline of the 
political development of the colonies sets the political environment that policing 
was nurtured.   
Five new colonies were established after the first settlement and three of 
those were established as a result of exploration by the NSW government along the 
east coast.  Initially a settlement was attempted at Port Phillip Bay (Victoria) in 
1803, this failed and the settlers moved to Hobart on Van Diemen’s Land 
(Tasmania) and settled there in 1804.  A settlement at Moreton Bay (Queensland) 
was established in 1824, which later moved to Brisbane.  Victoria was resettled in 
two places, firstly in 1834 at Portland and then in 1835 at the mouth of the Yarra 
River in Port Philip Bay (Melbourne). Eventually these three NSW settlements 
became colonies in their own right: Victoria 1851; Van Diemen’s Land was renamed 
Tasmania and became independent in 1856; and Queensland in 1859.  Two other 
colonies were established on the Australian continent, away from NSW as 
independent British colonies: Western Australia in 1829 and South Australia in 
1836.  Thus, by 1859 there were six independent British colonies on the Australian 
continent, all which had political and government structures based on Westminster. 
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The development of policing after 1859 was also influenced by the changes 
made in Britain and these were influential on the development of policing in the 
Australian colonies (Milte and Weber 1977, 22–32, Bryett, Harison, and Shaw 1994, 
77–79). 
B.3 Martial Law and the First Settlement 
The military units that accompanied the First Fleet to New South Wales were 
primarily responsible for regulating the convict population at sea then once they 
landed, maintain law and order (inclusive of regulating convicts) in the new colony.  
Initially a military governor had absolute power over the colony and this was later 
tempered with a judicial system based on the laws of England.  During this short 
period, there were no professional police or force, with the military taking 
responsibility until civilianisation became the central feature in the next stage of 
colonial policing (Bryett, Harison and Shaw 1994, 69–71). 
B.4 Policing the Early Colonies 
The military only played a small role in policing before successive Governors of NSW 
established police organisations.  Initially in 1989 Governor Phillip created positions 
for constables and nightwatchmen “to patrol the settlement during the night” 
(Milte and Weber 1977, 22).  Later, governors in 1895 (Hunter), 1801 (King) and 
1810 (Macquarie) established more police positions and provided a superintendent 
to manage the police (Milte and Weber 1977, 22–23).  As settlement expanded out 
of Sydney and along the east coast, the policing model used by governments was 
based on the Irish Constabulary, a paramilitary model that obviously suited the 
transition to civilian rule.  This model provided the steel to cope with regulation of 
the substantial number of convicts and ex-conflicts along with the ability to deal 
with the volatile issues along the expanding frontiers (Milte and Weber 1977, 22–
23; Sturma 1987, 20-28; Moir 2004, 59–60).  Perhaps the perceived divide between 
the classes that made up the population allowed the Irish approach to prosper as 
fear of aboriginal and civil insurrection appeared to be a powerful threat envisaged 
by the administrators of the colonies in the formative years of settlement.  
However, the great policing reforms emanating out of Westminster by the Home 
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Secretary Robert Peel in 1829, did eventually trickle down and changed how 
policing was undertaken in the colonies. 
From a government perspective the first major reform in policing came in 
1810, when Governor Macquarie established a full-time police force with a 
superintendent as the head.  “This provided civilian control of the force under a 
single head for the first time” (Milte and Weber 1977, 22).  The quality of policing 
was not always good and a range of changes occurred in order to improve the 
police of which recruiting experienced officers from England and Ireland was 
pivotal.  As mentioned previously, the model of policing was very much based on 
the Irish Constabulary with mounted police units formed to police the outer areas 
and along the expanding frontier, and able to provide appropriate responses in 
times of unrest.   
A significant development for colonial policing at this time, which continues 
to this day, was providing a statutory basis for the establishment and control of 
police.  This began with the enactment of first police legislation in Australia, the 
Sydney Police Act 1833.  Later this legislation was expanded to provide policing 
outside of the Sydney area, with the enactment of the Police Act 1838 No 6a.  
According to the Act’s preamble, the purpose of this legislation was to authorise 
police forces to be established “in the towns of Parramatta Windsor Maitland 
Bathurst and other Towns”.  This was the basic police legislation for settlements in 
other parts of the colony that later became colonies in their own right.   
After 1829 with the Peel reforms in Britain increasing the civil nature of 
policing vis-à-vis paramilitary Irish Constabulary approach, there was an option to 
follow “current British thinking” (Milte and Weber 1977, 23).  However this was not 
taken up for many years because of the perceived threats faced by the government 
from civilian unrest.  The fear of convict insurrection, native resistance to expansion 
of settlement and bushrangers made the existing model more feasible.  It was only 
in the 1850s when the approach to policing started to move away from the Irish 
model and more towards the tenets of Peel’s police (Sturma 1987, 27–28). 
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By the beginning of the next period of colonial policing in 1860, the 
acceptance of the Peel policing model and its application in the colonies was 
becoming a topic of discussion and action by governments.  
B.4.1 Providing a Statutory Base for Colonial Policing 
By 1860 the political and government structure of the colonies was developing and 
each colony enjoyed a great deal of self-government and local control.   An 
important part of the structure of government was the operation of policing that 
was seen as a government responsibility.  This view of policing was reflected in the 
police legislation that provided the rudimentary structure through the formal 
established of the police forces and governance being vested in a commissioner 
(Bryett, Harison, and Shaw 1994, 77–79).  By 1860 the main features of policing, 
emanating from this legislative approach, were: 
1. The Police Force and the powers of officers were provided by law. 
2. A Commissioner or Superintendent was responsible for the management of 
the force, including detailing the functions performed by officers. 
3. Policing was a full-time career.  
4. Policing was centralised except for Tasmania, which was highly 
decentralised.  In 1898, all the Tasmanian police forces were amalgamated 
into one police force under the control of the colonial government. 
5. There were no private police. 
6. The colonial governments monopolised policing and the Commissioner was 
responsible to the executive government through the Governor of the 
colony. 




Figure 1: Colonial Police Legislation 
Colony Colonial Police Legislation 
New South Wales Sydney Police Act 1833 
Police Act 1838 No 6a  
Police Regulation Act 1862 No 6a  
South Australia Police Ordinance 1839 
Police Act 1870 
Western Australia Police Ordinance (12 VICT. No.20) - 1848  
Police Amendment (23 Vict. No. 5) - 1859 
Police Ordinance 1861 (25 VICT. No. 20) - 1861 
The Police Act 1892 (55 VICT. No.  27) 
Victoria Police Act 1853  
NSW Police Act 1838 No 6a  
Police Force Act 1854  
Police Regulation Statute 1873  
Police Regulation Act 1890  
Queensland Police Act 1863 
Tasmania The Police Act, 1865 (29 VIC NO 10)  
Police Regulation Act 1865 (29 VIC NO 9)  
Police Regulation Act 1898 (62 VIC NO 48 
 
B.5 Evolving Colonial Policing Post 1860 
The main change to colonial policing after 1860 was the move away from the Irish 
Constabulary model and embracing the Peel doctrine for policing.  Milte attributes 
the passing of Australia’s first police act, the Sydney Police Act in 1833, to have 
been “inspired” by Peel’s police reform of 1829 (Milte and Weber 1977, 23).  The 
Act was the foundation act for all policing in the colonies. 
Peel’s police reforms were based on the philosophy policing needed to be 
undertaken with the consent of the community and not enforced upon it.  The key 
dimensions of the Peel model was the police force was to be established by 
legislation and the functions were to be governed by the law and underpinned by 
the notion of police enforcing the law in an impartial manner (Lenz and Chaires 
2007).  Governance provisions provided the police became accountable to the 
community and the government.  The foundation of this approach was Peel’s nine 
principles of law enforcement.  
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Figure 2:  Peels Principles of Law Enforcement 
1. The basic mission for whom the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. 
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon the 
public approval of police actions. 
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary 
observation of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the 
public. 
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes 
proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force. 
5. Police seek and preserve public favor not by catering to public opinion, but 
by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law. 
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of 
the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice, 
and warning is found to be insufficient. 
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives 
reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public 
are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to 
give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent upon every citizen in 
the interests of community welfare and existence. 
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions, and 
never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary. 
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the 
visible evidence of police action in dealing with it. 
 
As the principles attest, policing was to be delivered with the consent and 
cooperation of the community and not be delivered on the whim of the 
government.  The contrast between the paramilitary Irish model originally practiced 
in Australia, and Peel’s model was significant.  The most important aspect of the 
principles for colonial policing at the time was the fifth, which became part of 
colonial police legislation and continues to be part of current Australian police 
legislation.  The principle of police being impartial is included in every Oath of Office 
in the respective Acts and is the basis of the law that underpins police – police are 
primarily independent, which ensures in theory they are impartial. 
The modern colonial police forces that were taken to Federation had by that 
time established the characteristics of being government services that employed 
professional career based officers and subscribed to a doctrine based upon Peel’s 
principles (Bryett, Harison, and Shaw 1994, 86).   
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The nature of colonial policing in 1901, that formed the foundation for 
Australian policing was characterised by a number of organisational and function 
features, many that continue on in the present State police agencies.  These 
features have been derived from analysing the pre-Federation colonial legislation of 
the six colonies, in the late 1890s: 
1. Policing was monopolised by State governments and no local government or 
private police operated. 
2. Policing was centralised and each State had only one police force. 
3. The organisation and function of policing was based upon one police statute 
and the relevant common law derived from England. 
4. Policing was a profession, characterised by the Peelian tenets of impartiality, 
















Statutory provisions for functions of Australian police agencies 




Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) section 8  
(1) The functions of the Australian Federal Police are:  
(a) subject to subsection (1A), the provision of police services 
in relation to the Australian Capital Territory; and  
(aa) the provision of police services in relation to the Jervis 
Bay Territory; and  
(b) the provision of police services in relation to:  
   (i) laws of the Commonwealth;  
   (ii) property of the Commonwealth (including 
Commonwealth places) and property of authorities of the 
Commonwealth; and  
    (iii) the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests; and  





Police Act 1990 (NSW) section 6  
Mission and functions of NSW Police Force  
(1) The mission of the NSW Police Force is to work with the 
community to reduce violence, crime and fear.  
(2) The NSW Police Force has the following functions:  
     (a) to provide police services for New South Wales,  
     (b) to exercise any other function conferred on it by or under 
this or any other Act,  
     (c) to do anything necessary for, or incidental to, the exercise 
of its functions.  
(3) In this section:  
"police services" includes:  
(a) services by way of prevention and detection of crime, and  
(b) the protection of persons from injury or death, and property 
from damage, whether arising from criminal acts or in any other 
way, and  
(c) the provision of essential services in emergencies, and  
(d) any other service prescribed by the regulations.  
Northern 
Territory 
Police Administration Act (NT) section 5 
(2) The core functions of the Police Force are:  
(a) to uphold the law and maintain social order; and  
(b) to protect life and property; and  
(c) to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute offences; 
(d) to manage road safety education and enforcement 
measures; and  
(e) to manage the provision of services in emergencies.  
 
Queensland Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) section 2.3  
2.3 Functions of service  
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The functions of the police service are—  
(a) the preservation of peace and good order—  
(i) in all areas of the State; and  
(ii) in all areas outside the State where the laws of the State 
may lawfully be applied, when occasion demands;  
(b) the protection of all communities in the State and all 
members thereof—  
(i) from unlawful disruption of peace and good order that 
results, or is likely to result, from – 
(A) actions of criminal offenders;  
(B) actions or omissions of other persons;  
(ii) from commission of offences against the law generally;  
(c) the prevention of crime;  
(d) the detection of offenders and bringing of offenders to 
justice;  
(e) the upholding of the law generally;  
(f) the administration, in a responsible, fair and efficient manner 
and subject to due process of law and directions of the 
commissioner, of—  
(i) the provisions of the Criminal Code;  
(ii) the provisions of all other Acts or laws for the time being 
committed to the responsibility of the service;  
(iii) the powers, duties and discretions prescribed for officers 
by any Act;  
(g) the provision of the services, and the rendering of help 
reasonably sought, in an emergency or otherwise, as are—  
(i) required of officers under any Act or law or the reasonable 
expectations of the community; or  





Police Act 1998 (SA) section 5  
The purpose of S.A. Police is to reassure and protect the 
community in relation to crime and disorder by the provision of 
services to—  
(a) uphold the law; and  
(b) preserve the peace; and  
(c) prevent crime; and  
(d) assist the public in emergency situations; and  
(e) co-ordinate and manage responses to emergencies; and  
(f) regulate road use and prevent vehicle collisions.  
Tasmania No specific provisions for functions 
 





















Police related Commonwealth legislation 1980–2010 
1980–85 Royal Commissions: Costigan, Stewart and Hope identify criminal 
activity affecting the Commonwealth and establish the need for 
additional Commonwealth criminal offences and related 
investigation powers i.e. listening devices and telephone 
interception. 
1990–93 Commonwealth and States establish a committee to develop a 
national ‘model’ criminal code. 
1. Commonwealth Criminal Code 
2. Crimes Act Amendments 
1994 Commonwealth Parliament uses its external affairs power to 
override a State criminal law – Tasmania’s law against sodomy. 
1995 Criminal Code Act passed and supersedes Crime Act 1914 as main 
piece of Commonwealth criminal law.  Expands the scope and 
range of Commonwealth criminal law extensively. 
2001 States refer corporation’s law to Commonwealth Parliament. 
2002–10 April 2002 Leaders Summit on terrorism and multi-jurisdictional 
crime ratifies the expansion of Commonwealth criminal law and 
jurisdiction of Commonwealth police.  
First Commonwealth criminal offences and criminal procedures 
concerning terrorism legislated as a result of States referring this 
area of criminal law to Commonwealth.  State also refer powers 
concerning organised crime empowering new criminal laws and 
establishment of ACC. 
Federal police authorised to investigate State crimes incidental to 
Commonwealth investigations. 
Commonwealth use express incidental and implied incidental 
powers to legislate for additional Commonwealth crimes in areas 
concerning: 
1. Crimes against humanity 
2. Cybercrime 











1. Communique from Leaders Forum 4 April 2002 
2. Agreement 5 April 2002 








2.  Agreement of 5 April 2002 
 
COMMONWEALTH AND STATES AND TERRITORIES AGREEMENT ON TERRORISM 
AND MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL CRIME, 5 APRIL 2002 
The Prime Minister and State and Territory Leaders agreed that a new national 
framework is needed to meet the new challenges of combatting terrorism and 
multi-jurisdictional crime.  The attacks in the United States on 11 September last 
year indicated that previous assumptions about the nature and potential scale of 
terrorism are no longer valid. In addition, they noted that international and 
organised criminal groups did not respect state or national borders, and their 
activities could also result in major harm to all Australians. They recognised the 
importance of effective cooperation between the jurisdictions, and the need to 
build on arrangements that are currently in place in adding elements to national 
arrangements that will respond quickly and effectively to these challenges.  
 
In relation to terrorism, Leaders agreed: 
1. The Commonwealth to have responsibility for "national terrorist situations", to 
include attacks on Commonwealth targets, multi-jurisdictional attacks, threats 
against civil aviation and those involving chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear materials.  
 
2. The Commonwealth will consult and seek the agreement of affected States and 
Territories before a national terrorist situation is declared and States and 
Territories agree not to withhold unreasonably such agreement.  
 
3. To take whatever action is necessary to ensure that terrorists can be prosecuted 
under the criminal law, including a reference of power of specific, jointly agreed 
legislation, including roll back provisions to ensure that the new Commonwealth 
law does not override State law where that is not intended and to come into 
effect by 31 October 2002. The Commonwealth will have power to amend the 
new Commonwealth legislation in accordance with provisions similar to those 
which apply under Corporations arrangements. Any amendment based on the 
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referred power will require consultation with and agreement of States and 
Territories, and this requirement to be contained in the legislation.  
 
That all jurisdictions will review their legislation and counter-terrorism 
arrangements to make sure that they are sufficiently strong. 
 
4. That the Commonwealth and States and Territories will continue to: 
 
(i) improve Australia’s anti-terrorist intelligence capacity and to develop effective 
means for sharing intelligence. 
 
(iii) significantly upgrade the central coordination capacity so that the 
operational arms of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories can 
obtain the information and strategic advice necessary to respond rapidly 
and effectively. 
 
6. The existing Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State 
Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) will also be reconstituted as 
the National Counter-Terrorism Committee with a broader mandate to cover 
prevention and consequence management issues and with Ministerial oversight 
arrangements.  
 




7. To strengthen the fight against organised crime it is agreed to replace the 
National Crime Authority (NCA) with an Australian Crime Commission (ACC) that 
builds on the important features of the NCA for effective national law enforcement 
operation in partnerships with State and Territory police forces whilst removing the 
current barriers to its effectiveness. 
 
8. The ACC to be focussed on criminal intelligence collection and establishment of 
national intelligence priorities.  
 
9. The ACC to have access to taskforce investigative capability to give effect to its 
intelligence functions and to support its overall operations. The ACC to include 
the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments and the Australian Bureau of Criminal 
Intelligence. 
 
10. The Board of the ACC to include representatives from all States and Territories. 
Ministerial oversight will be retained by having the Board report to an 
Intergovernmental Committee of State and Commonwealth Ministers. 
 
11. To streamline the process for obtaining investigation references. 
 
12. The ACC will retain the capacity to use coercive powers and to investigate 
criminal activity of national significance; 
 
13. Other details to be settled by mutual agreement with the new body to come 
into operation by 31 December 2002.   
 
IN RELATION TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL 




15. To reform the laws relating to money laundering, including a possible reference 
of powers to the Commonwealth if necessary, for effective offences. 
 
16. To legislate through model laws for all jurisdictions and mutual recognition for a 
national set of powers for cross-border investigations covering controlled 
operations and assumed identities legislation; electronic surveillance devices; 
and witness anonymity. Legislation to be settled within 12 months. 
 
17. To legislate and develop administrative arrangements to allow investigations by 
the Australian Federal police into State offences incidental to multi-
jurisdictional crime. 
 
18. To modernise the criminal law by legislating in the priority areas of model 
forensic procedures (during 2002), model computer offences (during 2002), 
model serious drug offences (during 2003). 
 
19. To ensure adequate access to radio-frequency spectrum for an effective inter-
operability between national security, police and emergency services agencies. 
 
20. To enhance capacity in each jurisdiction for the collection and processing of 
samples to create DNA profiles, and the uploading of profiles onto the national 
DNA database. 
 
21. To undertake as a matter of priority work in the following areas of law 
enforcement:  control over the illegal importation of criminal contraband 
specifically illicit drugs and firearms; extradition between States; recognition of 
expert evidence (such as drug analysis certificates); firearms trafficking; identity 
fraud; vehicle rebirthing; gangs; and cybercrime. The purpose of this work is to 
ensure elimination of administrative and legal barriers in pursuit of criminals 
operating in more than one jurisdiction.  
295 
 





AGREEMENT ON COUNTER-TERRORISM LAWS 
25 June 2004  
This agreement is entered into on 25 June 2004 by:  
The Commonwealth of Australia  
The State of New South Wales  
The State of Victoria  
The State of Queensland  
The State of Western Australia  
The State of South Australia  
The State of Tasmania  
The Australian Capital Territory  




1. The Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers agreed on 5 April 2002 to take 
whatever action is necessary to ensure that terrorists can be prosecuted under the 
criminal law, including a reference of power so that the Commonwealth may enact 
specific, jointly-agreed legislation. It was agreed that the new Commonwealth 
legislation will incorporate roll back provisions to ensure that it does not override State 
or Territory law where that is not intended, and that the Commonwealth will have power 
to amend the new legislation in accordance with provisions similar to those which apply 
under Corporations arrangements. It was further agreed that any amendment based on 
the referred power will require consultation with, and agreement of, States and 
Territories, and that this will be contained in the legislation.  
2. The Commonwealth subsequently enacted legislation designed to enhance Australia’s 
capacity to deal with terrorists, including certain Federal offences contained in Part 5.3 
of the Commonwealth Criminal Code.  
3. The parties consider it appropriate to facilitate comprehensive national application of 
those offences by means of State references in accordance with paragraph 51 (xxxvii) of 
the Commonwealth Constitution.  
4. The parties consider it appropriate to facilitate agreement in relation to amendment of 
those offences from time to time by the Commonwealth Parliament by means of this 
agreement.  
5. The parties also consider it appropriate to facilitate agreement in relation to 
regulations specifying terrorist organisations for the purposes of Part 5.3 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code by means of this agreement.  
6. This agreement sets out a process, consistent with undertakings given to the States 
and Territories by the Commonwealth, for obtaining the States’ and Territories’ 
agreement to amendments and regulations which may be proposed.  
The parties agree:  
Part 1 Preliminary  
1.1 Definitions  
(1) In this agreement:  
Commonwealth means the Commonwealth of Australia;  
express amendment means the direct amendment of the text of the legislation by 
Commonwealth Acts, but does not include the enactment by a Commonwealth Act of a 
provision that has or will have substantive effect other than as part of the text of the 
legislation;  
initiate, in relation to the making of legislation, includes introduction in the 
Commonwealth Parliament and other processes leading to enactment;  
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party means the Commonwealth, or a referring State or a Territory that is a party to this 
agreement;  
referring State means a State which:-  
(a) in accordance with paragraph 51 (xxxvii) of the Commonwealth Constitution, has 
referred matters to the Commonwealth Parliament sufficient to enable the following 
legislation to extend, of its own force, to the State:  
(i) Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, as enacted by the Commonwealth 
Parliament on 27 May 2003, and  
(ii) express amendments to Chapter 2 and Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code 
after that date, and  
(b) has not withdrawn either or both of the referred matters covered by subparagraphs 
(a) (i) and (ii);  
State means a State of the Commonwealth; and  
Territory means the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory.  
(2) In this agreement, a reference to an Act, whether of the Commonwealth or a State, 
includes a reference to:  
(a) that Act as amended and in force for the time being; and  
(b) an Act passed in substitution for the Act.  
Part 2 Effect and operation of agreement  
2.1 Commencement  
This agreement comes into operation when it has been signed on behalf of all parties. 
2.2 Amendment of Agreement  
This agreement may be varied only by the unanimous decision of the parties. 
Part 3 Legislation  
Division 1 Preliminary  
3.1 Purpose of this Part  
(1) The purpose of this Part is to preserve and promote the legislative scheme that the 
parties are enacting for the punishment of persons participating in terrorism or terrorist 
acts.  
(2) This Part establishes procedures for consultation and agreement between the parties 
before:  
(a) the enactment of any legislation that would amend or alter Chapter 2 or Part 5.3 of 
the Commonwealth Criminal Code (to the extent that amendments of Chapter 2 are 
299 
 
intended to apply only to Part 5.3, and not to be of general application to 
Commonwealth offences); and  
(b) the making of any regulation specifying a terrorist organisation for the purposes of 
Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code.  
[Note: Limitation to amendments of Chapter 2 that would apply only to Part 5.3 reflects 100.8 of the 
Criminal Code as amended by the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003.]  
3.2 Nature of the legislative scheme  
The legislative scheme agreed to by the parties involves:  
(a) the enactment by State Parliaments of legislation referring certain matters to the 
Commonwealth Parliament in accordance with paragraph 51 (xxxvii) of the 
Constitution; and  
(b) the re-enactment by the Commonwealth Parliament of Part 5.3 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code, partly in reliance on the State referrals mentioned in 
paragraph (a); and  
(c) the possible amendment from time to time of Chapter 2 and Part 5.3 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code in accordance with this agreement.  
Division 2 Alterations of Chapter 2 and Part 5.3 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code  
3.3 Commonwealth legislation relating to Chapter 2 and Part 5.3 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code  
(1) Except as provided by subclause (2), the Commonwealth will not introduce a Bill or 
make subordinate legislation that would repeal or amend Chapter 2 or Part 5.3 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code unless, before its introduction or making:  
(a) the other parties have been consulted about it; and  
 (b) except as provided by subclause (3), a majority of the other parties, including at 
least four States, have approved it.  
[Note: For the avoidance of doubt, a regulation specifying a terrorist organisation for the purposes 
of Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code as amended by the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 
is not covered by this provision; a regulation made for the purpose of section 100.7 of the Criminal 
Code is taken to be covered by this provision.]  
(2) If a Bill contains amendments to Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code that 
the Prime Minister nominates as urgent amendments, the Commonwealth may introduce 
the Bill before the requirements set out in subclause (1) are fulfilled but must not seek 
the making of the amendments unless those requirements are fulfilled.  
(3) Subclause (1) applies to a Bill or subordinate legislation that repeals or amends 
Chapter 2 only to the extent that the repeal or amendment applies only to Part 5.3.  




(5) The Commonwealth is not obliged to introduce, make or support any legislation, 
including subordinate legislation, or to proceed with any legislative proposal, including a 
proposal relating to subordinate legislation, with which it does not concur.  
(6) If approval is sought for amendments to a Bill that is at that time before the 
Commonwealth Parliament, the Commonwealth will use its best endeavours to give the 
other parties a reasonable time to consider and to comment on the proposed 
amendments.  
(7) If approval is sought for amendments to a Bill that is at that time before the 
Commonwealth Parliament, then the other parties will use their best endeavours to 
respond within a time frame nominated by the Commonwealth.  
(8) Approval for amendments must be sought, and responses from other parties must be 
provided, through the Prime Minister and Premiers and Chief Ministers.  
Division 3 Regulations specifying terrorist organisations for 
the purposes of Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code  
3.4 Consultation on regulations specifying terrorist organisations  
(1) Before making a regulation specifying a terrorist organisation for the purposes of 
Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, the Commonwealth will consult the other 
parties about it.  
(2) If a majority of the other parties object to the making of a regulation specifying a 
terrorist organisation within a time frame nominated by the Commonwealth and provide 
reasons for their objections, the Commonwealth will not make the regulation at that 
time.  
(3) The Commonwealth will provide the other parties with the text of the proposed 
regulation and will use its best endeavours to give the other parties a reasonable time to 
consider and to comment on the proposed regulation.  
(4) The Commonwealth will also provide the other parties with a written brief on the 
terrorist-related activities of the organisation to be specified by the regulation and offer 
the other parties an oral briefing by the Director-General of Security.  
(5) The other parties will use their best endeavours to respond within a time frame 
nominated by the Commonwealth.  
(6) Approval for regulations specifying terrorist organisations must be sought, and 
responses from other parties must be provided, through the Prime Minister and Premiers 
and Chief Ministers.  
Part 4 Ceasing to be a party  
4.1 State or Territory ceasing to be a party  
301 
 
(1) The failure of a State or Territory to remain a party does not terminate this 
agreement.  
(2) If a State or Territory ceases to be a party, this agreement will remain in force in 
relation to the remaining parties.  
(3) If a State or Territory ceases to be a party, the Commonwealth will, within three 
months, convene a meeting of the remaining parties for the purpose of negotiating such 
variations to this agreement as are necessary or convenient to take account of that fact 
(including variations relating to the voting arrangements).  
Signed for and on behalf of each of the parties by:  
The Honourable John Winston Howard MP (Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of 
Australia)  
The Honourable Robert John Carr MP (Premier of New South Wales)  
The Honourable Stephen Phillip Bracks MP (Premier of Victoria)  
The Honourable Peter Beattie MP (Premier of Queensland)  
The Honourable Michael Rann MP (Premier of South Australia)  
The Honorable Dr Geoff Ian Gallop MLA (Premier of Western Australia)  
The Honourable Paul Lennon MHA (Premier of Tasmania)  
Jonathon Donald Stanhope MLA (Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory)  
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